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1. Introduction and summary
The AnnuaI Economic Review 1981-82 presents a detaiLed study of the
Communityts economic situation as 1982 approaches. The document, organ-ized around the major areas of macno-economic analysis, discusses in turn
and in depth economic cycLes, the baLance of payments, prices and costs,
monetary and exchange rate poIicies, budgetary poL.icies and empLoyment.This year, speciaL attention is paid to sectoraL probLems, the roIe and
scaLe of subsidies and the different types of investment incentive in the
Member States.
The Community's economjc outtunn was particuLanLy poor jn 1981,
The recession which began in 1980 contjnued this year, and if there was
evjdence of something of a recovery/ its pace was very moderate. Chapter 2
of this Review shows that the crisis now affect'ing Europe has many points
of simitarity with the crises of 1974-75. The reLative magnitude of the
1973 and 1979/80 oiL shocks is simiLar and the length of the recess'ion, one
yea?, appreciabLy the same. However, the present recession, if Less sharp
than the first, has been fotLowed by an upturn far Less vigorous than that
of 1976.
The other major industria[ized countries of the OECD area have
by contrast suffered Less severe[y than the European Commun'ity fnom the
nise in the pnjce of energy products. Tak'ing the annuaL average, the growth
of GDP
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reaI terms in the United States has been pos.itive th.is year, and
Japan rema'ined steady, mainLy due to the strength of her exports.
The Community is therefore in a reIativeLy more difficuLt position than
the other major industriaIized countries, especiaILy since in 1981 LittLe
progness was made in correcting its externat disequiLibrjum, 'in partjcuIar
its balance of payments on cunrent account, whjLe Japan and the United
States recorded a definite current account improvement. The Community
suffered a substantia[ deterioration in its tenms of trade which was not
offset to any extent by an improvement in its trade batance in volume tenms.
Faced wjth a heavy cunrent account deficit, it was compeL[ed to encourage
net inftows of [ongtermcapital, by pubLic bonrowing in particutar, and to
put up with some Loss of reserves. chapten 3 examines in detaiL the
adjustment of the Communityrs external balance to the ojL shock and the
structunaL features of its baLance of payments.
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The year now drawing to a cLose saw the persistence of a h'igh
average infLation rate in the commun'ity. The upward movement of prices
is LikeLy to sLacken next year, but{t seems more stubborn today than after
the first oiL shock. The Member States have endeavoured to encourage the
free pLay of competition in onder to hoLd infLation in check; systems of
price controL have often been reLaxerl and even djsmant[ed. At the same
time, and unlike the sequel to the first oiI shock, the energy plice rise
was promptLy passed on in costs in onden to encourage the productive appar-
atus to adjust to the high cost of energy and to avoid the perpetuation of
artificiaL situatjonrs as regards the reIative prices of different sources
of energy. 0n the other hand, Chapter 4 shows that the spread of infLation
rAtes between Memlcep states, after irnproving from 1976 to 1979, has
again widened jn ther Last two years. The upward movement of wage costs,
whjch had acceIeraterd in 1980, sLowed down th'is year, but income distrib-
ution remains b'iasecl towards wages and saLanies.
In the arera of exchange rates, Europe went through a particu[arLy
troubled oeriod in'1981. The substantjaL rise of the dolLar and the yen
and the consequent clepreciation of the European currencies were accompanied
by strains within the European Monetary System. The scaLe of the resources
avaiLabLe within the exchange rate mechanism aLLowed the European currencies
to weaken jn an orden[y fashion. Tlre two reaLignments of the pivot rates this
year, which reveaL a heatthy management of the system, have Lessened, if not
eLiminated, the cost and price divergences between Member States. Chapter 5
examjnes these deveLopments and the funct'ioning of the European Monetary System
in depth. It 1[en goes on to deaL with the probLem,of the rjse in interest
rates which, aLthou,Jh pantLy a resut,t of the nise jn US interest nates, was
mainLy a response to the domestic constraints of monetary poLicy' Lastty,
observation of the monetary aggregates reveaLs that the sLowdown in monetary
expansion in the Cornmunity, which began in 1979, ended this yean, due to the
Large deviations in money suppLy gnowth from the initial forecasts, which
occurred in several countries.
The pub[ic fjnance deficjt jn the Community grew in 1981 (see
Chapter 6). The sLackenjng of activity and its coroLLary, the sLowdown in
tax receipts, the size of the transfers paid to households, and the growing
burden of the pubLic debt, partjcuLarty heavy jn centajn Member States, have
had the effect of wjdening the budget deficjt. Thus the shane of centraI
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government receipts in community GDp again increased in 19g1, aften
advancing continuaILy since 1972, so that the budgetrs redistributive
function goes on expanding. In order to finance its defjc it, centraL
government made substantiat calts on the non-monetary savings of the nationaI
financjaI markets (the depressed state of demand for [ong-term capitat by
the pnivate secton hras a he[p here) and on jnternationaL cap.ita[ .in propor-
tions which vanied with the Member State. The majority of the Member States,
however, made greater use of monetany financing to cover generaL government
net borrowing. The upward movement of [ong-term interest rates, in 1981,
though part[y a resutt of the higher short tenm rates, atso refLects the
persistence of ceftain infIationary expectations and the gnow.ing demand for
Long-term sources of finance by the pubIic sector.
Chapter 7 deaLs with empLoyment and unemployment whjch today,
wjth infLation, form the centraL concenn of economjc poLicy. The shanp
rise in unempLoyment, sjnce the beginning of tast yea?, is a development
difficult to bring under control. It stems from a combjnation of demo-
graphic and economic factors: the Large numbers of young peopLe who havejoined the tabour force whiIe veny few jndividuaIs are reaching retirement
age, ptus the smaLL increase in job vacancjes. Thjs sjtuation has resuLted
in substantiat changes in the stnucture and nature of unempLoyment. The
smaIL number of job vacancies is a conseguence of the economic recession,
but jt has deeper causes, among them the Communityrs competitive position,
technoLogicaL deveLopments in equjpment and the competition between the
industriaIized and deveIoping countries jn the traditionaL industrial sectors,
The cost of this pensistent and growing jmba[ance in the Labour market js
becoming extreme[y onerous for the Member States, both in terms of the
direct cost for the government and, more generaLly, the sociaL cost for
the nation; the Iatter is admittedty more difficuLt to quantify, but it is
certainly very s'ign'ificant today.
The oiI shocks and the sLowdown in growth have thrown into re[ief
the importance of and necessity fon the structuraL adjustment of the
Communityrs productive apparatus. Chapter 8 ana[yses the adjustment of
sectorat structures between the two oiI shocks and points out that jt is
the energy, intermediate products and non-market services sectors whjch have
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made the greatest contribution to growth whiLe the capitat goods sector shows
some toss of dynamism. The sectors of the future, hotding out good prospects
for expansion, couLd repLace certain decLining industries, provided that
their devetopment js encouraged. The community authoritjes possess specific
means of heLping the structurat adjustment of the Eltropean economies, but
thejr actions have up to now mainly concentrated on assisting the traditionaL
sectors beset by serious adjustment crises'
chapter 9 deaLs wjth subsidies, investment incentives and the
taxatjon of energy. Productjon subsjdies as a whoLe have increased
significantLy in the'1970s, with current transfens as a generaL ruLe out-
strjpping jnvestment 6ids. The scaLe of the transfers varjes wideLy from
one Member state to another, and so do the form they take and their djstrib-
ution between recipient sectors. spec'iaL attention is given to investment
incentives in thejr different forms - aids, toans, jnterest rate subsidies,
the tax treatment of depreciationretc.; they are aLso examjned from the
angLe of the practices of Member States, The chapter aLso [ooks at energy
taxation poLicy and the community autlroritiest poLicy on subsidies.
The Economic Revjew 1981-82 as a whoLe is an in-depth study of
the outturn and the economic probLems today faced by the Community' In
the Fifth Medium-Term Economjc PoLicy Programme (1981-85) submitted to the
CounciL in JuLy, the Commission agrees that the projections for the next
few years, assuming no change in poLicy, do not point to a return to the
high growth rates enjoyed by Europe up to the earLy seventies. The resuLts
and the indicative forecasts made in the framework of the Fifth Prognamme
and reproduced below are an eloquent iLLustration of thjs:
{
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Fifth Medium-Term Programme - Base Projection
Average annuaI variations jn % except where otherwjse indicated
1973/60 1980/7s 1985/80 1985/81
GDP
GDP price
Investment
Emp Loyment
Punchasjng power of per capita wage
(Corrected) wage share in GDP
End-of-period baLance of goods and
services (GDP pencentage points)
4r6
419
514
0r2
qn
0r2
0r4
2r2
10 14
017
0r0
2r0
0r0
-1t4
119
811
111
-0rZ
0r8
-111
215
717
211
0r0
1r0
-1 14
-012
The projections for the penjod 1985 do not, strict[y speaking,
represent forecasts. A 2 1/2 7. growth rate over the next four years wiLL
probab[y be insuffjcjent to brjng down unempLoyment. Thjs is why the Commun-
ityrs main task is to devise and accept an economic strategy which wiLL
permit an appreciabLy better performance than the one described jn the
base proj ectjon.
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2. Er:onomi c Cyc Les i n the t,lor Ld and Europe
The industriatised countries of the OECD area as a whole probably
reached the bottom of the second oiL-shock recession earLy in 1981. But the
pace of the recovery in the second haLf of 1981 is generaLLy expected to be
sLuggish. !'lhi Ie output and worLd trade shouLd acce[erate someuthat during
1982, their growth seems l"ikeLy to be onLy modest. The Community econom'ies
have experienced a deeper and more proLonged recession than the other major
industriaLised economies and they are [agging behind in the recovery; after
remaining fLat in the first haLf of 1981, activity started to pick up again
graduaLLy from about the middLe of the year. Community gross domestic
product is expected tto faLL by 0,5'A in 1981 and to rise by 2rO % in 1982.
Unemployment wiLL continue to rise throughout most of this period. The 1980-
81 recession has not been quite as severe as that experienced in 1974-75
after the first oiL-r;hock, but evidence from business surveys and eIsewhere
suggests that the upturn on this occasion wiLL not be nearLy as brisk as in
the previous cycLe. Progress on containing infLation has been threatened
and uncertainties about growth prospects increased by the Large depreciation
of Community currenc'ies against the dolLar in the first haLf of 1981 and by
the rise in interest rates. Estimates are presented from simuLation studies
of the Likety impact of these deveLopments on the Community economy-
2.1. b'|orLd economic trends and outLook
Output in the industriaLised countries of the OECD area probabLy reached
the bottom of the current recession near the beginning of 1981, after decLining
during the middle quarters of 1980. In the United States the fatt in output in
the spring of 1980 was sharp but shortLived and was fottowed by three quarters
of acceIerating growlth. However, in the second quarter of 1981 expansion in the
USA was checked by the tiEhtness of monetary poLicy and hiEh interest rates which
heLd back jnvestment and consumer durables demand- Output in the United States
is expected to resume its growth towards the end of this year and it should
strengthen graduaLLy during 1982.
There t.las no faLL in output in JaPan
demand having been offset by a strong export
during 1980, the ueakness of domestic
performance. During 1981 consumerst
expenditure and investment have become more buoyant, and the graduat acceLeration
of output is expected to continue into 1982.
I
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The economies of Europe (inctuding the EC economiesuhich are described in
more detaiL beLow) experienced a Longer period of recession than did the other
major industriaLised countries. Output stanted to fatL in the spring of 1980
and through the winter and spring of 1981 remained reLativeLy fLat and depres-
sed. It was not untiL about the midd[e of the year that a tentative recovery
appeared to begin. The main components of domestic demand have shown LittLe
buoyancy throughout 1981, and whiLe the recovery in Europe is expected to
gather some momentum during 1982 thepace of expansion wiLI be on[y modest.
For the economies of the OECD area as a whoLe, year-on-year growth
gross domestic product is put at about 1r3% in 1981 and some 2r3% in
198?. By the second haLf of 1982 the 0ECD economies should be expanding
an annuaL rate of about 3 112'A (see TabLe ?.1).
The volume of world trade is expected to be at much the same Levet in
198? as in the previous year. lrlortd trade felL back in the second haLf of
1980 as the recession-hit 0EcD economies cut back their imports and demand
from the other zones of the worLd grew tess strongly. After a period of
stagnation in the first haLf of 1981 a gradual recovery is thought to have
begun whichshouLd be consoLidated during 1982. Strong demand for imports by
the OPEC countries is continuing to provide some offset to weakness eLsewhere.
By contrast the non-oiI devetoping countries, faced with the need to finance
continuousLy Large baIance of payments deficits, and the rotherr group of
countries (mainLy the centraLLy-pLanned economies) have shown weaker import
growth in 1981, and the modest strengthening expected for them in 1982 remains
uncertai n.
Part of the recent weakness in wortd trade has been due to the sharp faLLs
in the consumption and import of oiL which occurred in 1980 and 1981. Oit
consumption in the OECD area feLL by 7 112 % in 1980 and is forecast to faLL by
at Least 5 % in 1981. This is a larger faLL in demand than can be expLained by
the recession atone, and is cLear[y a response to the large hike in retative oiL
prices over the last three years. ldor[d trade in goods other than crude oiL
rose by some 5 % in 1980 and is expected to rise by 2 "l 1n 198'i and 6'/.
in 1982, and is thus noticeabLy stronger than the figures for totaI worLd trade
given in TabLe 2.1.
'tn
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Reduced demand for oiL together with rising non-OPEC output led to the
emergence of a substantiaL surplus in oit suppLies during the first haLf of
1981 and to downward pressure on oit prices. Members of OPEC meeting at the
end of frlay settLed for an effective freeze on the officiat prices set at BaLi
the preceding December, and they were unabte.to agree on a unified pricing
system at their meeting in August. In practice oiL prices in doltars have
fatLen as premia have been eroded. Atthough some of the OPEC countries have
decided on reductions in output Leve[s, the gLut of oiL suppLies seems Likety
to persist for at teast the next few months. Because of the price rises that
took pLace at the end of 1980, the average doLLar export price of crude oiL
in 1981 is expected to be some 10 112y, higher than in 1980. The forecasts
presented here for 1982 are based on the assumption of a further 41l7it rise
next year.
The Large increases in the price of oiI in 1979 and 1980 continued to
dominate deveLopments in the pattern of payments baLances in 1980 and 1981.
'The current account surpLus of the 0PEC countries which had risen to nearLy
USD 70 000 miL[ion in 1979 rose to USD 120 000 miLlion in 1980. The surpLus
is expected to decLine in 1981 and 1982 but onLy at a relatively stow pace
so that substantiaL deficits wiLI remain to be financed by oiL importing
countries for some years to come.
The main burden of the oiI price increases t"las refLected in the current
account positions of the industriaL 0ECD group whose combined current account
deteriorated by USD 80 000 miLLion in the two years 1979 and 1980. l,lithin
this group, houever, there have been substantiaL differences in current account
positions; the current balances of Canada and the United States actuaLLy
improved whiLe there h/as a very sharp deterioration in the current baLances of
the Community, Japan and the smatLer 0ECD countries. Although the deterioration
in the deveLoping countriesr current baLance was Less than for the industriaL
countries, this was due targeLy to the fact that this group of countries was
atready in substantiaL deficit prior to the Latest oiI price increases due partty
to their difficulties in adjusting to the previous oiL price rises of 1973 and
1974.
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After the previous round of substantiaL oit price rises in 1973-4 the
resutting OPEC surpLus had , been haLved by 1975 and was reduced to some
UsD 4 000 miLLion by 1978. This time the surpluses are not expected to faLL
quite as rapid[y. Thus the outLook for payments baLances suggests that a more
baLanced pattern of wortd current baIances witL onLy emerge retativeLy sLowLy.
The aggregate current account baLance of the OECD countries wiLl. improve this
year by about USD 28 000 miLLion mainly because of improvements in the current
batances of Japan and the Community. The oit importing deveLoping countries
wi[[ have a further substantiaL increase in the LeveL of their current deficit.
In 1982 the current account of the United States is expected to deterio-
rate significantLy and the Japanese current account wiLL continue to improve
whiIst a further improvement in the Communityrs deficit is foreseen. goth the
smaLler other 0ECD countries and the non-oiI deveLoping countries wiLL continue
to jncur very substantiaL deficits, with a sLight further worsening LikeLy for
the Latter group, so that the probLems of financing their deficits may prove
increasingLy difficutt. The 0PEC surpLus wiLL decLine by about UsD 24 000 miL-
tion this year and a decline of aboutUSD 2? 000 miLLion is expected next year,
so that by 1982 the OPEC surpLus wi[[ have dectined by atmost t+O% trom its peak
in 1980. The weakness of OPEC exports of oiL is a major factor Leading to a
reduction in the 0PEC surpLus, but the reLativeLy sLower decLine in the QPEC
surpLus compared with the years after the 1973 oit price increases is due to a
tess rapid expansion in the votume of OPEC imports than in the earLier episode,
and to a slower recouping by the industriaL countries of the terms of trade
Loss.
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i2 .2 Economi c out Look f or the Commun j ty
The reaL gross domestic product of the Community, which had been decLining
since the second quarter of 1980, stayed nelat'ivety flat during the first haLf
of 1981 and then probably started to turn upwards at about the middle of the
year. As yet indicatjons are that ther recovery wiLL be Very SLuggish'
ReaL personaL disposabLe income has been squeezed and private consumption has
faLLen or been stagnant in most countries. Governments anxious to contain their
budget deficits have been increasing their consumption expenditures onty very
sLowly. Fixed investment has been faltLing since mid-1980 and stockbuiLding has
become progressivety weaker. In response to the deveLopments in worLd markets
Community exports dropped sharply in the second haLf of 1980, but have shown
a marked recovery since then. Commun'ity imports, however, have been much weaker
and so there has been a positive EBntnibution to Community output from the ---'
reat foreign baLance. Between the first quarter of 1980 and the second quarter
of 1981 gross domestic product in the Community is estimated to have falten in
rea[ terms by over ?7,. This sharp faLL in output has been accompanied by a very
rapid expansion of unempLoyment in the Community which by the middte of 1981 had
reached over 9 mi'Ltion.
The prospects l'or output in the remainder of 1981 and for 1982 are most
uncertain and give no cause for optimism. As part of their anti-inftationary
policies some governments in the Community are attempting to foILotl strict
monetary and fiscat poIicies, thus giv'ing IittLe or no stimutus to economic
activity. Interest rates in Europe are higher than they woutd have been because
of the very high rates induced by monetary poLicy in the United States. These
are Iikety to hoLd back the usuat cycLicat recovery in business fixed investment,
stockbuiLding and consumer spending on durabLe goods. AdditionaL uncertainties,are
introduced by the massivedepreciation of Community currencies reLative to the US
dotLar uhich occurrecl during the tweLve months up to August 1981. The net
effect of this factor may not be to depress output in the Community, as the
gain in the Communityrs competitivity shouLd atLow an expansion of exports to
the rest of the worLcl and shouLd restrain the shares of third countries in
domestic markets within the Community. But this currency depreciation has
given a boost to inftation in the Community and may hotd back domestic demand
through its restraining effect on private consumption.
t\
2.6
Further evidence that a recovery is under way but that it is proceeding
onty weakLy comes from the Commissionrs business surveys. The balance of
industriatists jn the Community expecting output to dectine over the next year
began to narrow in the first quarter of 1981 (see Graph z.U, but as compared with
previous recoveries this retreat from pessimism seems much tess pronounced.
The Latest forecasts for the Community show reaI gross domestic product
faLting by Or5'A in 1981 compared t.lith the previous year, and then rising by
2,4i4 in 1982- After onLy a smaL[ increase in the second ha[f of 19g1 output is
expected to gradua[[y accelerate, with aLL the components of domestic demand
gathering speed, aLbeit gentLy. Uith worLd demand graduaLLy picking up
Community exports should move ahead faster, but the voLume of imports wiIL
also move ahead. Ey the second haLf of 19g2 community gross
domestic product shouLd be growing at an annuat rate of atmost 3 Z. The
expected weakness of the recovery impLies that unempLoyment in the Community
witL probabty continue to rise at Least untit the middLe of 1982, by which
stage the number unemptoyed couLd be over 9 112 nilLion. Thereafter the rise in
unemployment should onLy be smaLL but no decLine can be expected
during the forecast period. (See Tables 2.3 and ?.4 for detai[s of forecasts).
InfLation in the Community (as measured by the year-on-year rise in the
private consumption impLicit defLator) not.l seems LikeLyto be onty a Iittl.e Iower
in 1981 than it was in 1980q1,6'/, compared with 11 ,9%). The steady stowing in
the rate of price increase which had been achieved during 1980, was reversed
in the first hal"f of 1981 as the impact on import costs of the depreciation
against the doLLar began to be refLected in domestic prices. The prices of
Community imports of goods are estimated to have risen at an annuaI rateof
almost 22 % in the first hatf of 198'1, compared with onLy 9 % in the previous
haLf year. The rate of increase of import prices wiLL continue to be high in
the second ha[f of 1981, but during 1982 it shoutd slow to beLow 9 7", especiaLty
if, as expected, the Community currencies regain some part of their depreciation
against the doLLar. ALthough a part of the renewed acceteration in domestic
infLation this year wiLL automaticaLLy be refLected in increased hrage costs, the
weakness of the Labour markets may [imit the extent to which wages react. Part
of the terms of trade Loss experienced this year is therefore [ikeLy to be
absorbed by some reduction in reaL personal incomes, and so the boost to
infLation from the currency depreciation may not be perpetuated. Some stowing
down in domestic infLation is therefore to be Looked for in 1982, and the year-
on-year increase in the private consumption defLator couLd sLou to some 1Or5'1,
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The communityts deficit on current account narrowed in the second haLf
of 19g0 and the first few months of 1981 as imports feLt back more sharpty than
exports. The appreciation of the doLLar has added substantiaLLy to the Com-
munityrs import costs, and so in the middLe of the year the improvement in the
Communityrs trade and current ba[ance s[owed. But, heLped by the improved
competitiveness of community exports on worLd markets, the volume of exports has
been rising throughout the year, whiLe the voLume of imports has remained weak'
For 19g1 as a whote the current account deficit is expected to be some USD 30 100
miLLion or over uSD 9 000 miLlion narrower than in 1980 (atthough measured in ECU
the Community,s deficjt wiLL have changed onty a LittLe). In 1982 the Communityrs
terms of trade Loss should be much Less than in 1981.' and whi[e the volume of
imports shoutd start to rise again quite briskLy the votume of exports shouLd
rise even faster as C<lmmunity exporters make further gains in their shares of
more buoyant export markets. A further improvement in the communityrs current
deficit to about usD :24 800 miLLion is therefore expected.
2.3 Comparison of the post-oiL*shock cycIes
There are a numtrer of simiLarities between the recessionary experiences
of the community economies in the wake of the two sets of major oiL price rises
in 1973 and in 1979-80. In this section common features and differences
between the two recessions are examined, and the reasons why the recovery from
the present recession seems LikeLy to be more graduaL than occurred in 1975-76
are exptored.
The retative si:zes of the oiL shocks to the Community economies in the
two episodes were of:;imitar order. The extra cost on Community oiL imports
which the increases in oiL prices impl'ied (with no change in the volume of oit
imports) represented'in both cases appfaljmateLy 3 % of Community gross domestic
product. However, the oiL price rises in 1973 t.lere aLL concentrated in the
final four months of1he year. In ther second episode a series of increases were
spread over the per'iorJ from the end of 1978 to the end of 1980. The impact
of these Latter increases was therefore more diffuse, and they may have been a
LittLe easier to absonb.
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Furthermore in 1973-74 the oiL price rises were preceded by very
substantiaL rises in the prices of non-oiL commodities which aLso added
appreciabLy to the Communityts import costs. Commodity price increases in
1979-80 h,ere not nearly as strong. rn addition in 1974 the effects of oit
and other commodity price rises in doL[ars were exacerbated by a weakening
of the Community currencies against the US doLtar, whiLe especiaLl.y in 1919
exchange rate movements stightLy offset the doLLar pr.ice rises. so taken
as a whote, the size of the externaL shock in 1974 was [arger and more con-
centrated than in 1929-8O (see TabLe 2.5).
ALthough there have been no more oiI price increases in dolLar terms
since the end of 1980, the externaL shock in the present cycLe has been
ampLified and extended by the strong appreciation of the doLLar since the
autumn of 1980. The caLcuLations in TabLe 2.5 suggest that the contribution
to the rise in Community import prices in 1981 from dotLar-priced oiI and other
commodities becoming more expensive in terms of Community currencies is of
the same order as that feLt from the increases in the do[[ar price of oiL
in 1980. But the depreciation of the Community currencies, whiLe adding
substantiaLLy to import costs, at the same time improves the competitiveness
of Community exporters in t.lorLd markets.
Graph 2.1 shotls the quarterLy paths of gross domestic product and its
main components for the totaL of the four Largest Community countries during
the two cycLes from 1973 to 1977 and from 1979 to 1982. The figures are actuaL
recorded vaLues untit the first quarter of 1981 and are Commission forecasts
thereafter. The two cycLes have been superimposed and have been made to coincide
in the quarters at which gross domestic product peaked before the fatLs in output,
the third quarter of 1974 and the first quarter of 1980-
As can be seen both peak quarters uere followed by a hatf year of sharp
faLts in gross domestic product foLLowed by a further haLf year of reLative
stagnation. The shapes of the two cycles in the four quarters foLLowing the
peaks are remarkably simi Lar, but the present recession appears to have been
not quite so steep as in 1974-75 (GDP feLL by 216 % between 1974 3 and 1975'1,
and by 1r9 y. between 1980 1 and 1980 3). 0f course the experience of indi-
viduat countries has varied, and in particuLar the United Kingdom has seen a
much sharpen recession in the Last thro years than in the earLier period.
This means that in the other three major Community countries the Iatest
recession has been noticeabLy tess extreme than in 1974-75.
\t
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The graphs aLso iLLustrate that both fixed investment and stockbuiLding had
up to thefirstquarter of 19&l"fatt.en by less than in the compalabte period of the
earLier cycte. It woutd appear that enterprises have reacted less sharpLy to
the Latest round of oiL price rises and boost to inftation. In part this may
be because their cash fLows have been Less severeLy squeezed by increases in
their other costs. Non-oiL commodity prices showed much Larger increases and
wage costs reacted more markedly in the earLier cycte. It may atso be that the
knowtedge and experience gained by enterprises during the first cycLe have
hetped to reassure them that very dramatic changes to their pLans uere not
necessary on this occasion. FjnaLLy business confidence and stabitity might have
been heLped by the generaLLy tighter monetary and fiscaL poLicies foLLowed in
member countries wh1ch have had greater - aLbeit stiLL very Limitecj - success
in moderating the secondary impact of the oiL shock on Labour costs'
t,lhi Le business spending has so f ar not f a L Len so sharply during the
present cycLe, consumption expenditures by the private sector and by government
have shown a weaker deveLopment reLative to the earIier recession. The picture
for private consumption is confused by the more erratic quarter-to-quarter
movements in this aggregate in recent years. But it appears that whiLe nominaI
uage increases have risen less strongty during this cycte (a factor which in the
short term at least wouLd tend to reduce reaL incomes and depress consumption)
there has been no marl<ed tendency for savings ratios to rise in the way they did
in 1974 and 1975. Government consumption has been rising more sLowLy in this
cycLe because of the nnuch tighter fiscaL stance of most governments.
0n the foreign ltrade side there are aLso contrasts between the tt.lo cyc[es.
Uhite the fa[t in output in the European economies has been only sLightty Less
this time than in the eartier recession, in the deveLoped economies of the 0ECD
area as a whoLe the recent recession has been noticeabty Less severe. In the
United States it has been of shorter duration, and Japan has this time avoided
any actuaL faLL in GDP. The hiatus iri worLd trade at the end of 1974 and earty
in 1975 when import volumes by almost aLL the deveLoped countries felI very
dramaticaLLy served to intensify the recession and to transmit it from one country
to the next. In the Latest episode worLd trade has indeed falLen but not by as
much. Community imports have not decLined as sharpty as before because there has
generaL[y been no sharp fal-L in stocksi.
(5
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In 1975 the hatf year of stagnation in output was followed by a period of
rapid recovery. The reasons given above to expLain the smat[er faLL in output
during the present cycte (Less dramatic shifts in the behavjour of enterprises
and tighter fiscaL poticies) woutd aLso tend to suggest that the upswing wiLL be
more moderate. Since stockbuiLding has not been cut back so marked[y there cannot
be so pronounced a positive impact on growth from the resumption of additions to
stocks. The cycticaL decLine in fixed investment, atthough shaLlower than in
1975, cou[d continue f,or severaL more quarters (until_ the beginning of
1982> before turning upwards. If interest rates continue at ornear their present
high levet there'is a risk that this recovery wiLL be heLd back even longer.
Consumption expenditures aLso seem Like[y to rise much more stowLy during the
coming quarters, since the growth of reaI incomes is expected to be smaLL and
savings ratios shouLd remain reLativeLy stabLe.
Evidence from the EC business surveys tends to support the conctusion that
whiLe a recovery in output is on the way it wiLL be onty graduat. The baLance
of industriatists expecting production to fa[[ uas more extreme at the trough in
1975' but in the three quarters which foLLowed there was a sharp improvement in
production expectations which was soon transLated with a Lag of about trto quarters
into a rapid rjse in industriaL production. Production expectations appear to have
reached their lowest point in the present cyc[e aLready in August 19g0, and
since then there has been a steady-but stow improvqnent in prospects as seen by
industriaLists (see graph 2.2>. However, in the most recent survey (September 19El)
there stiLL remains a smatI majority expecting further fal"Ls in their outpr.,t.
2.4 Impact of recent movements in exchange rates and interest rates
The exchange rates of aLL the Community countries have faLlen sharpLy
against the doLtar in recent months and short-term interest rates have risen
partLy to prevent even further faILs in European exchange rates. Longer-term
interest rates have aLso increased, this perhaps reftecting to some extent
the upward revisions to inflationary expectations that have occurred ':
because of exchange rate changes. Tlre eommissionts forecasts given above
take into account these excha,nge rate and interest:fate changes in
addition to the many other factors influencing the devetopment of
\k)
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the Community economies. In this section the anatysis that Iies behind the
forecast is examined in some detaiL. Quantitative estimates of the effects
on the Community economy of step changes in exchange rates and interest rates
have been made using the Commission's economic modets and other economic
evidence. The exchange rate changes and 'interest rate changes have been
examined separateLy to aid understanding. The caIcuLations aIso assume that
any particuLar change i:; maintained over the who[e simulation period. The
resuLts are therefore not forecasts of what is Likety to happen but more
buitdjng btocks to be used in the constrruction of a particuLar forecast.
By August 1981 the ECU had depreciated by aLmost 28 Z compared with its
average vatue against the dotLar in 1980. The effects of this depreciation on the
e'tmmunity econonyif sustained wiIL depend on the reaction of commodity prices, the
price elasticity of exports and the infLuence of any rise in inflation on b,ages
and reaL demand. Most commodities are priced in dotLars and thus in the short
term an appreciation of the dotLar wiIt resutt in a deterioration in the
Communityts terms of trade, since the prices in dotLar terms of the Communityrs
exports of mainty manufactured goods wiLt fa[[ reLative to the prices of imports
of primary products and of manufactured goods from countries with strong
currencies. However, over time the terrns of trade shou[d recover part of the
[oss, since the doLtar prices of commodities shouLd adjust downwards and find
a nebJ equiLibrium in worLd markets. In the caLcuLations presented in Table 2.6,
showing possibte effects of a sustained 20 % devatuation of the ECU from the first
quarter of 1981, it has been assumed that over a tt.lo year period oiL prices faLL
by 5 % in dotlar terms compared with what they would otherwise have been and
that other raw materiat prices faLt by 10 "A. For food the situation is more
complex because of the Common Agricutturat Poticy which shouLd keep down the
prices of Community food products in dol.Lars. It has thus been assumed that
wortd food prices faLt by 5 % and Community food prices by 12 % in doltar terms.
lilodeL-based caLcuLations suggest these commodity price changes wiLI raise
Community import prices in ECU by around 9 per cent in the first year and raise
domestic prices by around 1 per cent. Even after assuming a substantiaI increase
in EC export prices to the rest of the worLd and some reduction in h,orld doL[ar
prices, the gain in price compet'itiveness of the Community is LikeLy to be in
excess of 10 per cent. ALthough it is wetL known that the effect of such retative
price changes on the votume of exports is spread over a number of years most
\l 2.12
econometric work indicates that at least 30-40 per cent of the futt effect occurs
within the first one and hatf years. The resutts therefore indicate a substantja[
increase in the voLume of exports of goods and services and thus in totaL output
in 1981 and 1982. Because of muttiplier effects the increases in output in 19gl
and 1982 would be a good deaL hjgher than.indicated were it not for the reductions
in domestic demand, in particuLar private consumption, which arise from the
upturn in jnftation.
The effects of recent interest rate changes are next examined separateLy.
NominaI tong-term interest rates within the Comrnunity ulcre by August 1981 on ave-
rage more than 1 per cent above the average for 1980. NominaI short-term interest
rates within the Community on average were about 3 percentage points higher than the
average for '1980 whiLst short-term US interest rates h,ere some 3 1tZ percentage
points higher. Since inftation has generatty slowed, both in the United States
and in the Community countries, the rise in reat rates of interest (measured
reIative to current rates of inftation rather than the difficuIt-to-observe
expected rates) has been even more substantiaL. The LikeLy effects of the pre-
sent US monetary and fiscaI poticy are of course matters of considerable un-
certajnty and dispute. In the short term, at Least, they are LikeLy to depress
US output (mainLy via a reduction in investment and stockbuiLding) and reduce
inftation. The rises in European interest rates wiLL work in the same direction
within the Communityt although the reductions in inftation may be Less powerful
because they are not in generaL associated with a major change in the perceived
conduct of domestic monetary poticy, and are therefore Less Likety to reduce
infLationary expectations. The Commission caIculations suggest that if the rise
in interest rates which has occurred is maintained it wiLL depress Community
gross domestic product by some or4 % in the first year and by o,T z in the
second yea?, mainly through its impact on investment. There could be some very
sLight tendency for inftation to be restrained. It is worth noting that some
of the rise in interest rates has probably occurred because the rise in the
do[[ar has raised inftationary expectations. Thus some of the rise in tong-term
interest rates can be thought of as impticitLy offsetting those increases jn
demand arising from the faLL in reaI interest rates in the exchange rate simu-
Iat i on.
\b 2.1s
The rise in r.lortd interest rates coutd if maintained have perhaps more
far-reaching consequences than those given in Tab[e 2.6 because of the effects
on debt interest payments of devetoping countries. In the very short term
however these effects wiLL to some extent be offset by the increases in reat
income of devetoping countries arising from the terms of trade gain of primary
commodities associated with the rise 'in the dottar'
The combined effects of the exchange rate and interest rate changes are
presented in the finaL two cotumnsof'IabLe ?16' In the second year after the
changes the tevel of community gross domestic product wouLd be about 111 7'
higher than it woutd otherwise have been, and the growth rate in that year uould
be some o16 % higher. The expansionary effect on the votume of exports appears
to be more substantiat than the restraining infLuence on the domestic components
of demand. The tevet. of consumer prices in the second year woutd be some 2'3 %
higher as a result ol'the changes, that is the infLation rate in that year woutd
be some 114 % higher since Org % of the increase woutd aIready have taken ptace
in the first Year.
These simuLations therefore suggest that the net effects of the changes in
exchange rates and interest rates which have been seen recent[y couLd' if
maintained, be to give some boost to reat growth in the Community over a th'o year
period. This higher output woutd be accompanied by faster price inftation which
cou[d in turn Lead to greater instabiLity in foreign exchange and domestic
markets adding greatLy to uncertainty about prospects' But the forecasts pre-
sented eartier in this chapter are based on the assumption of some partiat reco-
very of the communit;y currencies against the doLLar in 1982 and of some retaxation
.in interest rates. .tf these forecasts are reaLised then the effects given in
these simutations wiLL be reduced'
tq'l
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Production expectations as a Leadj indicator of the business cycLe
The EC business surveys (1) p.ouide monthLy data on industrjatistsr assessmentsof the most important variabLes reLating to their enterplises. This jnform-
ation may be used to monitor the business cycLe. The resuLts for certainquestions, in particuLar that on the expected trend of production in the
months ahead, disp[ay teading characteristics. The Table shows that, for the
Community as a whote, the turning-points in the production expectations serieshave Led those of detrended industria[ production(Z) Av an average of 6 to 7
lnonths for cycLicaI troughs and peaks, respectiveLy. There js some irreguL-
arity in the [ength of these leads, but on no occasion did the turning-pointin expectations Lag that in the index for the community as a whole.
In the case of the present cycLe, the low-point in industriaLists'op.inions
on production expectations was reached in August 1980. Information from theindustriaI production index shows that industrjaL activity ftattened out inthe first haLf of 1981. |rJhiLe an upward turn in the index shouLd soon become
apparent it is not yet possibte to date this turning-point. However, it
seems that the Length of the [ead given by the survey data on product.ionindications wiLt on this occasion have been at the Longer end of the range of1 to 10 months seen in relation to the Last three troughs of the Communitybusiness cycIes.
As regards the four targest tvlember states, the [ong tength of teading inform-ation given for Germany, ItaLy and the United Kingdom is rather sim1Lar, w1th
average Leads of between 3 and 7 months for their troughs and peaks. The
averages for France are atso within this range, but there are some instancesin this case in which the production expectaiions of industriatists did nottead the cycLicaL turning-po.int.
The Graph atso shows the resuLts of industrialistsr opinions on their order-book [eveLs, as wetL as their production expectations. Turning-po.ints in
opinions on order-books aLso tend to lead the production cycler-but by Lessthan the op'inions on production expectationsl sometimes the turn.ing-pointsin order-books are coincident with those of recorded activity, but even inthis event the information from the surveys is avaiLabte aboui two monthsbefore the industriat production index and has the further qual_ity ofgiving a smoother profi Le of trends.
ffiquestions,themethodofquantificatjonofresuLts,and
time-series data are pubtished'in European Economy, Supplement B -
"Economic prospects - business survey resutts".
(2) The de-trending and identification of turning-points is carried out
according to the method of the NationaL Bureau of Economic Research(NBER), New York, in which the trend is est'imated by means of a Long-
term moving average, adjusted to conform more c[oseLy to the originatdata, and turning-points are selected in series of deviations of the
originaL data from the trend. For a detaiLed expLanatjon of the method,
see G. Bry and c. Boschanr "cycLicaL Analysis of Time series : setected
Procedures and Computer programs,,, New york, NBER/ 1971.
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Recorded Industriat
Production ('1 )
Producti,cn Expectations
of Enterprises
Lead (-) or Lag (*) (Zlin number of months'--
-1
-7
-10
-5
-3
-5
-'t2
European Community
71-1?
75-8
78-8
69-5
73-9
77-1
79-1?
71-11
75-1
77-10
80-9
Federat Republic of Germany | -
71-12
75-7
78-3
7A-1
7:5-8
7',7-3
79-7
71-11
75-?
77-9
81 -2
70-9
75-6
77-8
81-3
68-12
73-3
76-1
79-1
F rance
-t't-s75-5
77-12
7t+-8
76-9
79-7
Ita Ly
71-7
75-5
78-8
69-7
7 !t-4
76-'t2
80-2
71-5
75-?
77-7
81 -5
united ringdom(3)
72-2
75-8
6e-6
7.5-6
79-6
71-6
75-6
| 80-e
(1) Trrrr,ing-points of production de-trended by the NBER method.(2) Turning-point in production expectations in retation to industriat production.(3) Results avajtable for the United Kihgdom before 1974 relate to the va[ue rather
than the volume of expected production, but an adjustment based on expectedprice deve[opments has been made in order to obtain broad comparabitity vith
the subsequent data.
68-12
73-6
76-8
78-12
Averaqe a -
-4
-5
-14
-6
-17
-3
+4
-E
+1
-4
73-3
76-6
79-11
-2
-10
-3
-6
Averaqe 6 - 5
-6
-3
-1
68-1 2
73-3
79-5
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The conver nce of economi c c tes in the EC and 0ECD.
tJhiLe it is obvious enough that Europe has been experiencing a generaIised recession
over the p"rt y""., ii-iI not seLf-evident whether.tf]r convergenc"_o1.":::n?l::^:r.,"t
is true more wjthin Europe compared to the industriaLised worLd as a whoLe (oEcD),
and whether these tendencies have been becoming more strong with time or not.
The Chart shor.,,s that in comparing the period 1971-80 with 1961-70, there has been a
much more powerfuL convergence of cycLes in the Last decade both within the
Community and the QECD area (the upward pojnted arrows indicating the extent of the
increase in the .o.."ltiion coefficjents'of each countryrs growth pattern on the
two areas). This certa'inty in good part refLects the two cycLes'in the rseventies
that were Led by massive oiL price shocks. Thus the worLd-wjde cycLe has become
much more dominant.
In separat'ing countries into two categories, those-most cLoseLy foLLowing respectiv-
eLy the Commun'ity ancl 0ECD's growth pJtt".nt, the rseventies showed the originaL six
l{ember States and the group oi non-EC European countries to be more cLoseLy Linked to
the communjty,s economic cycLes. In addition to the generaLLy increased cycl-icaL
convergence among thgse countries, the most striking change between the tt.lo periods
is tnai ItaLy joined this group in ttre rseventies, whereas its cycticaL movements
were uncorreLated t.,ith the Community irr the prev'ious decade. The group of countries
most cLoseLy correLated t.|jth the 0ECD cycLe incLudes the U.S., Japan and the four
nebrer Member states of the community: uK, Iretand, Denmark and Greece. These
Communjty countr.ies saw, in generaL, a stronger convergence on the Communityrs cycIe
in the'ieventies, bt.tt not to a higher degree than their convergence on the 0ECD
cyc Le.
This anaLysis of correLation coeffjcients, white having the merit of simpticity'
does contain some problems of statistic;a[ bias to the extent that the larger countries
may contribute heaviLy to the movement of the QECD total, and are present or absent
from the Community tolal as the case may be. To cross-check the findings a more
sophist'icated statisticaL technique (principaL components anaLysis) has atso been
used. In the present appL'icat'ion the matrix of bitateraI correLation coefficients
betueen individuaL countriesr growth patterns in the tLro successive decades 11ere
anaLysed (e.g. Germanyrs growth pattern in the rseventies t.|as correLated '9 on
France, the UK r"r.,r.."tlt"C .8 on the U.S., etc.). In scannjng the compLete
acononic grovth rates (6Df'ot GNP) in thc 1960rs end 1970's'
.ouiii.i"ni. from the tevel.s observed in thc period 1961-1970 to thosc
- i i"glon. or countries vlis-a-vis thc oEco as a rhote ("'>l or thc Ec
Chart : CorreIation of
tfrJile in corretation
observed in 1971-1980,
(1)(+)
rt oHec(l) GR IRL
o
o
o
G
o
o
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3{.{
Countries uhose cYcLes are
nore closety correlated
rith..the EC
Countries rhose cYctes lrc
aore ctosety corretatcd
rith the oECD
('t )
(2)
The direction of change is indicated by thc lrroes, the position of thc lrrovhead
injii.,i"g the IeveI i{ corre[ation obierved in the 1970's and the base of thc
arrou being the corretation obtaining in the 1960's'
Other Europe, excl'uding EC.
>3
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set of corre[ation coefficients the technique identifies a notionaI growthpattern that explains the maximum percentage variance in aLL countriesr growthpatterns; and then a second growth pattern that exptains the next [argestpercentage of the variance. The resuLts broadLy confirm the findings atready
reported (see TabLe). Thus in the rsixt'ies the same group of the originat
"six" and other non-EC European countries find themsetves to be the most
sign'ificant cycLicat[y convergent group: in the rseventies this group'is joined
by lta[y (and, curiously, Canada), and the whole grouprs mutuat convergence is
of a much higher order too. In the rseventies the group consist'ing <lf the US,
Japan, the UK, Iretand, Denmark and Greece is aLso confirmed as the second mostimportant set of cycticaLty convergent economies.
TabLe : Principal components of annuaL GDP growth rates 1961-70 and 1971-80 (2)
(Factor loadings on major economic growth patterns in the 0ECD area)
Predominant growth pattern Secondary growth pattern
1961-1970 1971-1980 1961-',|970 1971-1980
GR ,93
usA ,86J ,83
uK ,75DK ,71
rRL ,66
B
D
DK
F
NI
oiec (1 )
r85
,83
,76
r74
r67
r53
B
NL
I
gxsg (1 )
F
Canada
D
,95
,89
,88
,84
,79
,70
,67
J ,82I ,64
rRL ;61
Proport'ion of totaI variance of 0ECD growth rates exptained by the
above growth patterns.
34r32 62122 21,82 14,42(
(1) 0ECD Europe, exctuding EC"
(2) For a description of the technique,
"Exptoring Data Structures" (vot. A,
London 1977.
see 0rMuircheartaigh and Payne (eds.),pp. 89-124), John t.litey and Sons,
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3. ExtennaL performance : baLance of payments
The adjustment of baLances of payments to the most recent round of oiLpri.r in..".ses has so far been reIat'iveLy stow. Th'is is part'icuLarLy
so for the community which continues to experience a substantiaI current
account deficit. This is due to a number of adverse factol's not the
teast of which has been the veny [arge appreciation of the US dolLar
which has proLonged the terms of trade deterioration initiated by the
oiL price incru.i"s of 1979 and 1980. The Community members, however,
have had reLativety LittLe difficuLty in financing their current deficits
and the capitaL ftows resuLting from interest rate and exchange rate
deveLopments, aLthough financ'ing was [argeLy by means of pubIic sector
externaL borrowing. Senvices continue to pLay an important ro[e in
Community countries !externa L transactions,
The Communityrs deficit is expected to
to come. So far as 1981 is concerned, it is
decrease, aLthough onLy very sL'ightIy. Both
Un'ited Kingdom wi L L be 'in surpLus on current
3.1
remain sizeable for some Years
expected that the defi c i t wi L L
the NetherLands and the
account. AmonE the other
3.1 Adjusting to the oiL price increases
progress towards reducing the deficits induced by the oiL price
increases has been sLr:wen in the community than in other majon indusriaL
countries. The incnei:lse in oi t pricesr occurred at a time when the
CommunityIscurrentbaLanceWaSaIreadydeterioratingduetoasharp
rise in imports in 1979 whjch contjnued into 1980. The position was
made worse as companed to 1973-4 by tl"re very substantial- difference in
the performance of the German current account which' despite the quadrupIing
of the plice of oiL 'inr Late 1973, improved sharpLy in 1974 and Largety
accounted for the reL,ativeLy modest e1'fect of the 1973 otL price increase
on the Communjtyrs current baLance as a whole. In 1979, however' the
non-oiL trade baLance in Germany t^ras cleterionating sLightLy which, combined
t"lith the oi t pri ce increases and a continued deterioration in other items
of the current account, pushed the German current account into a substantiaL
def.icit. Hence for the Community as er whoLe, the current account deteriorated
by 23 000 miLLion ECU in 1979 and by a further 19 000 miLLion Ecu in 1980
so that the current defic'it was much t.arger than after the oiI price
increases of 1973-1974.
33
3.?
member countries onLy Germany and Denmark witL have a sLightLy improved
position this year with modest decLines in the size of their deficits
whi[e in rretand and Be[gium the current deficits witt increase signifi-
cantLy. |ilhiLe forecasts for 1982 suggest some improvement, the deficitis stiIL expected to remain very Large. The German current account position
wiLL be substantial'Ly improved but some deterioration is expected in the
French deficit. The deficits of the othen communjty members wiLt remain
broadLy unchanged but the united Kingdomrs surpLus wiLL decLine sharp[y
whiLe that of the NetherLands wiLL increase. Thus there has not yet been
an overatI recovery of the communityfs externaI position in the first
two years after the tatest round of oit price increases.
In the u-s- and Japan there t",as a more immediate response to the
oiI price increases. rmports feil. sharpLy in 19g0 and this, combined
wjth a very strong export performance, hetped to counteract the deterio-
ration in the terms of trade. The very strong export performance of
both the u.s- and Japan may have owed something to the structure of the
grobrth in worLd imports when there were substantiaL increases in the
vaLue of imports in Opec countries and in European countries, both within
and outside the community, but imports dectined in the U.s., Japan and
canada. UndoubtedLy aLso the increase in U.S. and Japanese exports is
at teast partLy due to the Lagged effects of the depreciation of their
currencies in previous years.
In the community, on the other hand, not onty did imports continue
to grow in 1980 but atso the communityrs export performance was
reLat'iveLy weak. Thus, for some years now, the Communityrs exports
3"3
have been growing in voLume terms more sLow[y than its export markets
so that the community has been Los'ing market share. This is in sharp
contrast to the United States which has been gaining market shares
over the past few years. Japan has had a somewhat variabLe performance
with very sharp Losses in market share in 1978 and 1979 and with a strong
recovery in 1980 and 1981.
The sLow adjustment by the Community of its externaL position
is aLso due to a continuing deterioriation of the terms of trade into
1981- Because the inmediate effect of a deprecjation is to a[ter the
terms of trade unfavourabLy white the favourabLe reaL effects onLy resuLt
later, the recent depreciation of community currencies against the doLLar
has had an unfavourabLe impact on the Communityts current account' Thus
whiLe the U.S. and Japan are experiencing the favourab[e effects of the
depreciation of their currencies in the period 1977 to 1979, the depreciation
of commun.ity currencies against the doLLar in 1980 and 1981 has proLonged
the terms of trade deterioration initiated by the oiL price increases.
0ver the three years 1979 to 1981 the cumulative terms of trade Loss for
the community amounted to 2.9 7, of GDP and, aLthough the reLative
terms of trade Loss for the community is Less than that incurred by Japan,
theCommunity.stermsoftredecontinuedtodeterioratethisyearwhiLe
in both the U.S. ancl Japan there were no further terms of trade Losses'
This, combined with thejr much stronger reaL performance,
enabled them to ach'ieve the continued improvements in their baLances of
payments.
t,jthjn the community the terms of trade Loss re[ative to GDP has been
Very Large for some of the smaL[er Community members (Iretand, Greece' BLEU and
Denmark) and for ltaLy. For the other members there has been a Loss equi-
vatent to about 2% of GDP in the two years 1980 and 1981 except for the
u.K. which had a sLight terms of trade gain' one or two
community members have begun the process of offsett'ing the terms of trade
Loss of the past three years. Both Denmark and the NetherLands have had
a very strong adjustment of net reaL exports amounting to a cumuLative 7'9%
of 1978 GDP in the case of Denmark and 4.8% of 1978 GDP in the NetherLands
over the three years 1979 to 1981. Germany and Greece have aLso improved
their net exports but not sufficientLy to offset the terms of trade loss.
)5
3.4
Overa[[, therefore, the pronounced movements in exchange rates
have so far hindered the adjustment of the Community to the oiL price increases.
0n the other hand the prospects for the coming years Look somewhat better
t'Jhi Le the appreciat jon of the U.S, doLLar has had an
immediate adverse'impact on the Communityts baLance of payments, the
Communityrs competitive position has 'improved. Its reaL net exports
are thus expected toincrease in 1982 whiLe the terms of trade wiLL stabiLise.
3.2 Financing and reserves
The Commun'ity's current account def icit of 31,000 mi LLion EcUl)in 1980
was financed by infLows of capitaL ofnearty 281000 miLLion ECU and by a faLL
in totaL reserves of 31000 miLLion ECU. The faLL in reserves is explained
whol[y by a very sharp reduction of 11,000 miLLion ECU in the reserves of
Germany part'ia[[y offset by reserve gains by aIL the other members. For
Germany the net capitat inftow was negIigibLe and the current account deficit
was whoLLy financed by the faLL in reserves. This occurred despite substantiaL
infLows of officiat capitaL both through direct officiaL borrow'ing and other
officiaL infLows which were offset by Large scaLe private sector outfLows
most[y associated with changing interest rate differentia[s on the DM vis-i-vis
the USD and the changed outlook for the DM as a result of the current account
deficit.
ALI- the other member states, apart from the United Kingdom, had a
positive infLow on capitaL account. However it shouLd be noted that in many
cases the favourabLe net capitat position and'increase in reserves
resuLted from targe scate public sector foreign borrowing. Thus a[[
Community members had officiaL recourse to the internationaL capitaL markets
to finance their baLance of payments and/or budgetary deficits with the
1) See footnote to tabLe 3.3
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exception of the Nethertands and the United Kingdom. t,|lhite exact detaits
of public sector externaL borrowing are not avaiLable it js cLear that for
BeLgium, Denmark, IreLand and Germany pubLic sector externaI borrowing tl;as
a dominant element in the net capitat, position of the batance of payments.
In France and ltaly, on the other hand, there appear to have been sizeable
private sector inftows in addition to pubLic sector borrowing mainLy in the
form of bank capitat transactions.
The recourse to pubLic sector externaL borrowing is in part a recogn'it'ion
of the fact that adjustment to the oiL price increases cannot be immediate and
that ba[ance of payments defic'its wiLt have to be financed for a number of
years. Howeverl in some Member Stattls the recourse to foreign borrowing
is re[ated not only to balance of payments fjnancing but aLso to the need to
finance domestic pubLic sector deficits; recourse to domestic markets for
financing these deficits wouLd have clisturbed domestic cap'itaL markets unduLy'
Thus in BeLgium, IreLand, Greece and Germany officiaL externaL borrowing was
used to finance both fiscaL deficits and externaL deficits' 0n the other hand'
it must be recogn.ised that recourse to officiaL externaL borrowing, especiaLLy
where this is denominated in foreign currency and the exchange risk is borne
by the borrower may'increase future tlatance of payments financing probLems as
a result of the need to serv'ice externat debts' Thus in 1980 officiaL externaL
debt amounted to between 9 and 1O % c>I GDP in Belgium and Greece' over 16 % of
GDp in Denmark and over 25 % of GDP 'in IreLand. As outstanding externaL debt
increasesrthe yressures for poLicies uf aujustrrrcrtt wiLL irrcrease aLsu'
DespitetheIossofexchangereservesduringlgS0thetotaLstockofreserves
at the end of the year h,as greater than the previous year due Largely to
changes in the vatue of goLd. Of the totaL stock of reserves at the end of
1980 over 7O% was in the form of goLd hoLdings. It shou[d be noted that
in tabl.e 3.4 goLd has been vaLued at a market reLated price for each Community
member whereas in the officiaI reserve statements of the member states goLd
is vaIued according to nationat va[uat'ion methods. NevertheLess it is ctear
that gotd is the [argest component of Community reserves. Given the substantiaL
s-l
3.6
fLuctuations in the price of goLd there is a reLuctance to give goLd its
fuLt market vaLue and there is a tendency to va[ue goLd conservative[y.
The ftuctuations in the price of goLd and the narrowness of goLd markets
reLative to centraL bank stocks aLso make CentraI Banks reLuctant to use
goLd activeLy as a reserve asset and goLd feserves are notnl mainty used as
asset backing for aIternative forms of officiaL baLance of payments finan-
cing, e.g. direct government to government borrowing, and to maintain
credit worthiness for officiaI borrowing in the international. capitat markets,
It shoutd aLso be noted that a portion of the Communityrs goLd stock has
been partially monetised in the form of swaps aga'inst ECU which are in turn
used for intra centraL bank settlements within the Community. The Communityrs
hotdings of currency assets amounted to over 66 000 miLtion ECU at the end
o'f 198O' of which the majority were held in dolLar form. Nevertheless,
other currencies accounted for about one sixth of this totaI and were
reLat'iveIy important in the cases of the U.K., IreLand and ItaIy.
3.3 Services and transfers
WhiLe the imports and exports of merchandise are generaLLy the most
important and Largest items in the gross fLows of payments underLying the
current account balance, in terms of their contribution to the net baLance,
the services and transfers parts of the current account can have an important
infLuence on the overaLL current account position. Thus the deterioration
in the current account baLance of the Community in 1980 t,las the result of a
deterioration not onLy in the ba[ance in merchandise trade but aLso in the
services account. ALthough the gross flows of payments on services and transfers
may be substantiaLty smaLLer than those on merchandise trade account, their
effect on the net ba[ance of payments on current account can be equaILy impor-
tant. The main components of the current account batances of the Community and
the U.S. and Japan are g'iven in table 3.5. Variations in the net batance of
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services and transfers can be quite substantiaL ( I 0.4% of GDP ) aLthough'
particu[arLy at the time of stnucturaI shocks such as the rounds of oiL
price'increases, the fLuctuations are generaLLy smaLLer than those of
the trade account. Both the communjty and the united states are net exporters
of services. In the United States the favourabLe net ba[ance on services
has been growing to reach a massive 1.4 % of GDP in 1980, more than off-
setting the negative batance on trade account even after the initiaL shock
of the 1979 oiL price increases. In the community the net baLance of ser-
vices feLL up to 1975 but has subsequentLy 'increased to 0.5 7. of GDP'
The Community, on the other hand, tends to have a substantiaL deficit
in transfer payments which in absolute terms has been growing year by year
and amounted to 0.8 % of GDP in 1980. UnLike the commu-
n'ity and the U.S., Japan has generaLLy a deficit both on services and transfer
payments which in 1980 amounted to'l-2 7" of GDP.
Gross receipts and expenditure on externaL services for the Commun'ity
amounted to 1851000 and 1741000 miLlion ECU in 1980 or about 9 % of Community
GDp. However the.importance of trade in services to the baLance of payments
varies among the community members. TabLe 3.6 indicates the size of gross
externaL service ftows reLative to totaL trade in goods and services for the
community and the members. For the community as a whoLe the service component
of trade in goods and services amounted to 28% of exports and 26% of imports
in 1980.
In Denmark and BeLgium the importance of services in the current account
has been grow.ing w.ith the ratio ris'ing tron 24 7, to 35 7. tor exports and
?5 % to over 33 % for imports in Belgium from 197O to 1980 and from ?7 % to
31 % for exponts and 19 % and to 29 7. for imports in Denmark. In lreland,
ItaLy and the U.K., on the other handr'the importance of services has decLined
particuLarIy in ]reLand where service exports and imports are now reLativeLy
smaLL. The faLL in the reLative irnportance of services in IreLand is due to
the sharp rise in Irish industriaL goods exports as a resuLt of the industriaL
deveLopment poLicy. The U.K. has an exceptionaLLy high ratio of service
exports and imports but these have been faLLing in reLative terms over the
tast decade and exports and imports of services in 1980 amounted to about
31
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337' and 30% of tbtat exports and imports of goods and services, wh'ich for
exports at Least, 'is sti[[ above the Community average. fn Germany, France
and the Nether[ands, exports of services have maintained their share of
total exports of goods and services but in Germany the ratio of imports of
services has been faLLing in recent years whiLe in the NetherLands there appears
to be an upward tendency.
The composition of trade in services for the Community members is given
in table 3.7. In terms of gross fLows the biggest service item is revenue
from capitaL, i.e. interest, dividends and profits earned from or paid
abroad. The Community'is a net recipient on this account although the net
baLance is smaIL relative to the gross fLows. The fLow of payments on this
account is particuLarLy [arge in the BLEU where the $ross flows are of the
same order of magnitude as those of France, Germany and the u.K. This is
due to the ro[e of the Luxembourg banks in the internationaL money markets.
Germany and France are the Largest net recipients whiIe the U.K.rs favourabIe
net baLance is tending to dectine partLy due to the growth 'in profits remitted
by overseas oiL companies operating in the North Sea, and to the increase
in sterting investments by externaL hoIders, 'in particuLar in the oiI producing
countries.
The Commun'ity has a very substantiaL deficit on tourism which has
been increasing in recent years. The deficit is due main[y to the [arge
negative baLance on this account for Germany which in 1980 amounted to approx.
101000 miLLion ECU or1,:7% of the German GDP. The German deficit on tourism
has been growing in recent years and is a substantiaL factor in the deterio-
ration of the overa[[ Gernan current account position; the deficit on tourism
in 1980 more than offset the surplus on trade account. The two main
net recipients on this account are France and ItaLy, particu[arLy the Latter.
Among the other service sectors the Community has a smaLL net positive
baLance on transport services. These are concerned mainLy with the transport
of merchandise imports and exports and with civiI aviation, In 1979 and
1980 Germany and the NetherLands were the targest net recipients aLthough
4s
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ift previous years Germany had a smaLL deficit on-this account whiLe the
NetherLands traditionaLLy has a surpLus. Since the major Greek shipping
companies are not resident in Greece onLy their payments in Greece, mainLy
wages to seamen, are incLuded in the batance of payments. Nevertheless
this is an important item on the Greek balance of payments.
The Community aLso is in surpLus on Government and other services.
The latter incLude financiaI services and the provision of construction
services abroad etc. The [argest net rec'ipient is the U.K. partLy due to the
earnings of the City which in 1980 amounted to 2t60O miLLion ECU. France
aLso is a substantiat net earner on this account mainLy due to the neceipts
from Large scaLe foreign projects.
The Community has a very Large deficit on transfer payments which
amounted to 161000 miLLion ECU or O.8% of GDP in 1980. About one third of
the deficit is due to private sector transfer payments of which the most
important are the remittancies of foreign workersr PdrticuLarLy from Germany
ahd Francer(aIthough Ine[and, ItaLy and Greece are net recipients on this
account). The major part of the deficit reLates to pubLic or officiaL
transfers. These incLude biLateraL aid, pens'ions, and other payments to
internationaI organisations incLuding the community. Payments to community
institutions, of course, whiLe representing a net infLow or outfLow for the
individuaL members, do not affect the overaLt ba[ance of payments of the
Community, except in so far as expend'iture or receipts are incurred outside'
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Tabte 3.1
Current baLances '1979 to 1982 1000 miLtion ECU
1979 1 980 1981
( foreca st )
1982
( foreca st )
BLEU
DK
D
GR
F
IRL
I
NL
UK
- 1.5
- 2.2
- 3.7
- 0.8
+ 0.3
-t.l
+ 3.9
- 1.5
- 2.6
- 3.7
- 1.8
- 10.4
- 0.7
- 6.3
- 1.0
- 7.1
- 1,7
+ 4.6
- 5.8
- 1.7
- 8.8
- 1.0
- 7.1
- 2.2
- 7.1
+ 0.7
+ 5.3
- 5.9
-2 n
- 1.1
- tu.)
- 2.1
- 4.9
+ 3.1
+ 2.5
EC
USA
J apan
- 9.2
- 0.4
- 6.4
- 28.1
+ 2.5
- 7.7
- 27.7
+ 4.1
+ 3.6
- 23.0
-7.4
+ 9.8
Source : Commission Services.
TabLe 3.2
Changes in the terms of trade and reaL adjustment 1979 to 1981
CumuLative Terms of Trade Loss
or ga i n
as a % of 1978 GDP
CumuLative change in the reaL-.
balance of goodi and servicesl)
as a % of 1978 GDP
1979 1 980 1981 1982 1979 1980 1981 1982(forecast)(forecast) ( fo reca st )( fo re ca st )
BLEU
DK
D
GR
F
IRL
II
NL
UK
0
- 
2.7
- 0.8
- 2.9
+ 0.1
- 4.9
- 0.4
- 1.5
+ 1-1
-?<
- 
4.2
- 
2.1
-7 7
- 2.1
- 9.5
- 3.3
- 2.7
+ 2.9
- 5.5 - 6.4
- 5.5 - 5.3
_ 3.1 _ 3.2
- 12.s - 16.9
- 1.6 - 4.1
-17.6 -17.2
- 5.6 - 6.1
- 2.5 - 1.1
+ 2.5 + ?.0
-0.6 +0.1 +1.0
+ 5.2 + 7.9 + 8.4
- 0.9 + 1.0 + 2.6
+1.0 +1.8 +2.3
-1.1 -1.3 -0-2
+ 0.5 - 1.1 + 1.3
- 4.4 - 1.5 - 0.7
+ 2.2 + 4.8 + 5.8
- 1.2 - 0.9 - 1-6
-1n
+ 1.2
- 1.1
-ne
-n7
- 4.8
-1?
+ 0.8
- 2.3
EC
USA
Japan
- 0.5
- 0.?
- 2.1
- 1.6
- 1.4
- 5.1
- 2.6
- 1.1
- 4.9
- 2.9
- 1.3
- 5.1
- 1.0
+ 0.4
- 0.9
-1.1 +0.3 +0.8
+ 1-3 + 0.7 + 0.2
+ 1.8 + 3.1 + 4.1
1) nationat accounts basis
Source ; Commission estimates.
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TabLe 3.3
Batance of payments financing 1980-1981 1000 mi L t ion ECU
Cu r rent
ba Lance
Non-moneta ry1 )
capi ta t.
SDR
aLLocation
Change in
,", 
"au"r 
3 )
Ba nks
1 980
BLEU
DK
D
GR
E
i*rz)
I
NL
UK
- 3.7
- 1.8
- 10.4
- 0.7
- 6.3
- 1.0
- 8.6
- ?.9
+ 4.6
+ 1.5
+ 1.6
+ 4.9
+ 0.7
+ 5.5
+ 0.9
+ 3.1
+ 0.4
- 6.3
2.4
0.3
5.7
0.2
5.4
0.6
6.2
3.2
2.1
0.1
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.0
n1
0.1
0.3
+ 0.3
+ 0.1
- 11.0
+ 0.2
+ 4.8
+ 0.5
+ 0.8
+ 0.8
+ 0.7
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
EC - 30.8 + 12.3 + 14.7 + 1.0 - 2.8
1)
2)
3)
inctudes errors and omissions
est inat ed
excluding gotd va[uation changes
Note: figures are on a transactions basis except for Itaty and the Netherlands which
are on a payments basis. This expLains the discrepancy in the current batances
of these tt.lo countries and hence in the E.C. totaL compared with those shown in
tab[e 3.1.
Source : Commission Services.
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TabIe 3.4
0fficiaI reserves 1000 miLtion ECU
IfvlF Position
and SDRs
Cu rrenc y
As set s
1979 1980
0.9 1.00.2 0.23.6 3.2
- 
n,l
1.0 1.50.1 0.10.6 1.10.8 0.90.9 1.4
1979 1980
1 .7 2.72.0 2.4
27 .7 23.60.6 0.86.6 10.5
1.4 1.98.4 9.52.1 s.2
11 .7 12.4
1979 1980
't0.4 19.50.5 0.9
28.9 54.30.9 1 .724.8 46.70.1 0.2
24.2 38.0
13.3 25 .1
5 .5 10.7
Tota L
1979 1980 1981
13.0 2s.2 23.5
2 .7 3.5 3.5
60 . ? 81 .1 84.3
1 .6 2.6 2.4
32.5 58.7 56.2
1 -6 2.2 2.2
29.3 48.6 45.0
16.2 29 .2 27 .2
16.1 24.5 25.1
Go Ld
BLEU
DK
D
GR
IRL
I
NL
UK
1981
1.2
0.3
3.8
0.1
2.1
0.?
1.4
1.2
2.3
1981
4.0
2.3
29.4
0.6
10.2
1.8
79
2.4
1?.7
1981
18.3
0.9
51 .1
1.7
43.9
0.2
35.8
23.6
10.1
EC 8.1 9.5 12.6 62.2 67 .O 71 .2 104.6 197.1 185.6 175,1 273.6 269.4
Note : 1979 and 1980, end December; 1981 end June.
Source : Commission Services.
TabLe 3.5
Components of the current b"L"nre1)
% of GDP
EC(10)
Merchandise trade batance
Ba[ance of services
BaLance of transfers
TotaL current account
USA
Merchandise trade ba[ance
BaLance of services
Batance of transfers
TotaI curra]nt account
Japan
Merchandise trade ba[ance
BaIance of services
Batance of transfers
TotaL current account
1970
+ 0.5
+ 0.4
- 0.6
+ 0.3
+ 0.2
+ o.4
- 0.3
+ 0.3
+ 1.9
- 0.9
- 0.1
+ 0.9
1975
+ 0.6
+ o.2
- 0.8
U
+ 0.6
+ 0.9
- 0.3
+ 1.2
+ 1.0
- 1.1
- 0.1
+ 0.1
1979
- 0.5
+ 0.7
- 0.8
- 0.6
- 1.3
+ 1.5
- 0.2
0
+ 0.2
- 0.9
- 0.1
- 0.6
1980
- 1.2
+ 0.5
- 0.8
- 1.5
- 1.0
+ 1.4
- 0.3
+ 0.1
+ 0.2
- 1.1
- 0.'t
- 1.0
1) baLance of payments basis.
Source : Commission Services.
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TabLe 3.6
Exports and imports
goods and servi ces
of services 1970 - 1980 as % of total exports and imports of
1970 1975 1978 1979 1 980
BLEU exports
'inports
DK export s
imports
D exports
'impo rt s
GR exports
imports
F exports
'import s
IRL exports
'imports
I export s
imports
NL exports
imports
UK exports
imports
24.1
25.0
27.0
19.3
20.2
27 .4
/+4.3
19, q
26.0
25.'i
29.6
13.2
"n|i
26.6
23.t)
36.6
?2 11
28.3
27.2
28.7
21.5
19.8
28.6
44.6
18 .0
?6.8
?1 Q
14 .7
24.7
23.0
25.5
24.5
3/r.?
27 .1
tY-l
27 .3
31 .1
25.4
20.4
27 .9
49.3
17 1
79.7
26.3
19 .4
lr+.u
?4.0
20.8
25.0
?4.3
32 
"8
26.5
30.6
?9.1
s1 .2
26 -6
20.1
23.8
48.8
16.6
26.8
23.2
1?1
A7
24.7
tv .o
27 .4
27 .0
32.3
27 .4
34.9
33.2
30.5
29.4
20.6
23.5
51.1
17.3
29.0
24.0
:
26.8
19.7
29.5
29.3
32.6
30.0
,.1 ) exPorts
inports
27 .O
25.7
?5.9
?6.2
26.2
25.8
26.0
24.5
28.0
25.9
1) Gross: incLudes
Source: Commission
i nt ra and ext ra .
Servi ces.
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TabLe 3.7
Services in the baLance of payments 1980
1000 miLLion ECU
T rans po rt
+-
77 ? ?J 
-J1.9 1.67.8 4.60.7 0.5
7 .7 8.0
4.0 5.0
7.1 5.3
10.1 9 .2
Touri sm
1 .3 2.4
1.0 1.2
4.8 15.01.2 0.25.9 4.3
6.4 1 .4
1.2 3.3
5 .0 4.6
I nvestment
i ncome
12.8 12.9 0.40.7 2.0 :9.5 8.2 1.70.1 0.3 :
13.2 11.6 't.2
3.8 4.3 1.5
7.4 7.6 0.4
13.5 13.6 :
Gove rnment3) Tota L
+-
22.9,23.0
5.3 5.7
36.2 41 .83.0 1 .3
38.2 32 .3
20.2 16.4
20.4 20.4
38 .5 33.0
ot h er4)
+-
BLEU
DK
D
UK
IRL
I
NL
UK
0.3 1.0
. n1
2.7 4.5
: 0.1
1.5 1 .5
0.2 0.2
n< n?
: 1.7
0.3.3.7 3.80.1 1.6 0.8
1 -2 7 -9 10.10.1 0-9 0.20.9 8.7 6.0
0.4 4.3 5.10.3 4.0 3.62.0 8.2 3.6
EC1) 43.1 37 .5 26 .7 32 .3 61 .1 60.6 : : 9.4 5.3 39.2 33.1 184.7 173.9
1) Gross : inc[udes intra and extra.2) eg : frontier workersretc.
3) MiLitary, representationa[, etc.4) FinanciaL and other services.
Source : Commission Services.
TabLe 3.8
Transfers in the baLance of payments 1980 r000 miLLion ECU
Private2) PubLic3) Tota L
BLEU
DK
D
GR
IRL
T
NL
UK
-^1)
+
0.5
0
0.5
0.8
1.1
1Z
0.5
1.3
5.6
NR
0.1
4.7
0
2.9
0.3
0.8
1.8
11 .4
+
0.7
0.7
4.1
0
3.3
2.1
1.9
1.6
14.3
1.4
0.6
9.5
0
4.4
?.4
2.2
4.6
25.0
+
1.2
0.7
4,6
0.8
4.4
3.4
2.1
?.9
20.1
2.1
0.7
14.2
0
7.3
2.7
3.0
6.4
36.4
1) Gross : incIudes intra and extra.2) PrincipaLLy emigrants rremittances.
3) PrincipaLty aid to deveIoping countries and contributions to/receipts from the
Community budget.
Solrce : Commi ssion Servi ces.
Due to the strength of Community currencies in 1979 and 1980, the impact of the
oii p.ice shock has been marginal[y Less than in 1.974- 75 aLthough
exchange rate deveLopmentshave extinded the period of adjustment. The divergence
in itpi.tt on individuat countries has been greater than previous[y but these
effects have been moderated by a more restrai.ned'domestic response which has
absorbed the shock rather than ampLified it. Thus there has been a generaL
reLuctance to cushion economies from externaL price rises and wage reaction has
been more moderate, aLthough probIems of inadequate corporate profitabi Lity
remain in a nunbcr-of csur.ttries. the shatp depreciation of Cotnmuni-ty currencies
in 1981 has regutted in a considerable improvement in the retativJcost pirsition
but has ats6 added irnporlantLy to infLationary tcnCencies'.The stabi tity of
irir,.;g"-""t"r-rittin'tht EMs.in the Beriod up {o 16€''ceaLignment of 4 october
has, however, not been accomBanied by greate" convergence of infIation performance'
4h
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4. Pri costs, i ncome di st ri buti on e4C-fqlg$-ve cosl rformance
4.1 Pri ces
Consumer price trends in the Community, measured by the impLicit price
index of consumersr expenditure (TabLe 4.1) continued to acceterate on a year-
to-year basis in 1980 despite some stoudown noted in the Latter part of the
year. Hotrever this deceLeration fron 1419% in the twelve months to ftlay 1980
to 1313% by December rlas halted and some further pick-up was recorded in the
early months of 1981. Forecasts for 1981 as a Hhole suggest that this should
be a temporary phenomenon and that a continuation in the downrard trend can
be expected in the second half of the year giving a Community average defLator
of 11r3%, narginatLy down from the 1980 Level of 1',|28%. This trend is forecast
to continue into 1982 when the average rate for the Community is projected to
faLf. to 1Or4%.0veratL the deceLeration in prices could be sLower in the
coming period than that recorded after the previous oiL price shock'
The trend
domesti c costs,
did not increase
in the GDP price defLator, uhich reflects the overaLt change in
showed a more even deveLopment over the most recent period and
at such a rapid pace in 1980 as in 1975. 0f greater note, however,
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is the absence of an immediate s?cond round reaction-to'the terms of trade Loss
in domestic costs vhercas in the earLier period the initiaL impact was amplified
substantiatLy, as can be seen in Tabte 4.1 for 1975. This more favourabte
position is, neverthetess, counterbatanced by the tagged'profi[e of the adjust-
ment shown in the forecasts rith the Community defLator dropping by tess than
tt{o percentage pointsover the period 1980-1982, compared nith the massive drop
of 4 percentage points recorded in 1976.
0n an overalt basis the divergencies in inftation rate performance by
countries in 19E1 confirm existing cLassifications of inftation groups. Thus
the ttlember States experiencing Lov inflation remain the Federat Republic of
Germany,andtheBene[uxcountriesatLwithinaran9eofbetueen5,8and8Z
An intermediate group from11 to14?( nou also includes the United Kingdom, as
wetL as Denmark and Frence, whi[e to the higher group, betueenl9r5 and 242 and
inctuding Itaty (where tlte price accet€ration has beef* bigger thbn :in-'tgZ4-75)
snd lreLand, must be added Greece which has moved irp from the middLe group.
TabLes 4.? and 4.5 endeavour to give a more detaiLed account of price
trends by commodity and by origin, aLthough there are some Limitations in the
data avai tabte aLready referned to in the previous Annuat Review. The
category fuet and Light continues to outpace the price rises of other goods
in the latest period avai Lab[e atthough at a community LeveL increases in this
category are moderating. This, houever, is not the case in a[[ member countries.
tn the NetherLandgand to a Lesser extent in the Federat Republic of Germany,
energy prices have acceLerated primariLy due to the Lag in the Linking
of natural gas prices to those of oiL. It should be noted that other categories,
particu[arIy non-food goods and services atso contain energy components.
Non-food goods were again the largest contributor to the rise in prices,
by virtue of their we'ight in the totaL, but this contribution
t
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has decLined in the most recent period studied. Aside from "fuet and [ight" onLy
the category',services" has made a greater contribution to the rise in prices
than its weight in the total woutd warrant. This was particularLy true in the
case of ltaty;due mainLy to more substantiaL adjustments than usuaI in the early part
of the year of pubLic utitity charges and insurance.OnLy in France and BeLg'ium
have services not shown a greater contribution to infLation than their weight in the
totat. This generat movement couLd indicate,some seconciary reaction to the initiaL
shock or a mofe speedy adjustment of pubLic entreprise charges. The category "food"
is stiLL.having a moderating effect on infLation aLthough some upward pressure is
evident in the most recent period as Community agreed price increases feed through
into the index.
The other method of examining the components of inflation is shown in
Tabte 4.3 yhich shous the contribution of principaL inputs to the rise in the
prjce of totaL finaL expenditure. The contribution of imports to the rise in the
totaf. price level is 3167, in 1981, A[though the contributions
in the individuaL years are far Less than the massive 8r3t contribution recorded
in 1924 this has been mainty due to the greater strength of Community currencies
against the doLLar than in 1974. Since the beginning of 1981 this effect has
worked in the opposite direction so proLonging the stjmu[us to the rise in domestic
prices. ALthough unit Labour costs contributed less to infLation in 1980 than in
'1974, a more sjgnificant factor is that of the dectine in their contribution
estimated in 1981 uith a further tapering-off assumed in 1982 as against the severe
ampf.ificqt'ion of the initiaI shock recorded in 1975. Indirect taxes are also shown
tb have. contributed somewhat more'to infLation in the recent period refLect'ing,
undoubtedLy, attempts by governments to change tax structufes ?P{q( redress their
targe deficits, this Ueing-particu[arLy the case in the UK in 1979 and 1980.
In general, the price Level has been affected to a considerable degree in
most Community countries by the l"ack of government intervention in the price
adjustment process. Poticy has tended to ptace substantiaLty Iess retiance on
direct controls as a means of timiting inflation, preferring in most cases to tet
the futt impact of externat shocks bear on domestic priqgs. ALso mogt countries,have
been quicker to-adjust taxes on the consumption of energy
as against the experience recorded earLier where the reaL vaLue of such
taxes h,as rapidty eroded. Commulri ty poIicy on f arm
products has continued to work in a price stabiLising direction.aLthough this has
been dictated to a greater extent by the desire to avoid excess supply on markets
rather than to infLuence infLation rates directLy. InitiaI Commission proposals for
the 1981 182 agricu[turaL year were for an average increase in common prices of 7r8X
but this 1.1as subsequentty raised by the CounciL to 9147,. As can be seen from tabte
4.2:ncreases in food prices in the Community since 1978 have been Less than the
rise jn the generaL Price [eveL.
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4.2 Labour costs
The rise in nominaL wages and sataries per person decelerated in 1981
to 1Jr1% in the Conmunity without reaching the high rate of growth recorded
in 1975 C16r3'/,); a further easing is projected tor 19E2.
A[though the overatL Ievet of divergence betyeen Member States, as
measured by standard deviations, h,as slightly Less in 1980 than in 1925, the
improvement has been Less pronounced in 1981. Additionatty, divergence is
considerabty greater among the EMS group of countries in 1980 and 1981 (with
standard deviations of 519 and 5r3 respectively) than was the case betueen
snake currencies jn 1975 and 1976 (3r1 and 2r5) indicating in general greater
potentiaI for disequiLibrium on foreign exchange markets. Thus for exampte
nominat per capita compensation of employees rose by over zol in rtaLy and
IreLand in 1980 compared to 5r7% in the Nethertands (the country r.lith the
lowest Labour cost increase). For 1981 some improvement is registered, rlith
the increases moving down to 1913"1 for Itaty, to 18r47a for lreland but aLso
to 4'3% for the Nether[ands. It shouLd be noted that the gap has not been
bridged by greater productivity in the high wage countrjes since the gain in
productivity (measured by the increase in votume of GDp per head) average
around 'l% p.a. in these three countries for the two years in question.other
Ettls countries in 1980 were ranked between these extremes in the ascending
order Federat RepubIic of Germany, Betgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and France,
and this order was maintained in 1981. Devetopments in the United Kingdom
showed a marked slowdown in nominaI per cap'ita compensation of employees
estjmated for 1981 after a steep upulard trend from 1977 and refLects the very
severe macroeconomic and monetary conditions. However, despite this turnaround with
a near halving of nominaL pay rises from z1z in 1980 to 1?% in 19g1 2 onLy
timited progress has been made towards compensating for the massive rises in
reat compensation of employees over the years 1978 to 1980 since the rate of
infLation is faL[ing rapidLy as wetL.
The performance of reaI compensation of empLoyees may be considered
together with institutionaI mechanisms for the indexation of pay, or otherwise.
In Belgium, Luxembourg and ltaLy which have the most comprehensive and rapidLy-
work'ing systems of tinking hourLy trages to a price index (in the Latter country the jndex-
ation system uas even speeded up in trlarch 1980 by making adjustments at quarterLy intervats
in the pubLi c sector), reaI compensation of employees has appeared immune'to cutbacks,
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aLthough this was also the case in certain countries where indexation does not appLy. In the
Nethertands and Denmark where indexation systems are semi-annuaL and partiaL (the
index used not incLuding'in particuLar, the effects of increases in indirect taxes -
atready since 1963 in the Danish case) the resutts have been mixed. The indexat'ion
system in the NetherLands xas modified in Juty 1980 when , an indexation payment was
rep[aced by a fixed sum and in January 1981 when measures were taken to achieve a
reduction of 2 percentage points in the automatic Iink, as wetL as a reduction
of O15 percentage po'intsin hoLiday aItowances. These changes wouLd appear from
the tabte to have achieved the aim desired of reducing reaL compensation in 1980
and 1981. In Denmark energy prices were excLuded from the index with effect from
January 1979 and the index was rebased again in 1980 (with the aim of reducing the
number of tranches of indexation payments)and tt.lo tranches actuaLLy aboLished in
f{arch 1980 (1). However atthough the reduction in purchasing power brought about
has been significant in the past' forecasts for 1982 suggest
some recovery in purchasing poyer, on the basis of present poLicies,
in 1982. For IreLand, uhere indexation i s not di rect Ly
appLied but tends to form the starting point for pay negotiationsrreat compensation
of emptoyees increased quite vigorousLy, aLthough some sLowdown is estimated for
Ireland in 1981, after the massive increases of the previous three years. In
France where only the minimum saLary is indexed reaL compensation showed steady
progress over the period.
The other non-indexed countries have aLso foLLowed differing paths. Thus
in the FederaL RepubLic of Germany, reaL compensatjon has increased each year
up to 1981 although at somewhat more modest rates in the period 1g7g-19ti0 whereas
in the United Kingdom periods of Large rises in reat compensation have aLternated
uith faLLs.
OveratL it is cLear that in certain countries indexation, even in cases
where infLation has been kept down, produced rigid'ities which made adjustment
more difficutt and Ljmited the powers of poLicy to confront probLemsrbut it is
aLso obvious that the absence of automatic indexation did not etiminate aLL
probLems of rapid adjustment. Indexation practices are in themseLves highly
variabte in their actual- appt'ication, and for this reason the Commissionrs recent
Recommendation on Indexatjon Lays particutar stress on the principLes that
shoutd govern their use.
(1) For further detaiLs see European Economy, No 8 - March 1981.
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Table 4.5, which gives figures for labour costs per unit of output, shows
a fajrLy s'imiLar though somewhat more encouraging picture than the previous tabLe'
Thus rea[ [abour costs per unit of output rose substant'iaL Ly Less in the Commun'ity
in 1978 to 1981 than in 196as wage cLa'ims were pitched at a more moderate LeveL '
0n a country basis the onLy exceptions were the FederaL Republic of Germany,
where productivity performance has weakened, in contrast t{r previous r.esuLts, and
Ire[and..where rages rose reniskabLy, but where some improvement shoutd come through in
1981 and 1982 as empLoyer resistance firms up. In BeLgium reaL Labour costs
per unit of output continue to increase steadi[y over the period
covered in the tabte. Another country which saw substantial
problems emerge in f980 was Luxembourg. Here the erratic year to year movements
in the GDP defLator compLicate the anaLys'is but some sLippage seems to have been
recorded on the wage front in 1980 and into 1981, a factor which undoubtedly led
to necent government measures on wages in the steeL industry. F.igures for the
United Kingdom for 1981 and 1982 from this tabte look considerabty more promis'ing
but s'ince tfiey do not take into account exchange rate changes, a fuLL consideration
of their imptication for competitiveness must be postponed to Section 4.4.
Apart from the probtems of diverg-ence mbntioned lb6ve, on an overaLL basis
the trend in reaL unit tabour costs for the Community in totaI suggest a re[ative[y
favourabLe position, with product'ivity growth from 1976 to 1979 exceeding the rate
of growth of [abour costs, compensating for the [arge increase in real wages in
1974-75. The butge in 1980-81 is considerabLy Less pronounced and is forecast to
be reversed in 1982.
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The impact of the oiL price shock on the terms of trade impties a Loss of
reat incomes for aLI countries except the United Kingdom. To the extent that this
transfer of reaL purchasing power from oiL importing to oiI producing countries is
not compensated for by the growth in productlvity, real incomes must faLL. In
order to preserve Lasting price/cost reLationships, th'is adjustment has
to be borne by the personaL sector if the burden is not to affect investment
and the future growth of income. Graph 4.2 shows the reaL wage gap defined as
the cumutative margin between reaL per caPitancompensation of empLoyees and
productivity, adjusted for the terms of tradb''; the cniteria for-this comparison
is an unchanged income distribution. For the Commun'ity as a whote, the graph shows
that on average in the period 1960-75 there h,as a movement in favour of wage earners.
However this overaIt deveLopment was broken down into two phases, retative
stabiLity in the sixtjes and a marked shift towards employees in the early years
of the seventies. In 1974 and 1975 there was a considerabty more pronou,rced gain
in the income share of wage earners, due in'1974 to the significantLy negative
terms of,trade and in 1975 to the decline in output, combined jn both years with
considerab[e wage resistance. In the foLtowing four years the gains in wage share
were graduatLy eroded but not significant[y enough to offset the gains made in
1974 and 1975. In 1980 the terms of trade effect again unbaLanced the situation
and a further shift towards the wage sector was recorded. However this movement
h,as more short-Ljved than in the earLier period and according to the forecasts
shoutd return to the pre-1980 Level in 1982. The conclusion to be drawn from the
Community totaI wouLd therefore be that although, on the basis of expected
devetopments, the 1980 change in jncome distribution js tikely to be adjusted
for, there stjLL remains a residuaL downward readjustment marg'in fo'r the Community
wage share if the distribtrt.ion of income which pertained in the Late sixties i'las
to be re-estabLished.
..t..
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As far as individuat ftfember States are concerned, Betgium and Luxembourg show
perhaps the most striking deveLopments. trn these countries there has been a virt-
uat[y continuous movement in favour of empLoyees in the income distributfsn 6ndont/
in the forecast for 1982 is any stabitity foreseen. The positive movernent .
in favour of wage earners has atsg been impontant in France, despite some
ftuctuations, Movements in Italy and IreLand have also been significant but
the increase in the [abour/income ratio can be explained to some degree by
movements out of subsistence agricuLture into higher pajd industriaI occupations.
The remaining countries are c[ustered in a group uith smaLL or even marginal
shifts in favour of tabour income. However naturaL gas and oiL in the NetherLands
and the United Kingdom respective[y has meant for these countries deterior-
ations for the economy as a rhote, although for manufacturjng industry the move-
ment of income distribution against profits has been substantia[.
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4.4 Retative cost Performance
0ver the period 1974-1980 unit Labour costs in manufacturing in the
Community, measured in common currency terms, rose on average by 2t4% per annum
jn retatjon to compet.itor countries outside the Community (for a'detaiLed comment-
ary on the method used and historicaL data for Member States see European Economy
No 8, March 1981, pages g'l -9n. In the United States, however, there uas an
annuat faLL of about 'l15% over the same period after an even more marked
downward trend in the opening years of the decade. A more substantiaL faLt (r87(
per anndm) was recorded in Japan in the years under study, admittedty after a
plogressive upward movement in the earIier years of the seventies.
DeveLopments unti L 1980 t,lere a product of sevenaI different factors. l{ages and
sataries in nationat currency terms rose more quickLy in both Japan and the
European Community (average of around 131l per annum) than in the United States (not
quite 1o1i,). However productjvity growth in rnanufacturing in Japan at neartyT%ppr annum !{as
substantiaLLy in excess of that in the Community (3 1/2%> which in turn was
substantiaLLy above the annuaI jncrease in the United States ( 112%>. Labour
costs per unit of output accordingLy rose over the period at annual rates of just
under 10% 1n the Communityr S 112% in the United States and 5 '112% in Japan- Annua[
data for the movements of "reLative" Labour costs in nationaL currency are
presented in the second part of TabLe 4.6 and these uere reinforced over the period
up to 1980 by deprec.iations in the effective rate of the united states do[[ar and in
1979 of the yen whiLe the opposite v,,as the case bJith respect to the Community.
Since 1979 the gap in performance has become even more pronounced with
the Japanese economy recording massive gains in competitiveness in 1979 and 1980
mainLy due to Low increases'in reLative unit Labour costs in nat'ionat currency
rei n for ced by the decIine jn the effective exchange rate. The United States
more or Less jncreased its, competitive edge buitt up in the first haLf of the decade
untjL 1980, whiLe the Communjty position continued to deteriorate both in nationat
currency and to an even greater extent irr common currency terms. More recentty
on the basis of Commissjon forecasts for 1981 a reversaL of this position can
be seen. In J apan, after some faLtering in the second haLf of '1980' productivity
is LikeLy to pick up in 1981. In additiorr wages and salaries are
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runn'ing betow 6% due to the moderate wage round of 1980, with not much acceleration
foreseen in forthcoming pay negotjations. Thus a contjnuation of the regular fatl
in Japanese reLative tabour costs in nationaI currency recorded since 1976 is
Likety to be reg'istered'in 1981rensuring that the marked appreciatjon of the
effective rate of the yen (1 4r3% in 1981 on the basis of the assumptions of
stabitity for the rest of the year) t.liLL onty have a Ljmited effect on the
accumutated competitive positjon of Japanese industry bujLt up over 1979 and
1980.0n the other handrthe dramatic rise in the effective exchange rate of the
dolLar since towards the end of 1980, has reinforced the weak position in nationaI
currency terms in 1981 of the United States, and means that the Communityrs
cost competitiveness is restored to its 1970 Leve[. The danger, however,
exi s t s that the deterioration in Europers effective exchange rate nay feed
into Labour costs to a greater extent than provided for in the forecasts.
Among the Member States, the Largest deterioration in reLative cost positjon
since 1974 has occurred in the United Kingdom. The decLine in British competitiveness
over the period 1978-80 is unparaLLeLed w'ith retative Labour costs in common
currency increasing intotaL by nearLy 602. This has invotved static or dectinjng
productivity, targe wage increases and substantiaL rises in the effective exchange
rate. Although some productivity gains may be made during 1981 and although the
exchange nate of the pound has eased againbt the doLLar, jt is stiil. re[ativeLy
firm against the continentaI currencies. 0n present exchange rate assumptions,
the effect'ive nate'of sterting, as shown in the first part of the tab[e,
wiLL onty show a s[ight depreciation, mainty as a re'sult
of positive carryover from 1980, as aga'inst strong depreciations in other
Member States. Therefore, despite a considerabLe moderation in pay demands
through the year and some gains in productivity, a further deterioration in
competitiveness cou[d be regjstered in 1981, atthough not nearty the magnitude
recorded in 1980. Taking the EtvlS group of countries together the Federat RepubIic
of Germany, Denmark and the Benetux have improved their retatjve Labour cost
positions in common currency appreciabty in 198A, targety through the faIL in
retative tabour costs in nationat curreney, but aLso with an effective excnange
'iate depreciation in Denmark. 0n the other hand, in lreland and to a lesser extent
in France and ItaLy, reLative tabour costs in common currency incneased despite
effective exchange nate depreciations in the Irish and ItaIian cases. In 1981
aLt these countries should experience an improvement in their competitjve
positions due to the Large appreciation of the doLLar. The FederaL
Republic of Germany should record a Large gain in relative
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wage costs in natjonaL currency with most deals in the 4 to 57( range in the
present round, aS productivity picks up somewhat. SimiLar, aLthough Less
favourabte, patterns shouLd appLy in the other countries. However, in Itaty
the improvement couLd be fairLy minimat as productivity decLines and wage
increases faiL to sLow down appreciably and in the United Kingdom a further
decLine 'in reLative Iaboun costs is expected.
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Box Chapter 4
Major deveLopments in Prices and Incomes PoIicy
BeLgium: FoLlowing a series of proposaLs by the Government and the entry
into force at the beginning of January 1981 of a taw containing interim andtransitionaI income restraint measure3 ("mini-taw on restraint-) which
froze incomes in excess of BF 351000 per month, except for index-Linked
increases, generaL agreement was reached between two sides of industryfor the period 1 January 1981 to 31 December 1982 on uage restraint
arrangements. These permitted the appLication of existing wage scaLes
and sectoraL agreements, provided that they had been concluded before
1 January 1981 and aLLowed an extension of these for 12 months from their
expiry date. New agreements can nou be negotiated which, depending on
working hours already in force, provide for a maximum of a 1Z per year
wage increase over and above the index-Linked increase or a phased re-duction in working hours totaLling not more than one hour at the end of
ttro years.
A freeze on prices was introduced in ApriL 1981 on the basis of 19 March
LeveLs and was extended untiL the end of May on a selective basis. Except-
ions were made for products subject to programme contracts (such as oiL)
ind I'ater for reasons of prof itabi L'ity or increased costs. price controLs
were removed on 1 October 1981. In November 1980 the [aw on rent contro[
was extended by one year, the authorised increase being raised to 6%
as opposed to 5% in 1980.
De4mark: The nationaL pay agreement urhich expired inearLy 19g1 was re-ie-tTn a number of sectors and trades in February of this year. The
agreements impLemented were negotiated separateLy in aImost aIL cases
without legaI intervention by the Government which had been the case from
1975 untit 1981 due to faiLure to obtain agreement. They provided basic pay
rises which variedby branch but-in generaL were between 1112 and2'lt?%; wagedrift was frozenuntiL. the end of the year. In addition to the measures taken in 1
to excIude energy items fr.om the uage reguLating index, a monetary Limit (0r90 Dk
per hour) was fixed for the maximum increase per index portion released. The
absence of Government LegaI intervention in the negotiations has been expLained
bythe need feLt bythe two sides of industry to reassert their autonomy as pegar
the Government, and to decentraIise negotiations aL lowing developments in each
seetor to be taken into account, as weLL as by the Goverrimentrs position on thepermissibte rise in wage incomes (see aLso box on "rncomes poticy in
Denmark" European Economy, No BrMarch 1981).
The controls on prices, profits and dividends adopted in December 1919
expired at the end of February 1981 but it was decided to extend the rentfreeze to the end of Apri[. AccordingLyr onLy very Limited reguLationsgoverning price increases exist, principat Ly aimed at controtling
monopoLies.
Fe4eraL RepubLic of Germany: No direct inftuence is exercised by the
FederaL authorities on income formation. However, the recent tax pro-
gramme which granted certain reLiefs to wage earners couLd be interpreted
as giving support to moderation in wage ctaims. As regards prices, thedesire of the authorities to let market mechanisms uork yas reftected in
recent measures to increase excise duties on mineraL oiL and abolish
certain subsidies on petroL.
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Greece: Although automatic indexation has not applied in the past, increases
Iffiii-imum Lrages and saLaries are subject to Government norms uhich take a
account of past price rises. tlage and saLary contractsr negotiated on a tri-
partite basis, inctude a cLause nhich, subject to certain restrictive con-
ditions, prouid". for a further flat rate increase in the event that price
increasls, in the trreLve months to end of December 1981, exceed a threshoLd
of 2O%.
0n 10 February 1981. prices of goods and services hrere freed from control
except for certain tategories of products. In May, a further series of
products were decontrotIed, Leaving ttdenty-three basic consumer items stitL
subject to price controt. In addition, certain agricutturaL subsidies have
been dismantted.
France: tlages are determined in annuaL cotLective agreements by industry,
ffi between emptoyers and representative trade unions. The Government
does, however, 
"ci indirect[y on incomes through its taxation and sociatnoLiiy and the determination of the SMIC (minimum inter-professionaL grovth
wage), 
"t r"Lt as exerting its influences as an employer, uith agreementsin the semi-state sector often being used as a reference. In one of itsfirst major poLicy decisions on 3 June, the new Government raised the SMIC
by't02 which represented an increase of 617% in purchasing power terms-
The progressive elimination of contro[s on prices was pursued in the earLy
part of the year with the decontrolling of the prices of a number of food-
stuffs ana cif6 prices hrith effect from 26 March 1981 (see box "Lifting ofprice controLs in France", European Economy, No 8, March 1981) Flore recentLy
the new Government introduced price surveiLlance on certain services in
tourist regions and took measures tn improve consumer information. From
3 gctober 1981 the prices of services, key basic foodstuffs and importerrsprofit margins were frozen for three months"
IreLand: The second NationaI Understanding finaLised jn September 1980
governs pay for a 15-month period starting for the majority of workers on
1 gctober 1980. In addition, it incLuded commitments by the Government to
increase certain tax aLLowances and sociaL weLfare payments. A review
provision, rlhich was incLuded in the second phase of the agreement and
applied if prices in the period tvlay 1980 to February 1981 exceeded 1O%,
was invoked by the unions but the empLoyers rejected these demands.
No atterations were made to existing contro[s on prices, under which sanc-
tion for increases in prices of specified goods and services must be
obtained from the NationaI Prices Commission before the increases can be
imptemented. In May, direct government measures were taken to increase
sub"idies on butter, miLk, bread and fLour and in August further subsidies
on miLk were introduced. In addit'ion, sanctions for increases in prices
of pubLic transport and eLectric'ity were withheLd untiL JuLy.
ItaLy: ALthough various propositions have been made for the modification
ofrF"" indexation of brages on prices, uhich has existed in industry since
1945-46 and was harmonized by the Law of JuLy 1975, no changes have as
yet been made in the existing system. Neither have any changes occurred in
prices poLicy t.lhich invoLves administered prices for a Limited number of
goods and services and surveiLLance of other prices by an Inter MinisteriaL
Commi ttee.
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Luxe{nbqurg: In May 1981 the Tripartite Conference on the SteeL Industry
reached agreement on measures to Limit the gronth of uages in this sector
which accounts for 36:l of the Luxembourg work force. In the industry, the
saLaries of white cotLar staff niLL be frozen in reat terms over thl periodJanuary'1981 to December 1983, aLL advance indexation payments wiLL be sus-pended and the s[iding uage scale niLL be delayed by one-month.
under price controL arrangements atready in force, the Government, inFebruary, authorized an increase in the prices of certain products and
services in order to aLign prices to those charged abroad.
NetherLands: In the absence of agreement betueen the two sides of industry,TffienttookmeasuresinNovember1980tomoderatetherjseofHageS
and sataries in 1981' after the partiaL suspension of the indexation mech-
anism in 1980 and the payment of a flat rate monetary amount to aLL uage
earners- These rneasures took the form of a cut of 2 percentage points inthe adjustment of rages to price rises in January 1d81, and in the holiday
attowance of hatl 
" 
pu..entage point. The ceiting of tire hotiday atloyancehras set at 7 112?( of an amount corresponding to two and a hatf times the
"dominant" uage (that of the Largest category of wage earners), In order to
compensate for the effects of these measures on purchasing power, tax
a L Lotrances and t ransf ers were i nc reased.
No additionat measures to controI prices direct[y were implemented duringthe year under review.
Uni ted l(i ngdom: The principLe of free coLtective bargaining was maintainedin the United Kingdom. The authorities onLy intervened inin the pEst year
the pubLic sector, where a 6% cash Limit was proposed for pay in centrat
government and the health services in the pay round to 1 August 1981.
rn addition, locat authorities were asked to observe this Limit for
their employees also. The 6% cash [imit was repLaced by a 4% figurefor the pay round 1981182.
FotLowing the aboLition of the Price Commission 'rn 1979, detaiLed price
controLs no longer appty in the United Kingdom.
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TabLe 4.1
Consumer pri ces and the GDP Price defLator (nationaL currencjes) (percentage increase)
1961-74 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 198?
( averaqe ) i mate fore
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914
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9r0
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97 ln7ett tvrJ
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12,9 15,0
?q qRJtr r av
4,? 4,3
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Standard
deviation
,IR 5r4
1n ?
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Y,Q
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2
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q
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5
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612 AN
B
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D
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q<
?1
A7
5r?
6,?
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,12 q
17 ,6
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q7
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A?
6r0
319
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1?,8
17,3
17,4
6t7
619
GDP Price defIator
1?,5 7,5 7,3 4,2 4r0 4r3
12,6 9,2 9,0 9 12 7 ,3 8rL
6,4 3 14 3,8 3,9 4r0 4r8
12,3 15,6 12,9 13,1 17 ,0 18,1
13.4 10,1 9,0 9,5 1o'1 11 15
??,3 ?O,3 1?,4 1Q,1 13r0 1516
17 ,5 18,0 19 ,1 13,9 15 ,7 20,3
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q?
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13,5 9,8 9 17 8r5 9,7 11 16
7,3 4r9 4,9 316 4r9 6,2
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9r8
<A
Note: Consumen prices
impLicit price
Source: Eurostat and
- impLicit price index of consumersrexpenditure. GDP price deftator =
'index of GDP.
Commission senvices.
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TabLe 4.2
Components of consumer pni ce deveLopments (percentage i ncr"ease)
Food Non f oorj
goods
FueI and
Lisht
qent(1) (2) Servi ces(3) Tota I
trL-y tora(
197 4
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1976
1977
1978
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13,8
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1 8,0
A4
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'5
EC9 1 0,0 13,1+ 24,? 15 16 1?,9 13,9
B
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D
F
IRL
I
L
NL
UK
Pe r cent age
6,1 10,?
9,9 10,7
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14 t6 11 ,?
'16,2 22,3
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9rg :
6,1 3r5
increase JuLY
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2?7
2q<
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1981 / JuLy
11 S
7q,
413
13,7
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14,9
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1980 (4)
5r2
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11 ,4
)?n
:
617
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11 ,6
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)4n
Rq
616
E7r9r'.,, r, , ,1lrA 1!.1--(1,l lncLuclrng nepairs, maintenance and othen expenses retative to pnoperty investmer*.-(2) For'IreIand = housinq.(3) ExcLudinq rent.
14y August 1981/August 1980 for IreLand,
Note: Consumer prices = consumer price
Source: 0ECD and Commission services.
June 1981/June 1980 for ItaLy,.
indi ces.
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TabLe 4.3
0rigin of pri ce increases (finaL expenditure), EC 9
(Contnibution to the increase in the deflator of
Import s
Unit
Labour
cost s
totaL finaL ex nditur^e)
Indi ne ct
taxes(1)
0ther
factors(r'esiduaL)
(1)
Totat(2)
197 4
1975
1976
1977
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1982
/z\
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1r0
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o11
)1
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17
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?n
17 
'?
11 ,9
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CQ
819
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11 ,2
10 /7
0r8
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44
1.0
no
1?
1q
12
1rO
(1) Per unit of outPut.(2) Tota[ = defIator of finaI expenditure'(3) Est i mate .(4) Forecast.
Source: Eurostat and Commission services
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TabLe 4.4
Per capita compensat.ion of empIoyees
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(1) Per cap'ita compensation of
Source: Eurostat and Commission
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Labour costs Per unit of output : totaL economy (percentage change)
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5.1
5. The European Monetat y System and
monetarY PoLicY in the Commun'itY
Since 1979 the.instabiLity of the main non-community currencies on the ex-
changes has, together with the sh'ifts of the u.K, pound and the drachma,
been in contrast uith the reLative stabiL'ity of exchange rates within the
European Monetary system (EMS). Intervention by EMS centraL banks has been
substantiaL, but has been far from exhaust'ing the resources of the system'
Participat'ing countries have in generaL observed the rules and adapted do-
mestic nionetary conditions p.o*piLy to the requirements of the system'It has
not so far been possible to reduce the divergence of cost and plice rises
with.in the EMS. Their effect has been moderated, but not fuLLy offset by
reaL.ignments of pivot rates. The resuLt'ing shifts of reaL exchange rates
have been sustainabLe onLy because Lat"gu tirgins of reLative costs and prices
existed in 1978. By thus estabLishing more normaL reLative posit'ions, the EMS
has exercised a moierating'infLuence in countries where infLation or the LeveL
of reLative costs li,as too rrigl'1. An important factor in the success of the
EMS since 1979 was the stance of monetary poL'icy'in favour of stabiLity and
greater convergence. However, monetat'y growth has departed in 1981 markedLy
from earLier forecasts in severaL count.ies. After the reaL'ignements of
4 October 1981, it is essent'ial to make a success of the devaLuations and en-
sure that monetary poLicies within the EMS are convergent' If more weight is
to be put on employment and growth objectives without putting at risk the im-
provement of the 
"rtu.n"L baLance and a reduction 
in the rate of inflation,
monetary policy must be prudent. Its restrictive effects can be reduced by
measures affecting the size of public sector deficits and their means of
fjnancing as welL as by action affecting the growth of incomes and their
functionit distribution. European interest rates have fol Lowed the
rise in rates in the USA since 1979 without, however, undergoing the same wide
fLuctuations. A faLL in European rates, which wouLd be desirabLe in view of
the depressed state of the Community economy, nust'.if,ril it l: bu durable' be
conditionaLonareductionofinfIat.ionaryexpectation#inmostmembercoun-
tries. Even if this condition is fuLtitteo, Long term'rates.f]LL show a faLL
in nominaL rather than in reaL terms I reaL interest rates wiLL in fact con-
tinue to refLect the size, which differs from one member country to another,
of structuraL imbaLances as reveaLed by reaL wage pos'itionsrpubLic sector
deficits and current account baLances of payments.
5.1 DoLLar Yen Ecu and EMS
In contrast with the reLative stabiLity of exchange rates within the
European wlonetary system (EMS), internationaL currency fLuctuations have per-
sisted and actuaLLy widened in 1981, affecting reIations between the three
major currency areas in the t^iest: Japan, the United States and Europe'
Between February 1980 and August 1981, the yen rose againt the ECU by some
50 %, but this upturn folLowed a drop of roughly the same amount between
August 19TB and November 1979 (cf. Graph 5.1). The US doLLar was worth the
same as one ECU .in August 1981(as it had been 'in 1970), whereas in JuLy 1980
one ECU had been worth 8 1.45, a rise of 45 % in the value of the doLLar in
thifteen months. cLearLy, such Large variations in exchange rate reLationships
fQol
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over a fairLy short period do not mirror similar divergences in inflation
or in costs but are the refLection - accentuated by the fore'ign excnange
markets - of othen factors, notabLy d'ifferences in economic and monerary
poLicies. Exchange rate movements of such magnitude add considerabLy to the
uncerta'inty attaching to internationaL trade.
For a more thorough anaLysis of the doLLarrs movements against the
European cunrencies, a d'istinction has to be made between the currencies par-
ticipating in the EMS exchange-rate mechanism, on the one hand, and sterLing
and the drachma, on the other, the Latter two having diverged sign.if.icantLy
from the EMS currencies since March 1979 (cf. Graph 5.D. One highLy impor-
tant economic factor in the doLlarrs performance against the EMS currencies(in the shape of the ECU, minus its sterling component) is that the respective
current-account pos'itions have been reversed. A further facton was the deLayed
effects of the depneciation of the doLLar and of the appreciation of the Ger-
man mark and of othen European currencies prior to estabLishment of the EMS.
0n account of thei r" widening externaI def ic'its, but also because of the mone-
tary stabiLization poLicy they pursued after the new oiL shock, the EMS coun-
tries were obLiged between 197B and 1981 to foLLow, at times reLuctantLy, the
underLying rise in US interest rates (cf.5.5 beLow). But the extreme voLati-
L'ity of US rates, stemm'ing from the monetary controL arrangements adopted in
the United States from 0ctober 1979 onwards, led to a saw-toothed movement
in US and European interest rate differentials (cf. Graph 5.D. This develop-
ment and the short-term cap'itaL movements it triggered were a major determinant
of the dolLarrs fluctuat'ions against the EMS currencies, especiaLLy in 1980.
ALthough these fluctuations were substantial (a faLL of around 10 % between
May 1979 and January 1980, a rise of 13 Z between January and Apri[ 1980 and
a fresh faLI of 10 Z between ApriI and July 1980) and although they gave rise
to further uncentainty in'internationaL trade, they were not, untiL the Last
quarter of 1980' grouped around an upward trend. It has only been since the
end of 1980 and earLy 1981, as the doLLar has continued its cLimb despite a
marked narrowing of interest rate different'ials, that an unmistakabte and more
susta'ined upward tendency has emerged which cuIminated in August 19g1.
In order to reduce the fLuctuations of the dolLan against the EMS curren-
cies and to curb the upsurge'in interest rates (notabLy'in Germany during
1980 and up to February 1981), the EMS centraI banks intervened mass'iveLy in
'lo
. 
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doILars on the exchanges, particuLarLy between November 1979 and ApriL 1980
and between December 1980 and June 1981 (cf. Graph 5.2). In aLL, gross sales
of doLtars on the exchanges by the EMS centraL banks totaLLed $ 50 000 mjLLion
for the period ApriL 1979 - June 1981, and net dolLar intervention amounted
to 8 32 400 million (equivalent to some 1.4 % of the EMS countriesr GDP in
1980). A Large proportion of these operations was by the Bundesbank, whose
net jnterventions totaLLed I 18 700 miLL'ion, equivaLent to around 2.3 7. of
Germanyts 1980 GDP. In the case of the EMS countries, the Large-sca[e inter-
ventions in doLLar did not bring about a matching faLL in their officiaI net
reserves, except in Germany. This was due not onLy to accounting factors
(vaIuatjon of goLd and foreign currency) but aIso to substantiaL imports of
capital part[y.in response to a deliberate poLicy of externaL borrowing on the
part of the pubLic authorities (cf. Chapter 3). The effect of doILar inter-
vention by the EMS centraL banks llas strengthened untiL March 1981 by interven-
tion in European currencies by the FederaL Reserve Bank of New York. In May
1981, however, the US authorities offic'iat.Iy confirmed that, except in excep-
tionaL circumstances, they no Longer intended to'intervene on the exchanges-
Thus European countries are compeL Led either to shouLder the
burden of intervention alone, to permit their currencies to fLoat freeLy
aga.inst the doLLar or to aLLow their interest rates to be as voLatiLe as those
of the USA. These are choices which, under certain cjrcumstances, may prove
extremeLy awkward. European views on these matters need to be spelt out (1)rnot
only in the interests of cLoser cooperation between the major currency zones
but aLso to ensure that intennationaL monetary tensions do not damage the
internaL functioning of the European Monetary System-
5.2 Community Currencies and developments within the EMS
Between 13 March 1979 and the end of JuLy 1981, the two Community cut"-
rencies not part'icipating'in the EMS exchange-rate mechan'ism, sterL'ing and
the drachma, rose by 23 % and feLL by 17 % respectiveLy against the EMS
currencies (as nepresented by the ECU, minus its sterling component - cf.
Graoh 5.D. Since the sharp rises in the dolLar at the beginning of 1981,
(1) cf. Commission foreword to the draft of the fifth medium-term economic
pol.icy programme/ cOMGI)344 fjnaL of 22 JuLy 1981, page 8.
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both currencies have moved qu'ite cLoseIy in Line with the EMS currencies.
The depreciation of the drachma in 1979 and 1980 broadLy refLected the infLa-
tion differentiaL and lvas in Iine with the poLicy pursued by the Greek autho-
rities before Greece jo'ined the Community. The rise in sterLing can be put
down not onLy to the resoLute monetary stabi tizat'ion poL'icy of the United
Kingdom and an interest-rate differentiaL of around 3.5 to 5.5 points com-
pared with the average rate for the EMS currencies throughout 197g and 1980
but also to the appreciabIe improvement in the UKrs current account between
1978 and 1981 equal to 0.6 % of GDP, brought about by t\torth Sea 0i L and the
recess i on.
The European Monetary System has, during this period of wide fLuctuation
in internationaL exchange rates, satisfactorj Ly performed its roLe of creating
a zone of gneater currency stabiIity in Europe, even though no progress has
as yet been made towards achieving its other, more ambitious, objective of
convergence towards internaL stabjLity. The two reaLignments of pjvot rates
which occured in the autumn of 1979 and the Lira devatuation of March 1981 had
onLy a modest effect on the systemts parity grid. The reaLignment of 5 October
1981 did not change the bilateraL p'ivot rates of the Danish krone, the Betgian/
Luxembung franc and the Irish pound,'in reLation to these currencies the German
mark and the Dutch fLorin were revaLued by 5.5 % whiLe the french franc and the
itaLian Lira were devaLued by 3 % (see Tabte 3 of the AnnuaL Report). Since the
creation of the system the onLy b'ilateraL pivot rates which have not changed
are those between the BeLgian/Luxemburg franc and the Irish pound. fabLe
5.1 shows in detaiL the pivot rates at present in force and the cumuLative
change in bilateral pivot rates since 13 March 1979.
Such reaLignments are a sign of the frexibiL.ity of the system and, if
used properly, can prevent the cumuLative deLays in adjusting exchange ratesthat tlere one of the drawbacks of the Bretton woods system. rn retrospect,
and disregarding the difficuLties obtaining at the time, the 1g7g realignments
mereLy rectified the initial pattern of pivot rates whereas the Lira devaLua-
tion of March 1981 can be seen as a partiaL - and hence not fuLly accommoda-
ting - adjustment to soaring neLative costs and prices in Itaty (cf. 5.3be[ow)' To forestall a vicious circLe between devaLuation and jnfLation, theLira devaIuation lJas accornpan'ied by monetary measures and the announcement
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of domestic stabi Lization measures. Simi LarLy, the recommandation (1)
addressed by the Commission to the ItaLian Gover"nment on 1 JuLy 1981
caLLs for the introduction of stabi Lization and domestic adjustment
measures, stressing'in part'icuLar that no prOtectionist measure can correct
the factors causing fundamentaL disequ'iLibrium, and that adjustment of
the growth of nominaL incomes hoLds the key to'improved competitiveness of
the economy and hence to exchange rate stabiL'ity and disappea'rance of the
Latent propensity of market operators to anticipate a devaLuation of the Lira.
This recor:le:datirr has Lost nore of its reIevance since the reaLionment of
0ctober 19S1, This Last reaLignment was of a more generaL nature; triggered
by the rise of the Genman mark and the probLems of the French
!ranc, it moderated but did not fuLLy offset the consequences of the divergent
rises of costs and prices which have occured since the beginning of 1979. If
th.is reaLignment is to be a success it must be accompanied by appropriate
measures of economic and monetary policy which, particuLarLy in the devaLuing
countries, must put the emphasis on stabi lity.
To date, currency management w'i th'i n the EMS has not, generatty spea-
king, given rise to major confLicts. The divergence indicator (2), which
provides a systematic indication of the extent to which each EMS currency
diverges f rom the other part'i c'i pat'i ng cunrencies as a group, has fuLf i LLed
the rote expected of it. Between March 1979 and August 1981, its upper
threshoLd (set at a LeveL equaL to ?5 % of maximum upward divergence) has
hardLy ever been crossed (cf. Graphs 5.3a and 5.4a) aLthough the French
franc (in ApriL and November 1980 and in January/February 1981) and the
German mark (in August)have approached or reached it. The DM crossed the upper
threshold in September and this event was foLtowed by lhe reaLignment of 5
0ctober 1981. The Lower warning Limit has been reached and overstepped on a
number of occasions and for Lengthy periods. In the case of the Danish krone
(August/September 1979) and of the ItaLian Lira (March 1981) there folLowed
an adjustment of the pivot rate. In the case of the Belg'ian franc (May
to Ju[y and September 1979, February/March 1980 and February/ApriL 1981)
and the French franc (l\ay 1981), the necessary measures (intervention, an
increase in interest rates and other monetary and economic po.[icy measures)
were taken to redress the situation. 0n numerous occasions, policies have
been adjusted before a currency has moved unduLy out of Line. In this way
the discipL'ine'imposed by the system has had a pre-emptive effect.
Commission Recommendation of 1 JuLy 1981 to the Government of the lta-
Lian RepubLic pursuant to ArticLe 108(1) of the Treatyr0.J. L189 of
11 JuLy 1981Q) For the catcuLation of the divergence indicator, cf. European Economy
No 3 of Juty 1979.
(1)
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The maximum permissibIe spread between tt"to currencies at any one time
(2.25 %, but 6 % for the [ira) has frequent[y been takeh upu notabLy.in
1979, in Aprit 1980 and between October 1980 and August 1981 (cf. Graph 5.3b
and 5-4 b)-0n one occasionrtwo cunrencies which stood at opposite extremes with-
in the band swapped pLaces within a short period. Between January/February
and May 1981, the Franch franc moved from the top to the bottom of the
band, changing places with the German mark. As a resuIt, the maximum
permissibLe divergence between two EMS currencies over time (4.5 points)
was aLmost reached. Movements within the currency band and reversaLs of
positions constitute a further element of ftexib'i tity in the EMS. They
can reduce the need for intervention and weaken the close Iink that tends
to deveLop between nominal short-term interest nates, in sp'ite of differing
inflation rates, if there are no expectations of exchange rate adjustment.
Further, a particuLar currency's position withjn the EMS band at any given
moment does not provide an automatic indication of its strength or weakness as
measured by the fundamental factors that determine its performance in the
tonger run. tiith a given set of underLying factors (reIative prices and
costs, current account baLance, etc), a currency'rs position is determined
principaILy by the degree of restrictiveness of the monetary poIicy pursued
by the country in question(and the way it'is perceived by the markets) and
by its externaL borrowing po['icy.
Two exampIes may iLIustrate the po'int (cf. Graph 5.5b). In spite of
Germanyts favourabIe and steadiLy improv'ing relative price and cost position
vis-i-vis its EMS partners, the German mark tnras weak in the EMS
band in the second half of 1980 and up to February 1981. The main reasons
for th'is were Germanyrs externaL deficit and the authorities I reLuctance,
due to the weak economic situation at home, to aLLow money-market interest
rates to rise. Fo[ Lor.ring the measures taken on 19 Februa ry 1981 when the
Lombard facjLity was suspended and German interest rates rose from around
9-1O % to 12'13 %, the German mark reversed its position in the EMS band
and, since 9 March, has been the strongest currency. The ethen exampLe con-
cerns France, In spite of reLativeLy high domestic infLation and a sLow
but continuous deterioration in the retative price and cost position, the
French franc t^ias one of the strongest currencies during 1980 and untiL ApriL
1981, It maintained th'is position even though, compared with the rate of 1
infLation, money-market interest rates remained modest (11-13 y,). This was
due to three main factors : a poLicy of tight controL over the expansion of
money and credit, spontaneous and organ'ized infLows of capitaL whjch more
than offset the current account deficit, and a nominaL interest-rate
1LL1l
5.7
differentiaL vis-i-vis Germany. The Latter two factors came'into pLay
because market operators did not expect any adjustment in exchange rates-
The position within the band of the major currencies - and espec'iaLLy
the German mark, an aLternative reserve currency - atso influences the cur-
rency bandrs movements against third currencies, notabLy the dolLar. The
German markrs weakness within the band in the second haLf of 1980 and up to
February 1981 thus dragged down the entire EMS against the dolLar. Jn some
respects,this heLped the other EMS currencies (e.g. the BeLgian franc) and
contributed to the cohesion of the system. FoLLowing the turnaround in the
situation in February/l\arch 1981, it has been the German mark which has
curbed the doLlarrs cLimb, w'ith its own r"ise being curbed to some extent
by the other currencies within the band. This exampLe aLso underscores the
importance of defin.ing a common pos'ition for the European currencies against
thind currencies, notabLy the doLLar.
Some countries such as Denmark and the NetherLands, but aLso ItaLy
and IreLand, appear to be seeking a comfortabLe pos'ition for their currencies
or one that is easier to defend within their respective bands.0n numerous
occasions, th'is has Led them to adjust thei r monetary poL'icy 'stance before
their currencies have approached their permissibLe fluctuation Limits, there-
by voLuntar.iLy enhanc'ing the discipLines of the system and pnobabLy reducing
the amount of intervent'ion needed. The BeLgian lranc, on the other hand,
has found itseLf in the Lower haLf of the currency band ever since the sys-
tem came into operation. For tong periods, it has been the weakest curren-
cy, touching its Lower intervention threshoLd. This is due to . funda-
mentaL features of the BeLg'ian economy (highLy unfavourabLe reLative Labour
cost position vis-A-vis its EMS partners and Large budget and current acccunt
defjcits) which have so far shown LittLe, if any response to monteray sta-
biLization poLicy and which require very high - and, in reaL terms, rising -
interest rates if the exchange rate is to be maintained (cf. point 5.5
beLow). In theory, the position of the BeLg'ian franc within the currency'
band couLd be'improved if monetary conditions in BeLg'ium were tightened
__l
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further but, since monetary poLicy is already very restrictive, the cost
in terms of empLoyment and growth is deemed to be excessive. Devaluation,
on the other hand, wiLL hardly resoLve the probtem because of the "open-
ness" of the BeLg'ian economy (imports of goods and services are equiva-
lent to about 70 % of GDP, with 60 % of such imports coming from BeLgiumrs
EMS partners) and because of a rigid and generatised system of indexation.
Under these circumstances, the monetary authorities in BeLgium are wal"king
a tightrope, keeping monetary conditions sufficiently restrictive to main-
tain the exchange rate yet avoidjng any further tjghtening , a move which
couLd ease the position of the BeLgian franc within the currency band.
BeLgjum can be regarded as the EMS country that has come cLosest to ex-
hausting the possibi tities of monetary stabi Lfzation po Licy, which, in
BeLg'ium, has traditionaLLy taken the form of exchange rate poLicy. It is
now evident that the solution to BeLgiumrs macroeconomic probLems Lies
in a reform of public finance and in an adjustment of incomes and notabty
of Labour costs. It was with this in mind that the Commission addressed a
recommendation (1) to the BeLgian Government on 2? Juty 1981 in which it
stressed that monetary poLicy shouId not be reLaxed unti L paraL Lel concrete
and satisfactory progress had been made in the other areas of economic
and soc'iaL poLicy.
In addition to intervention in doLlars (cf. po'int 5.1 above), there
has been a substantiaL voLume of intervention in Community currencies,
undertaken to infLuence their positions within the system and to keep them
within their margins of fluctuation. lntervention in Commun'ity currencies
totaLfed around g 30 000 miLLion between March 1979 and June 1981. In
the first two years of the systemrs operation, some 64 % of intervention
in community currencies was intra-marginaL , i.e. carried out before
fntervention Iimits were reached. fhese operations refIected the autho-
ritiesrdesire to guide the movement of their currencies within the EMS
band or to repurchase them from creditors for the purpose of settling debts
arising from previous intervention operations. As yet, there are no speciaL
ruLes govern'ing intra-marginaL intervention , which is enti reLy dependent
on the consent of the centraL bank issuing the intervention currency.
(1 ) c f. Commi ss ion
Kingdom of
0.J. L 228
Recommendation of 22 JuLy 1981
BeIgium pursuant to Artic Le 11
of 13 August 1981.
to the Government of the
of the CounciL Decision,
I
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This is why, jn pract'ice, some countries which wjshed to jntervene before
their fLuctuation Limits had been reached (1) have reIied aLmost excLu-
sively on intervention in doLLars, being unabLe, in an emergency, to
make immediate and automatic use of Community currencies. This practice
may have undesinabLe effects in that it accentuates a g'iven doLLar trend.
To remedy this drawback and to make intervention poLicies more effective,
it has been suggested that certain rutes be Laid down to faciLitate wider
use of intra-manginaL intervention whenever a divergence threshoLd is
crossed and that this be combined with more cLoseLy coordinated action
against the doLLar.
Intra-marginaL intervention'is not normaLLy notified to the EMCF
except where it is financed by transfers of ECUs or use of the very short-
term f jnanc ing mechani sm. Intervent'ion at f Luctuation l'imits, on the other
hand, whjch resuLts fnom the bas'ic pr'inc'ipLes of the EMS, must be notified.
Between March 1979 and July 1981/ the EMCF was notified of intervention
operations totaLLing some 15 000 miLLion ECUs, over half of which were
carried out in the first haLf of 1981. Graph 5.3c shows that intervention
operations peaked in June 1979 (in support of the BeLgian franc), in Sep-
tember 1g7g (in support of the BeLgian franc and the Danish knone, whose
pivot rate was subsequentLy adjusted); in March/April and 0ctober/November
1980 and in February 1981 (French francs soId against BeLgian francs and
German marks), in March/Apr"i t 1981 (in support of the BeLg'ian f ranc) and
in May 1981 (in support of the French franc). RLthough Large, these
ooerations were far from exhau:;ting the system's resources' In par-
ticuLar, no caLLs have yet been made on the short-term monetary support
faci Lity or on the arrangements for medium-term financiaL assistance.
An interesting point is that, genenalLy speak'ing, these operations have
so far not resuLted in any buiLd-up of Large debtor or creditor pos'itions
1n1ith the EMCF. Genmany, for exampl.e,which was in a creditor position in
1979 haximum of + 1 900 miLLion ECU at the end of September), moved into
a debtor position in 1980 (a max'imum of - 2 100 milLion ECU at the end of
December), before return'ing to a creditor position in the second quarter of
(1 ) This is particuLarLy true of Ita Ly,
wider margin of fLuctuation; if Ita
margin, this might have more marked
in the case of a margin of 2.25 %.
whose currency has been g'i ven a
Ly had to make fuLL use of this
psychoLogicaL repercussions than
-r)ll
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1981 G 4 100 miLLion ECU at the end of June). Conversely, France buiLt
up a cred'itor position in 1980 and in eanLy 1981 particuLarLy (maximum
of + 4 700 milLion ECU at the end of February 1981) before moving into a
sLiEht debtor position in the second quarter of 1981 ( - 900 milLion ECU
at the end of June). Belgium is the only country that has permanentLy
been in a debtor position (just over - 3 000 milLion ECU in June 1981).
The debtor or creditor positions of the other countries have been negLi-
g'ibLe. This record of debtor and creditor positions with the EMCF shows
that the EMS countries have by and Large compLied with the systemrs ruLes,
adjusting thein domestic monetary cond'itions to the systemrs requinements
at the right time whi Le pursu'in9 a poL'icy of borrowing on the internatio-
naL cap'itaL market which has broadLy enabled them to finance their current
account deficits.
5.3 Effective exchange rates and adjustment of
reaL exchangq rates within the EMS
In spite of the adjustments of pivot rates made in 1979 and March 1981,
there t^ras very LittLe change in the effective exchange rates of the countries
participating 'in the EMS exchange rate mechanism (see TabIe 5.D. Tracre
between EMS countries has not thenefore been affected by the wide fLuc-
tuations in exchange rates internat'ionaLLy. This differs from the
divergent exchange-rate trends recorded within the Community in the pe-
riod 1973-78 and is important for an area on the road to cLoser economic
'integration in which some 46 % of trade (in 1979, for the EMS countries)
is transacted between member countries. As a resuIt, intra-area imports
(averaging 45 % but rising to 6o %, for exampLe, for the BeLgo-Luxemoourg
Economic Union) have not been dir"ectLy affected by the doLLar's risel however,
in view of the continuing inftation differentiats between member countries,
this a[so means to some extent that the countries having more stabLe prices
have irnported infLation and that the countries having Less stabLe prices import
stabiIity through-the mechanism of direct price interdependance. Conver-
seLy, intra-area exports (averaging 48 T. but rising to 65 % in tne case
of the BLEU) do not benefit from increased competitiveness due to the do|.Larrs
appreciationrbut the countries having more stabLe prices have gained frofil
the sLower rise in their costs whiLe the countries having Less stabLe prices
have been obL'iged to take steps to boost their competitiveness and to rein
back to domestic costs. ALthough the real'ignment of 5 October 1981 did not
have a very targe effect on effective exchange rates (see Table 3 in the
?9.
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Annual Report) it wiLl nevertheLess serve to damp down th'is process of imported
infLation or stabi Iity.Compared with the industriaLized worId as a whoIe
(7 or 23 trad.ing pantners - cf . Table 5.2), the sLide in the EMS curren-
ciesreffective exchange rates t^ras Less market than might have been sus-
pected given the upward surge in the dol[ar and the yen. Th'is is not
only because, in spite of its voLume, trade with the United States and
Japan accounts for onLy a reLativeLy smaLL proportion of the EMS countries'
totaL trade Q.8 % in 1979) but also because the currencies of a Large num-
ber of other third countriesrnotabLy in Europe, have moved in Line not
with the doLLar but with the EMS currencies (e.g. the Austrian schiLL'ing)
or with a basket of currencies in wh'ich the EMS currencies pLay a predo-
minant role (e.g. the Swedish krona). iim'iLarLyrthe drachma since August 1980
and sterL'ing s'ince January 1981 have moved more or less in Line with the
EMS currencies (cf. Graph 5.2). The effects of greater exchange rate sta-
biLity thus permeate beyond the group of countries participating in the EMS
exchange-rate mechan'ism. Even so, the reLativeLy insignificant variations
in effective exchange rates, espec'iaLLy aga'inst the 23 trading partners (cf.
Tabfe 5.2)rqiouLd not obscure the fact that, in many cases, 'imports of raw
materiaIs, notabLy ojl, have to be paid for in doLIars. As a resuLt, these
indices of effect'ive exchange rates give an unduLy favourabLe measure of the
situat'ion, at Least in the short term view. In the medium term, if the
doLLar were to hoLd steady at its summer 1981 LeveL, the adjustment wou[d
have to come through a sLower increase or through a faLL in the doLLar
orice of these raw materiaLs.
The relative stabiLity of effective exchange rates within the EMS has so
far not been matched by a greater convergence of prices and costs.0n the
contrary, when expressed in nationaL currenc'ies, average annuaL divergences
from EMS partners h,ere,'in many cases, greater in the period 1979-81 than
in the peniod 1971-78 (cf. Table 5.3, CoLumn 2). For the years 1979-81'
aggregate variations in the ne[ative LeveLs of unit Labour costs (in natio-
naL currency) have ranged from - 14.5 % (Germany: index 1981/78:85.5)
to + 32.7 7, (ItaLy : index for 1981/78 : 13?.7). The EMS, then, has resul-
ted in appreciabLe variations in reaL exchange rates, that is to say, in
the reLative LeveLs of unit [abour costs expressed in a common currency
(Table 5.3). In the countries having more stabLe prices, the faLL in the
I
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reLative LeveL of tabour costs ranged from-3.8 % in BeLgjum (index of
96.2, in Column 4) to 8 % in Germany (index of 9?). In the EMS countries
having Less stabLe prices, the retative increase ranged from 12.1'A
(France) to 25.7 % (IreLand). (1).
The accumulation of such deviations in a relativeLy short time can be
ascribed to a combination of factors : primariLy a monetary and interest-
rate poLicy taiLored to maintaining nominaI exchange rates and the exis-
tence of deviationrs in the reverse direction accumuLated during the
preced'ing period. Tabte 5.3 shows that, during the period 1971-78, such
deviations had accumulated under the combined impact of the relative
movements in national currencies (CoIumn 2) and of the movements in effec-
tive exchange rates (Column 3), which had been much [arger in the countries
with depreciat'ing currencies ( France, IreLand, ItaLy and, outside the EMS,
the Un'ited K'ingdom). Thus changes in ef fective exchange rates between 1978
and 1981 represent, in the major'ity of cases, the balancing off of positions
which had deveLopped prior to 1978 during a period of monetary disturbancel
and shou[d not be interpreted as a setback for the system.
Howeven, it is evident that a singLe base year (gr0 in TabLe 5.3)
need not necessaliLy represent an;'equ'iLibrium situation" for aLL EMS coun-
tries or for aLl Community countnies. For this reason, and to make it easier
to gauge the marg'ins avaiLabLe in 1978 (the year prior to introduction of
the EMS) and the margins remaining avai[able in'1981 (aLmost three years
after introduction of the EMS), Table 5.4 expresses the relative leveL of
costs and prices for these two years in a common currency by reference to
different base periods : 1970, the period 1961-70 and the period 196g-7?.
It wiLL be noted that,'irrespective of the base period, the countries
which had belonged to the earLien "snake" (and which, in the second half of
the 197Osrhad become the countries with more stabLe prices) had accunuLated
much sharper incneases in unit Labour costs (expressed in a common currency -
cf . TabLe 5.4a)by 1978 nainLy as a resuLt of their apprec'iating currencies.
The onLy exception was Germany, whichrthanks to a more rap'id adjustment'in
its Labour costs, reverted to a position sL'ightLy beLow that for the base
(1) These caLcuLations do not yet take account of the most recent reaLignment
which does not have a very great effect on the annuaL figunes for 1981
since it onLy af fects the Last three months of the year. In 1982 it r.,i LL
have its fuLL effect on effective exchange rates but this wiLl be more or
Less offset by continuing divergences of costs and prices expressed in
nationaL cunrencies.
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year 1970 (index of 99.1). In 1981 (1)rtaking the same base periodsrthe devi-
ation became negative in Germany (in spite of the rise in the effective
exchange rate) and in Denmark (notably as a resutt of the devaLuation of
the Danish krone), whiLe the deviation remained positive for Betgium and
the NetherLands but narrowed$y 4.2 or 4.4 points depending on the base
period and by 7.6 or 8.4 points respectiveLy) as a resuLt of an adjust-
ment in Labour costs and without there be'ing any s'igni f icant movement in
the effective exchange rate. The reLativeLy high LeveL recorded in the
NetherLands, particuLarLy when compared with the period 1961-70' was
infLuenced by a structuraL factor since the countryrs rapid industriaLi-
zation jn the 1960s, the discovery of naturaL gas and, Later, the increase
in the price of gas perm'itted some upward shift in retative costs without
thereby jeotlandizin0 externaL equitjbrium' By 1978, the other
countries (France, Ireland, ItaLy and the United Kingdom)had accumuLated
Large negative deviations compared with aLL the base peliods' These devi-
qtions were the resuLt of currency depreciation weLL in excess of the rise
in reLative costs expressed in nationaL currency. Depending on the base
period, these d'isparities have, to differing degrees, been made good in
1gB1 in France and IreIand.(1),whiLe ItaLy thanks to the devaLuation of lt'larch
19g1 stitI has some margin aviitabte. The United Kingdom,howeverrhas as a
resuLt of the combined effects of infLation and currency revaLuations
suffered a deterioration of its costs reLative to those of its partners
belong.ing to the EMS of more than 50 % between 1978 and 1981.
Section b) of TabIe 5.4 simiLar"ly shows neLative movements caLculated
on the basis of GDP deflators, which may be broadLy interpreted as "totaL
costs oer unit of output". In generaL, secion b) confirms the results gi-
ven in section a). It is important, however, to note the differences bet-
ween the reLative positions caLcuLated on the basis of unit tabour costs
and those based on GDP defLators. In the case of the NetherLands, Germany,
Denmark and the United Kingdom, the reLative LeveLs based on labour costs
are distinctLy Lower, indicating that Labour costs have adjusted more rapid-
Ly than GDP defLators. In ItaLy, IreLand and BeLgium, Labour costs have
been stickier. Th'is phenomenon is particuLarLy significant in Betgium'
where the reLative LeveL in terms of Labour costs is between 12'7 and 16'1
points higher than that based on GDP deflatot's depending on the base period
taken. This difference refLects a much t'ighter" squeeze on company profits
(1) See footnote on Previous Page
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than in the other member countries. The persistance of this gap has meant
that an increasingly restrictive monetary and interest-rate poLicy has had
to be pursued to maintain the exchange rate. This bears out the anaLysis
made earLier (point 5.2), which showed that the faiLure to adjust Laboun
costs i s one of the ma jor probLems of the BeLg.ian economy.
The fact thatrin its first three years of ooerationrthe EMS has,in spite
of reaL'ignmentsrabsorbed a Large pant of the relative cost and price margins
that existed in 1978 does not mean that from-not^t on any persistent diverqences
in costs and prices would automaticaLly recquire an adjustment in centraL rates(1)of the same order.0n the one hand, a number of countries stilL have a [ow
reLative cost or price LeveL which alLows some teeway for an
upward movement. On the other", it is quite possib[e that a shift from a
Low to a high reLative cost and pnice teveL wiLL serve to exert pressure
in favour of increased domestic stabiIity if backed up by an appropriate
monetary poL'icy. This is often the only way in which the reaI probLems
of domestic adjustment are forced into the open (BeLgium is one exampIe).
These prob[ems wouLd otherhiise beobscured by a sp'irat of devaLuation andjnf[ation; and this wouLd do nothing to resoLve the basic probtems (this
was the experience in the UK and Ita[y between 1973 and 1978>. It is im-
portant that this EMS stabiLization mechanism shoutd be aILowed to operate
freely in countries where infLation or the LeveL of reLative costs is stilL
too hish; this means not only that monetary poLicy must defend the exchan-
ge rate but also that domest'ic adjustment, notab[y in the areas of incomes
and pubt'ic finance, must be faciLitated and speeded up through other appropria-
re measures. The need for domest'ic adjustment of this sort is part'icuLarLy
pressing because the Leeway given by Low reLative costs is dissappearing(the
Irisn case) or has been - partty - restored by devaluations, for exampLe in
France and Ita[y; or because, in some cases, positive reLative costs have per-
sjsted for too tong and threaten to stifLe economic activity (notabLy in BeL-
gium). Quite independentLy of the existence of EMS, such internaL adjustment
is necessary in order to open up possibiLjties of economic growth in conditions
of stabiLity and to jncrease emp[oyment. The EMS simpLy highIights the need for
adjustment and heLps in its reaLisation. This is an important roLe which the
EMS must pLay in the years ahead.
(?) Any overa[|. assessment of reLative prices and costs in a particuLar country
must aIso take account of its reIations with countries outside the Commu-
nity or countries not participating in the EMS eschange-rate mechanism.
This aspect is deaLt with in Chapter 4.
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hlhat has been said above does notrhoweverrmean that EMS pivot rates
shouLd rema'in unchanged after the reaLignment of October 1981. Persistent di-
vergences in costs arrd pricesrand chronic baLance-of payments disequiLibria,
wiLL probabLy make further pivot-rate adjustments inevitable after a certain
time. The decision tq modity an EMS pivot rate is a politicaL decision to
be taken by mutua t agreement and by reference to a set of economi c
and poLiticaL criteria incLud'ing that convergence of cost and price
changes towards stab'i Lity which is one of the objectives of the EMS'
This objective wiLt be easier to achieve if the lower-infLation countries
bLock 'imported inf Lation in good t'ime by revaLu'ing thei r currencies and if
the higher-.inftation countries maintain for a sufficientLy Long period the
stabiLizing djscipLine imposed by a fixed exchange rate. Shoutd domestic
stabiLization poLicy in a higher-inflation country come up against major obsta-
cLesrsteps must be taken to prevent the deveLopment of unsustainabLe situations
which might encourage protection'ist tendencies. However, any devaLuation
deemed to be inevitabLe wouLd have to be accompanied by additionaL domestic
stabiLization measures for it to have any chance of success' In the finaL
analysis, revaLuations and devaLutations within the EMS shouLd be carried out
LittLe by t'ittLe so as to minimize uncertainty, which is damaging to trade,
and avoid undue disruption of the process of economic integratjon'
5.4. Quantitative monetary poLicy
Since 1979, the stance of quantitative monetary poLicy has become
more restrictive in practicatLy aIL Community countries. This change has been
prompted by the need to combat infLation and in particuLar by the desire to
prevent the emergence of secondary inftationary effects foLLow'ing the rise
in the price of oiL. At the same time, the introduction of the EMS has pro-
vided those countries participating jn the exchange rate mechanism with a
strong incentive to a de facto coondination of their monetary poLicies :
if an EMS country had adopted a monetary pol'icy stance sjgnificantLy diffe-
rent from that of its partners, it would not have been abLe to fuLfiL'its
exchange rate commitments.
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This interdependence means that monetary poticies within the ElrlS
are strongty infLuenced by the Larger countries. In these countries, the
intermediate objectives of monetary poLicy, expressed in terms of the growth
of specific monetary aggregates, are normative. The figure chosen is set
largety with an eye to domestic economic poIicy objectives, and, among them,
principaILy to the fight aga'inst infLation during recent years, The fact
that there has been agreement on the objective of stabitity has been of great
'importance for the operation of the EMS: it has meant that major confLicts
between quantitative monetary objectives and the maintenance of EMS pivot
rates have been avoided.
rn the smat[er countries such as Belgium, Denmark, rreLand and
the NetherLands, intermediate monetary objectives have Less 61 the nature
of a commitment; they frequentLy serve on[y as indicators for the authori-
ties.Owing to the openness of their economies, the exchange rate in these
countries is of particuLar importance for internaL stabj L'ity, and monetary
poLicy is determined [argeLy in the tight of the objective of mainta.injng
the exchange ratel this is a case of a derived stability objective.
The pragmatism which has governed the controL of the monerary aggre-
gates in countries whose quantitative objectives are normative has heLped
to resoLve the accidentaL confLicts between such targets and exchange rate
object'ives : temporary deviations from the prescribed path of the aggregate
chosen as an intermediate objective have been aLLowed; the effects on mone-
tary aggregates of exchange market intervention have been onLy temporary
and have LargeIy been steriL'ised; wherever possibLe, interest-rate poLicy
has taken account of both internat and externat object'ives and has never
been compIeteLy subordinated to the short-term controI of monetary aggregates.
This pragmatism in monetary pol'icy within the EMS contrasts with the mone-
tary poticy pursued sjnce October 1979 in the United States, where very short-
term and frequentty fortuitus deviations from the prescribed path of the
target aggregates have immediately Led to corrective measures and therefore
to great instabi Lity in jnterest rates.
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The wide range of aggregates chosen as the key variabte of mone-
tary poLjcy in Community countries is perhaps surprising and certainLy
does not make it easjer to interpret a synoptic tabLe (cf' Table 5'5)'
It.is due to a number of factors: institutionaL factors, the varying
stabiL.ity of the demand for money, the size ol the economyretc. tlJhiLe an
objective based on the broadLy defined money supp[y, as used in Germany,
France and the Un'itecl Kingdom, may heLp to reduce the rate of infLation
in the medium termr'it does not make'it possibLe to detect -excessive domes-
tic cned.it expansion aLLowing a persistent baLance of payments def.icit;
converseLy, an objective or indicator expl'essed in terms of domestic credit
expansion, such as'is generaL[y adopted in the sma[ler countries and in
ItaLy, may heLp to contain an externaL defic'it, but, if the baLance of pay-
ments moves into surplus, it may aLLow a too rapid growth in the money sup-
pLy and so Lead to a subsequent acceLeration in infLation' This is why
assessments of quantitative monetary pol"icies must focus both on the
money suppLy and on its counterparts (cf. TabLes 5.6 and
5.7 )" This is also one of the reasons why harmonization, at Community
LeveL, of the intermediate objectives and instruments of monetary policy
is a much Less urgent task than the coordination of the poLic'ies actuaLLy
pursued. Given suffic'ient aEreement between the Large countries on
fundamentaL objectives, the EMS constitutes a powerful instrument in
this respect.
!\lhiLe there h/as a tendency towards overshooting of the monetary objec-
tives in 1978 and 1979, the generaLLy Lower norms fixed for 1980 were
observed fairLy cLoseLy in the member countries, except in Denmark and the
United Kingdom. The targets for 1981 generaLly continue to refLect a poL'icy
of graduaLty reducing the growth of money or cred'it in L'ine with the generaL
aim of combating infLation, but they are LikeLy to prove more difficuLt to
achieve. The information avaiLabLe in September 1981 on the success of
member countrjes in ach'ieving their various monetary objectives or indicator
Levets shows that five countries (Greece, France, ItaLy and the United King-
dom) have gone above the LeveLs'impLied by their initiaL objectives or chosen
indicators, sometimes by a wide margin (see TabLe 5.5).
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Whereas most countries, and in particular France, Germany and Ita Lyrhad
adopted between 1979 and 1981 a pragmat'ic poLicy of a phased reduction in
their quant'itative object'ives, the United Kingdom announced in advance that
as pant of a medium-term financial strategy it would reduce its inter-
mediate objective (expressed in terms of sterLjng M3) from the z % - 1j y.
adopted in June 1979 to approximately 6 % per annum by the spring of 1984.
However, this objective has so far pnoved very djfficuLt to achieve, not
onIy because of major changes in monetary controI arrangements (1) but
aLso because of the sharp appreciation of sterling in 1979 and 1980, which has
exerted a very strong stabiLiz'ing pressure on the economy that wouId have
been even greater if the authorities had adhered to their monetary objec-
tive regardLess of cost.
The monetary poLicy adopted s'ince 1979 aimed at stabiLization and pro-
duced a reduction in the rate of growth of the money suppLy (M2 or M3) in the
community from 13.97" in 1978 to 10.5% in 1980,the Latter be'ing dLose to the
average rate of the 1960rs. As recentLy as May 1981, forecasts suggested a
further reduct'ion in 1981 to 8.8% (see TabLe 5.6). The forecasts of Seotember
1981rhowever, show figures for severat countries which are higher, and in some
countries considerabLy higherjthe impression thus emerges that in terms of the
Community average the deceLeration of monetary growth ceased in 1981 and gave
way'in some countries to a renewed acceleration, In the wake of the recent
reaIignment it is necessary to make a success of the devaIuations and ensure
that monetary poLicies within the EMS ane convengent. It is particuLarLy ne-
cessary to avoid further reaLignments of pivot rates caused by deveLopments
in the monetary domain rather than by those fundamentaI factors such as reIa-
tive pr'ice and cost LeveLs and baLances of payments on current account which
shouLd determine pivot nates w'ithin the EMS. The need to bring the externaL
account back into baLance and the need to reduce the rate of infLation both
indicate that monetary policy in the Commun'ity must continue to aim at stab'i-
Lity. Such a poLicy does not necessariLy excLude a higher priority for objecti-
ves of empLoyment and growth: its restrictive effects can be reduced by mea-
sures affecting the size of pubLic sector deficits and their means of financing
as welL as by action affecting the growth of incomes and their functionaL
distribution. Adjustments in these two areas are essentiaL if Lasting opportu-
nities are to be opened up for growth with stabiLity,
As regards the structure of financiaL fLows, TabLe 5.7 - which depicts
the deveLopment of the counterparts of money suppLy and therefore their con-
tribution to monetary expansion - gives some idea of the extent of the
(1) AboLit.ion in June 1980 of the suppLementary speciaL deposits scheme or
"corset ".
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orobLems. In aLL Conrmunity countries, domestic money creation, as measured
by the expansion of bank Lending to residents(private and public sector),
has been aprec'iabLy greater than the growth of the money suppLy' The dif-
ference has been absgrbed either by non-monetary LiabiLities or by the
negative externaL impract nesuLting from the baLance of payments deficit
(current account and non-bank capitaL account). Thus in many countries do-
mestic credit expansion has fed through into the acquisition of Longer-term
assets not included in the definition of the money suppLy, as is to be ex-
pected'in a period ol'hi9h interest rates; it shouLd be noted, however,
that, if interest rat,es laLl, this deveLopment might welL be reversed, adding
to the L.iquid.ity of the economy. The expansion in Lending has aLso enabLed
the non-bank private sector to finance its current deficit anC/or the
export of non-bank capita L. (The f igures, expressed as a percentage of
the money suppLy at the beginning of each peliod, are particuLarLy high
for IreLand and BeLg.ium - ct. Table 5.7). Such a phenomenon is to be expec-
ted in.itiaLLy'in a period in which a current account defic'it is made inevi-
tabLe by an externaL shock; but if it were to continue fon Long on such
a scaLe, this might make it more difficuLt or even impossibLe for the baLance
of payments to recoven. A very high proportion of the expansjon in domestic
cred.it has gone into the monetary financing of the pubLic sector: the figures,
expressed as a percentage of the money suppLy at the beginning of each
period, are particuLarLy d'isturbing'in the case of lreLand, Greece, BeLgium
Denmark and ItaLy. This is a major source of money creation and potent'iaL
inflation that is extremeLy difficuLt to stop: any attempt to increase the
share of non-monetary financing of the pubLic sector wouLd have the effect
of further boosting the rise in intersst rates and wouLd be !ikety to squeeze
out the orivate sector and in particul-ar that pr"oductive investment which
creates empLoyment. In those countlie's, therefore, in whjch the public
deficit as a proportion of GDP (cf. TabLe 5.9) is particuLarLy high (cLose
to doubLe figures or even highen) a poLicy directed towards stabiLization
and, in time, growth and higher employment can be pursued only at the cost
of a thorough neform of pubLic finance, however difficu[t this may appear
in the oresent economic situation.
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The importance of an adjustment in income trends and income distribu-
:ion for the Lasting success of monetary stabiLisat.ion poLicy shouLd aLso be
rade cLearer- The reduction in monetary growth in the Community between 197g
rnd 1980 was not foLLowed by a falL in the rate of growth of nominaL GDp
lntiL 1981 (975 : 12.8%; 1981 : 9.5% - cf . Table 5.8). This development com-
'rises an acceLerating rise in the GDP price defLator (from g.g% in 19Zg to
1'6"A in 1980 and 10% in 1981) and a marked reduction in the reaL growth rate,
rom 3.1% in 1978 to - 0.5% in 1981. Monetary stab'iLisation poLicy has thus
revented an expLos'ion in the infLation rate of the kind which occunred after
he first oil shock (GDp price deflator : 6.g % in 1grzr 14.z y" in 191il,
ut a reduction of reaL growth has been inevitabLe, notably as
resuIt of an inadequate adjustment of incomes and costs (qreater
hough it has been than in 1924/7il. Ilonetary policy succeeded in 1979
nd 1980 in stabi Lis'ing, broadLy speaking, the marg.in for price increases,
n the sense of the growth in the money supply per un.it of real GDp, (cf,
abLe 5.8/Line 1); the faster rise in the GDP defIator actuaLLy recorded untiL
980 was made possibLe onLy through a reduction in the Liquid.ity ratio of the
conomy or,in other termsrthrough an increase in the veLocity of circuLation of
roney, which has accompanied the rise in interest rates. At the same tine,
lolJever, the margin for reaL GDP growth nesuLting from the combined effects
'f monetary growth and the increase in unit Laboun costs (cf. TabLe 5.g,
ine 2) has considerably narrowed (from 4.7 % in 197g to _ 1.3 % in 19g0).
he rise in Labour costs, which'is responsible for th.is phenomenon, is due
'irstLy to the acceLeration, in most countries, of the rise of per cap.ita
ominaL wages foLLowing the increase in'import prices (particuLarLy of oiL
roducts) and secondty to frequent cases of underestimation, when coLlective
greements were conc(uded, of the sIowdown in growth and productivity ga.ins.
he actuaL slowdown of GDP growth in volume terms has been somewhat less
arked than that of the rnargin for growth owing to the reversat of a
tructuraL eLement determined by changes in the reLationship of the Liquid.ity
atio to the divergence of reaL wage growth from product.ivity (see TabLe 5.9,
ine 5)' In 1981 this factor had the opposite effect so that in spite of a
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smaLI reduction in the growth of wage costs and some acceLeration of
monetary growth, GDP voLume shows an absoLute decLine.
For 1982 Commission staff forecasts indicate a growth of the money
stock sLightLy Less rap'id than that of 1981, aLongside a more noticeabLe
sLowdown in the growth of wage costs on the basis of a more rapid rise of pro-
ductivity rather than a sLowdown in per cap'ita wages. ConsequentLy, the
scope for growth aLLowed by the reLationship between monetary growth and
rising Labour costs shouLd aga'in be marginaLLy pos'itive (cf. TabLe 5.8,
coLumn 1982a, Iine 2), wh'ite the actual growth 'in rea[ 6DP (982a z 2.0 7,)
is expected to be sLightLy higher owing to the structuraI factor mentioned
above. According to this estimate, the margin for price increases wouLd
narrow considerabLy, but the actuaL rise in the GDP defLator wouLd not
be reduced owing to a sharp faLL in the Liquidity ratio, i.e'
a further acceLeration in the veLoc'ity of circuLation of money.
These figures (coLumn 1982a of TabLe 5.8) refLect estimates made in Sep-
tember 1981. They are not satisfactory, either for growth and empLoyment pros-
pects or for in-fLation.It is therefore important to ask how - with the same sta-
biL'ity-oriented monetary poLicy - this performance might be improved through
a better adjustment of incomes trends and incomes distribution. Supposing,
for exampLe, a 50 % reduction compared with 1981 in the increase in unit
Labour costs and assuming, at the same time, an increase in reaL pen cap'i-
ta wages which is 2 % Lower than that of productiv'ity, it wouLd theoreti-
caLLy be possibLe (rsubject to changes in the L'iquidity ratio) to obtain
both an appreciably higher rate of growth and a reduction in the rate of
infIation (cf. TabLe 5.8, coLumn 1982 b). This exampIe clearIy has onLy
iLLustrative vatue. However, it should be remembered that in 1976, compa-
red with 1975, the increase in Labour costs was reduced by more than haLf
and that the stowdown in the increase in reaL wages 'in reLation:to produc-
tivity was of the same order as that env'isaged in this exampLe.
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The sLowdown in the rise in unit [abour costs - as in aLL nominaL incomes
per unit of output - wouLd be necessary to neduce the rate of inflation
and to increase, given unchanged monetary growth, the margin for reat GDp
grotdth. The increase in unit labour costs would have to be less than that
'in prices or, put another way, the growth of real per cap.ita wages wouLd
have to remajn below that of pnoduct'ivity so that firmstprofit margins
couLd be restored (1) ; this'is a prerequisite for increasing firmsrpro-
pens'ity to invest and thei r capac'ity to create jobs. Such a deveLopment
in 1982 and beyond wouLd permit an expansion of non-infLationary demand
resulting either from a spontaneous growth in exports and investment or
from certain stimulatory measures whose adoption wouLd be faciIitated by
the fact that they wouLd no Longer threaten to Lead rapidLy to further
infLation. Such a deveLopment wouLd in tjme bring about a reduction
in unempLoyment and a higher gnowth in reaL wages than the stagfLation
now in prospect.
CLearLyrmonetary poL'icy cannot aLone trigger the process outLined
above. However, the pot'icy aiming at monetary stabiLization which has
been pursued for three years in the Community is a necessary cond.ition.
Against this background, "an incomes poLicy of some suitabLe designr.based
on consensus rather than on constraint, shouLd not be ruLed out. Admit-
tedty, incomes poLicies have foundered in the past, but in many cases they
have failed because they were seen as an aLternative to monetary restraint
rather than as a supporting instrument. It is because it was used in this
second way that the deIiberate moderation of income growth has had quite
good results in a number of countries, and notabLy in those which have had
most success in mastering inf Lation. Is this meneLy a co.incidence ? ,, e).
(1) A substantiaL improvement 'in f irms, prof .it margins i s aLL the more
necessary for 'improved growth and empLoyment prospects, since, in most
member countries, the gap which has opened up since the 1960s betweenthe growth of reaI per capita wages and that of productivity, adjustedfor changes in the terms of trade, is stiLL very wide (cf. TabLe 5.9b);
these are after-effects of what went wrong in the first haLf of the
1970s and of the first oiL shock, which have not yet been overcome at
macroeconomic LeveL.
(2) See the conc Lusions
tiona I Sett Iements,
of
p.
the 1981 annual report of the Bank for Interna-
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It is aLso cLear that a decision to Let the rate of monetary growth in
the Community lise from 10.5% in 1980 to 12, 13or 14% in 1982 might Lead
to a poss.ibLe recoveny'in 1982 on 1983; but a resumption of growth under
such monetary conditions wouLd not alLour a reduction in the base-Line given by
the present rate of infLation (Community average of 1A% for the GDP defLator)
and wouLd quickLy Lead to an acceLeration of price rises; such a deveLop-
ment wouLd rapidLy urrLeash a net^r stabiLization crisis and wouLd contribute
nothing to a lasting improvement in growth and empLoyment prospects'
5.5 Interest rates
The present phase of high'interest rates has aLready Lasted Longer
than the 1973/74 phase, wh'ich accompanied the overheating of 1973 and the
fi rst oi I shock ; furthermone, intenest rate LeveLs are'higher. In the
autumn of 1981, this phase is in its third year and the peak money market rates
(three-month interbank rates, Community averages) have been of the order of
14 to 16 %, whereas the prev'ious phase Lasted onLy from the second quarter
of 1973 to the first quarter of 1975 and the maximum teveLs then were between
12 and 13 %.
The new wave of rising interest rates stafted with the acceLeration in
infLation in the United States which began )n 1978; to this was soon added
the impact of the second oiL shock. In the Community, the resurgence of
infLationany pressures, the emergence of a substantiat baLance of payments
deficit on current account and the more restrictive stance of monetary poLicy
[ed, dur.ing 1 979, to a ri se 'in money market rates comparabLe to that i n the
United States. Graph 5.5 shows that the rise in Community rates has been
a good deaL more steady than that in the United States : average Community
rates increased from around 7 - 8 % in 1978 to approximateLy 12.5 - 14 %
in 1980 and to 15 - 16 % by mid-1981, whereas in the United States three-
month Treasury bills fLuctuated between a first high of 16 % in March 1980'
a Low of 7.g % in June 1980, a second high of 16 % in December 1980, a further
Low of 1?.5 % in March 1981 and a furthen h'igh of 16 % in MaylJune 1981
(see Graph 5.5). This extreme voLati L'ity of U.S. rates 'is probabLy one of
the main reasons why public opinion in Europe has frequentLy put the blame
for the generaL escaLat'ion in interest rate LeveLs foLLowing the second oiL
shock square[y on the shou[ders of authorities in the United States.
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The average teveI of interest rates in the community was kept gq1-
b/een 1z.s % and 14 % from the end o'f 1979 untiI the beginning of 1gg1
partLy because the monetany authorities in the member countnies did not
wish to foLLow the instabiLity of transatLantic rates but ma'inLy because
they were guided by cons'iderat'ions of domestic economic poL'icy: an appre-
ciabLe faLL in rates after March lgB0ron the United States pattern, wouLd
have been compatibLe neither with the Communityts substantiaL deficit on
current account nor with the need to combat infLation; a further b.ig
upsurge in interest rates in the second haLf of 1980 wouLd have confLicted
with the worrying fatl-off in activ'ity and rise in unemployment. However,
the continuing h'igh externaI deficit and rate of infLat'ionrwhich were LikeLy
to be further aggravated by the soaring rate of the dol Lar, made a further
upward adjustment of interest rates in Europe inevitabLe, This movement
was started by the Bundesbank measures of 19 February 1981 (suspension
of the Lombard faciLity) and folLowed, between February and May 1981, by
the BeneLux countries, ItaLy and France.
Graph 5.5 shows that, since 1978, the generaL trend in money market
interest rates has been very simiLar in Germany, France, rtaLy and the Bene-
Iux coUntries in particuLar - a resu[t of the EMS. The differences in
[eve[ are due mainLy to divergent rates of infLation and to different situ-
ations as regards payments balances and pubLic budgets. However, it
shouLd be emphasized that, when the markets do not anticipate a shift
of pivot rates, short-term investment in the various member coun-
tries is guided simply by nom'inaL rates, and that the inf[uence of
differing'infLation rates on short-term interest rate differentiaLs tends
to diminish as a resu[t of the existence of EMS. Shor"t-term rates in the
Un'ited Kingdom have folLowed a different pattern: a very sharp rise from
1978 to the end of 1979 was fol[owed by a gradual fall untiI the middle of
1981; this trend reflects the great effort made to achieve monetary sta-
biLity and the gradual reduction in the rate of infLation from a Level
exceeding 20 % at an annuaL rate in the first haLf of 1980 to approximateLy
11 % in JuLy 1981 : short-term interest rates in reaL terms thus fLuctuated
around zero from the beginning o'f 1979 untiL the middLe of 1981.
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Long-term interest rates are Less infLuenced by the day-to-day
conduct of monetary policy. Since 1978' their trend in the Commun'ity
has generatLy been simjLar to that of short-term rates, a[though they
have fLuctuated much Less. As measured by the Community average, short-
term rates exceeded Long-term rates fnom mid-1979 untiL mid-1980 and
did so again from the first haLf of 1981. Despite the methodoLogicaL
probtems invoLved in caLcuLating reaL interest rates, a structuraL study
of reaL long-term interest rates over a Long period provides'interesting
findings. Taking the Community as a whoLe, the LeveL of reaL Long-term
rates r^ras positive and reLativeLy high during the 1960s (average fon
1961-70 z 2.9 7, - ct. TabLe 5.9 and Graph 5.6). This Level lvas accompa-
nied by Low rates of inflation, h'igh rates of GDP and investment growth,
pubLic budgets mone or Less in baLance, current payments generaLLy'in
surpLus and a trend in reaL per capita wages - Leaving aside cycLicaL fluc-
tuations - paraLLeL to that of productivity adjusted for changes in the terms
of trade (see Gr"aph 4.2). At the beginning of the 1970s,neaL Long-term rates
started a steady faLL (cf. Graph 5.6), the Low po'int being reached during
the 1975 recession (- 1.8 D. At the same time, a considerabLe gap opened
up between the growth of reaL wages and that of productivity adjusted for
changes in the terms of trade; the r.ise in prices acceLerated considera-
bLy, the tnend growth rate of GDP and of investment feLl and pubLic budgets
and baLances of payments showed substantiaL deficits. These trends were
cLoseLy Linked w'ith the Lax monetary poLicies pursued in the earLy 1970s
(cf. Chapter 5 of the 1980 annuaL review) and with the inddequate adjust-
ment of incomes to the consequences of the first oiL shock. It wouLd seem
that, during this period, the role pIayed by interest rates in the aLtoca-
tion of resources and the distribution of incomes vlas greatLy disrupted.
The major structunaL rJistortions which r"esuLted t^rere onLy very partiaLLy
corrected by deveLopments in the second haLf of the 1970s. hlhiLe the
stricter monetary poLicies adopted at the time of the second oiL shock
prevented infLation from again getting seriousLy out of controL, they
Led in 1981 to a reappearance of high reaL Long-term interest rates'
Qnl'
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Owing to the pnesent prospects of sLower growth , these reaL rates ;
are having a greater impact on the economy than the simiLar rates observed
duri ng the 1 960s.
With economic activity sluggish in the Community, a genenaL faLL 'in
short- and Long-term interest rates wouLd undoubtedly be desirabLe. Fon
the time being, the high LeveL of United States interest rates prevents
such a faLL fnom occuring, aLthough the decLine in demand for credit re-
sulting from the current sLowdown in economic activity couLd welt justify
a downturn in the near future. For a faLL to Iast, however, infLat'ionary
expectat'ions nrouLd have to be reduced appreciabLy in most member countries.
Even if this were achieved, the generaL faLL in Long-term rates wouLd be
more a fal['in nominal rates than in reaL rates and the differences in
reaL rates wouLd continue to reflect the varying size of structuraL imba-
Lances in the member countries. TabLe 5.9 shows how the LeveL of real
Long-term rates is associated, in member countries, with the divergence
of reaI wages from the growth ofproductiVjty adjusted for changes in the
terms of trade(reaL wage pos'it'ion) and with high or persistent
pubL'ic budget and current account def icits. The situation differs appre-
c'iabLy from one member country to the next. In BeLqium the diverqence of reaL
wage position is widest $23n and the deficits both of the publ.ic sector and
of the baLance of payments ane highest (rreLand Left aoart) : these
three factors combine to force reaL Long-term rates up to a very high LeveL;
in Denmark the position of reaL wages has been corrected, aLthough the sharo
growth in the pubL'ic secton deficit since 1978 and the cont'inuing baLance
of payments deficit on curnent account since the 196As, resuLting'in a very
substantiaL exter"naL debt, have aLso Led to a ver"y high LeveL of reaL rates;
Germany, where reaL long-term rates have never been negat'ive, and the
NletherLands and France occupy/ aLbeit r,rith major differences of deta'iL,
a middLe pos'ition, though this in no way impL'ies the absence of structuraL
'imbaLances ; in ItaLy and Ireland, reaL rates . remained negative or
marg'inaLLy positive unti t 1981 desp'ite a high or very high position of reaL
lJages and substantiaL pubLic secton and externaL deficits, because in both
countries the process of reducing the rate of infLation (between 1T% and jB7" in
1981 in terms of GDP prices) has scarcely got under way and the monet ary fi-
nancing of the public sector is stiLL very substantial : in the United Kingdom,
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finaLLy, after a l..engthy period of negative rates (fnom 1974 to 1980
with the exception of 1978), reaL Long-term'interest rates again became
positive 'in 1981. These country-by-country observations show that the
high LeveL of interest rates in the Community is not excLusiveLy a
problem of internationaL reLations or of overaLL monetary controLrbut
is aLso one of structural imbaLances which LargeLy developed in the first
haLf of the 1970s. A monetary poLicy which aims at stabiL'ity and which refu-
ses to permit an escape route which wouLd'invoLvegfurther wave of inflation
shows up these imbraLances and may prevent them from worsening. However,'in
order to speed up this correct'ive process, whiLe at the same time timiting
the cost in terms of growth and job Losses, the reform of pubLic finances
and a mone rapid adjustment of incomes are essentiaL.
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In most countries the thrust of budgetary poliuy'in 1980 and 1981 has been
aimed at reducing budget deficits over the meCium-term and at giving support
to anti-infLat.ionary ionetary poLi cy. Thus measures to restrain expenditure
or increase tax rates are Limiting ihe increase in budget deficits in 1981
to an amount.quuL to 019%s1 Community GDP, whereas otherwise the deficits
couLd have risen b)r more than th,ice as much under the combined impact
of weak economic activity and r"ising interest payments. In 1982' government
attempts to compness deficits are titety to be reinforced in a number of
countries, but in others discretionary poL'icy may swing 'into a more expan-
sionary posture. For the Community as a whoLe discretionary policy wiLL be
sLightLy Iess nestrict'ive than in 1981, but the overaLL budget deficit in
the community shoul.d be reduced by about QrZ% of GDP as the impact of the
recession on goverrlment finan.uu ..cedes somewhat. SLightLy 'increased reLiance
has been pLaced on non-monetary financ'ing of deficits in 1981; such reLiance
wiLL probably be maintained in 1982. The interpLay of policy changes and the-
movement of the economy in 1981 is reflected in a rise in the ratio of transfers
and interest payments to GDP, whiLe government final expenditure as a proportion
of GDP'is rather stabLe and tax presiure rises. These resu[ts continue a Longer-
term trend for govennment's roLe as redistributor ' rather than finaL user, of
income to expand. rn '1gE?, tax pressure couLd ihcrease further but the proportion
of GDF taken up by finat govu.n*"nt expenditure couLd faLL back'
6.1 Budgetary deveLopments in the cvcLe: 1978-82
The LikeLy rersumptjon of a moderate growth of output in the first haLf
of 1982 wiLL complete a somewhat atypicaL cyc[e of three-and-a-haLf years Length
which began in the second haLf of 1978 with an upswing which was cut short by
the oi[-price shock. The stance of budgetary poLicy in the community is, however,
substantiaLty diffenent now as compared with the period at the outset of the
1978 upswing.
Then, budgetary poL'icy had been supportive of activity in a number of
inember countries. Further, the concerted Action Decision of 24 JuLy 1978 was
aimed at significantLy increasing budgetary support to economic activ'ity,
especiatLy in the FederaL Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and France'
The effects of measures resuLt'ing from the decision of 24 July 1978 bore
mainty on 1979. But duning the course of 1979 the drastic change in the economic
c[imate brought abqut by the oi l" pri ce shock 1'1as accompanied by a sh'ift to a
more restrictive
t'ing the gLobaL
stance of budgetary poLicies in a number of countries, offset-
effects in 1979 of poLicies introduced in 1978' Thus for the
Community as a whot.e the main net outcome for 1979 llas a restructuring of
government budgets:: the pressure of taxes and sociaL security contributions
aS a percentage of GDP was LittLe changed, but with a switch away
from direct taxes, whiLe the volume of government current consumption
as a percentage of reaL GDP and the share of current transfers to
households jn nominaL GDP both feL[. The net borrowing
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of generaI government (henceforth referred to as the "budget deficit")
in the community dec[ined fron 4,0% of GDp in 1978 to 3,6i( of GDp in
1979 Oabl.e 6.4). Re[ativety rap'id economic arot^rth in 1979 tended to
increase tax receipts, and faLting unemptoyment to reduce the growth in
payments of unemployment benefits, in the Commun'ity as a whole. Among
Member States (TabLe 6.?) the budget deficit indeed rose in the FederaL
Republic of Germany and decIined in IreLand and rtaLy, as foreseen by
the CounciI Decision, but rose in Denmark, BeLgium and the NetherLands,
countries in which the Decision had sought efforts to curb the gnowth
in current spending,
In most member countries budgetary policy in 1980 was aimed at
reducing on at Least restraining the generaL government deficit as a
percentage of GDP. In consequence, programmes of expenditure reduction
or rest ra'i nt, somet'i mes supp Lemented by tax i ncreases, were announced i n
a number of countries. In some instances (notabLy BeLgium and ItaLy)
poL'iticaL or administrative difficuLties prevented the fuLL impLementa-
tion of programmes of restraint of expenditure. 0ther countries experienced
difficuLties in the areas of pubLic sector saLaries (IreLand, the Un'ited
K'ingdom) and of expenditure onLy indirectLy controLLed by centraL govern-
ments (Denmarkr United Kingdom). In addition, announced programmes of
restraint were in some cases modified to provide support to particuLarLy
hard-hit sectors, notabLy the construction industry (Denmark, IreLand,
the NetherLands) , and to stimuLate private investment through subsidies
and incentives. NonetheLess, tax pressure rose in 1980 (to 40o3% of GDP) and the
voLume growth of current expenditure was reduced from its 1979 rate. Aga'inst
this, the recession in economic activity worked to reduce tax revenues
and sweLL current transfers, particuLarLy unempLoyment benefits. Moreover,
high nom'inaL 'interest rates increased the cost of servi cing publi c debt .
For the Community as a whole (see Tab[e 6.D a very slight[y reduced generaL
government-deficit as a percentage of GDP resulted, utith a substantiaLLy tower
deficit in the United Kingdom (though still not as targe a reduction as
originalLy pLanned by the Government) and in Ita[y and even a sma[[ sunptus
in France exactly offsetting deteriorations eLsewiiere, particutarIy in
Belgium, Ireland ancl Denmark.
\olt 6.3
PoLicy changes in 1981 again are having the effect, other things
equat, of tending to reduce deficits, reftecting a desire in a number
of countries to steer as c[ose as possibLe to medium-term targets for
budget deficits and to concentrate on structuraL rather than on tradi-
tionaL "demand-managementt' policy measures. This is particularLy true
of the FederaL RepubLic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the NetherLands.
In Belgium and IreLand the avowed aim of governments to restrict deficits
reflects more urgent worries about growing public sector indebtedness
and baLance of payments deficits, but again poLiticaL factors have pre-
vented effective restraint in 1981. In Denmark the baLance of payments
deficit is aLso a major preoccupation, but the effort of budgetary restraint
which bore some fruit in a reduced curnent deficit in 1980 appears to have
been somew'fial i6af<ened in 1ea-t.
For the Commun'ity as a whoIe, government consumption'is forecast
to grow by 1157" in volume, a rate of growth probably below what might
be expected to be its trend rate even given worsened medium-term prospects
and, in some countries, an intention to reduce the share of expenditure
accounted for by the pubLic sector. SimiLarLy, whereas the share of sociaL
benefits in GDP increased by about 2 points in the deep recession year of
1975, the increase in 1981 is expected to be about 1/2 point, the difference
being considerabLy bigger than is expLained by the somewhat smaLLer in-
crease in the unempLoyment rate in 1981 as compared with 1975. Further,
the need to limit the expansion of deficits has, at Least in part,
frustrated the desire of governments to avoid increases in tax pressure
as measured by the share of taxes and sociaL secun'ity contributions in
GDP (see section 6.3).
0n the basis of announced poLic'ies, 1982 is aLso IikeLy to be a
year in which a desine to restrict or reduce budget defic'its is, in
many Community countlies, the stnongest influence on budgetary policy.
In France and Denmarlg however, concern aboutthe impLications of unempLoy-
ment 'is teadi ng to a change of tar"geted budgetary stance .
_l
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Deficits are LikeLy to faLL as a percentage of GDp in Germany, BeLgium,
the NetherLands, IreLand and the l.Jnited Kingdom, to be L'ittLe changed in ltaLy,
and to increase in Denmark, Luxembourg and France. Gross
sav'ing wi L L remain substantiaL Ly negative in BeLg.ium, Denmark, rreIand
and ItaLy, but onLy in Denmark wouLd this be the case if net interest
were excLuded (see box on budgetary deveLopments in individuaL countries).
For the Commun'ity as a whoLe, generaL government burjget def i c'its in 1982
may be reduced somewhat as a percentage of GDp (to 4r2%of GDp)/ measures
of budgetary restraint just more than offsetting the effects of rather
modest groh,th 'in output and a continued rise in unempIoyment (TabLe 6.1).
Net of interest, the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP could decline
by a sfightLy larger amount, being reduced to 1r1itas against the 1,6%
ti ke Ly for 1981 .
In sum, the traditional counter-cyclical roLe of budgetary poLicy
has beenr'in the Community as a whoLe, severeLy cincumscribed duling the
present cycLe. The consequences of an emphasis on monetary controL and
on medium-term poLi cy objectives ('in whi ch the adjustment of externaL
imbalances is aLso an important factor for certain memben countries) have
in many Community countries ruLed out discret'ionary budgetary action'in
response to the weakness of act'ivity and empLoyment in the commun.ity
economy. Further, to the extent that such weakness couLd be ascribed to
poor competitiveness, structuraL maLadjustment and a shortage of profit-
abLy uti Li zabLe capitaL, budgetary stimuLation of demand would be inappro-
priate even without taking monetary repercussions into account. This draw-
back wouLd appLy as much to the "automatic stabiLizers" as to d'iscretionary
stimuLation of demand and wouLd'impLy that an increase in budget deficits
brought about be the "automatic stabiLizers" might not be easiLy revers'ible.
The operation of these mechanisms h,ouLd in such circumstances pose a
threat to the attainment of financiaL plans invoLving medium-term reductions
in budget defi ci ts.
tslo
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.These considerations mean that it is difficuLt to divide changes in
budget defi cits into conventionaL "automati c" and "discret'ionary" components.
However, it is stiLl. cLearLy of interest to examine the effect that varia-
tions in output and unempLoyment, whatever thein causes, have on the budget
deficit. For this purpose, a trend rate of growth for the Community economy
has had to be assumerd and thus the caLcuLations have something of an iLLustra-
tive nature. fhe rate chosen from 1974 onwards is 2 1/2% a year; this corre-
sponds to estimates prepared by the Commission services using capacity utiL'i-
zation data from ther EC business surveys (see AnnuaL Econromic Review 1980-81
pp,1.9 and 1.10). The effects of changes in net interest payments are shown
separateLy, so that "d'iscretionary" changes (identified wjth the residuaL
change shown in Table 6.3) in budget deficits are taken to mean changes in
effect.ive rates of tax and trarrsfers, excLuding net intenest payments, and changes in
the ratios of govennment consumption and capitaL fonmation to trend GDP.
The caLcuLations suggest that wheneas foL Lowing the first oi L-pri ce shock
discretionary budgetary poLi cy tended to increase budget defi cits in the
Community, the reverse has been true after the second oil-price shock- In
particuLarr'Uiscret'ionaryt'changes in 1981, a receSsion year, llouLd have
reduced the budget deficit by an amount equivaLent to 1r2%o'f GDP in the
absence of the deficit-increas'ing "automatic" effects of changes in economic
activity and the effects of incneased net interest payments. The comparison
of 1gB1 h,ith 1 975 points up the seriousness of the constraints on budgetary
poticy which arose or were pence'ived between the two episodes.
For lgS2r"discretionary"changes are smaLLer than in 1981, and more than
offset "automatic" and interest payment effects so as to produce a reduction
in the actuaL deficit.
6.2 Longer" term budgetarY t rends
The previous section anaLysed necent changes 'in general government budget;
deficits expLicjtLy in terms of "djscretionary" and other changes. The present
section examines changes in budget deficits in the Commun'ity, over a Longer
period, in terms of the deveLopment of the major budgetary aggnegates.
_l
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It is first of aLL noteworthy that gross saving of generaL government
in the Community has tended to deteriorate more rapidLy than the overaLL
budget def icit froma substantiaL5,5% of GDp inlgToto-0,4zin1gg1. capitaL
out Iays (capitaL formation pLus capitaL tnansfers) have decLined fai rLy
steadity as a proportion of GDP (TabLe 6.4). Government capitaL formation
has decIined steadiLy (with 1974 and, to a Lesser extent, 1980 being exceptions).
t"Jithin the current account of generaL government, totaI taxes and sociaL
security contributions rise from 35,77. of GDP in 1970to a forecast 41,1i(in1982.
A particuLarLy sharp rise in tax pressure, thus defined, took pLace between
1972 and 1977. Since 1977 the rise has been more restrained but nonetheless
evident, especiaLly in 1980 and 1981. Governments in a number of Community
countries have seen a reduction'i n tax pressure as a des'i rabLe a'i m, other
things being equaL, but a perceived need to counter "automatic" increases in
budget deficits and, particuLarLy in the case of Denmark, the poLicy priority
of correcting an externaL disequi Librium have up to not^r frustrated this
desire. For 1982, however, a smalt reduction in tax pressure in the Communityjs forecast. Among countries, the rise in totaL tax pressure over the period
was strongest in the Netherlands and BeLgium, whiLe the United Kingdom, at the
other extreme, show€d litt le change.
SociaL contributjons have been the fastest-growing eLements of tax and
parafiscaL charges, espec'iaLLy in the NetherLands, where such charges reached
207" of GDP by the beginning of the 1980's. |.Jith an unchanged r6,gime, the
eLast'ic'ity of contributions with respect to GDP mjght be expected to be cLose
to or beLow un'ity: the rise in the ratio of contributions to GDP over the
period probabLy represents attempts to baLance the operations of sociaL
security funds in the face of strongLy-ris'ing sociaL benefjts, espec'iaL-
Ly in Denmark, BeLgium, France and the NetherLands.
Such benefit payments have increased from.14137, of GDP in 1970 tu 2Ar27.in1981.
The increase resutts from a combination of factors: rising unempIoyment, and
at feast untit the [ater 1970s, a growing number of pensioners, improved
eIigibiIity conditions and increased reaI benefit rates. The slight faLL
in the ratio in 1979 probabLy ref[ects the fact that the faLL in unempLoyment
in that year, atthough smalL in totaL, was concentrated among maLes. The
stabiIity of the ratio in 1980 and the reLativety smalL rise in 1981 compared
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with 1975 (despite strongLy rising unempLoyment) are evidence of
measures'in a number of countries to restrict etigibiIity and/or reduce
reat rates of benefit per recjpjent. In 1982 it is forecast that, w'ith
a sLower rise in unempLoyment, these mea.sures wiLL hetp pnoduce a faLL in the ratio-
The oeriod bet u,teen 1972 and 1977 saw a rise in the ratio of direct
taxes to GDP from 10,4y. in the former year to 12,67" in the Latter. This rise
was pr.imariLy brought about through the workings of fiscaL drag during a
period of rapid infLation. 0nLy tn 1972 and 1975 did the share of direct
taxes in GDp feLL sLightty, years in which cuts in direct tax rates (before
the effects of fiscal. drag are considered) were made'in response to weak
economi c act'ivity. However, schemes of at Least partiaL fjscal indexation
were'intnoduced in a number of countries towards the end of this period. In
combination with redt-rced infLation in 1978 and 1979 these schemes reduced
the effects of fiscaL drag in those years, whiLe direct tax rates were reduced
in a number of countries in attempts either to support activity or to re-struc-
tune the tax burden. A reacceLeration of infLation in 1980 and poLicy changes
in a number of countries Led to a furthen nise in the ratio. LittLe change
is in prospect for" the Community as a whoLe in 1981 and 1982, Among the
member countlies, however, the direct tax ratio rises qu'ite sharpLy in Denmark
and the United K'ingdom.
Incljrect taxes tended to falL as a percentage of GDP during the first
haLf of the 1970rs, excise duties being generatLy non-'indexed. The faLI at
the Commun jty leveL jn th'is period ma'inLy resuIted f rorn deveLopments in ItaLy
and the Unjted Kingdom. In 1976 and 1977, however, indirect tax rates were
increased, aLong with the tax burden as a whoLe, as part of discretionary
moves aimed at reducing budget deficits. Since then they have continued to
increasermost noticeabLy in the United Kingdom and the Federal RepubLic of
Genmany, bearing the weight both of effects to restructure the tax burden or,
as in 1980 and 1981, to restrict the growth of deficits whiLe increasing the
direct tax burden as LjttLe as possjbLe.
0n the expenditure s'ide, government consumption, as a percentage of
GDp, has tended to rjse in yeans of low on negative growth (19721 19741 1975,
1980, 1981) and to falr.1 in yeans of rapid growth (1973, 1970. The ratio feLL,
I
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however, tn 1977, and rose sLightLy in 1978 and 1979, yeafs when private
domestic demand llas atready rising quite strongLy.Over the period as a
whote the trend in the ratio was upwards (but it is expect'ed to fat'[ back iomewhat in
1982) - UntiL 1975, an increase in punchases of goods and services and in
consumption of fixed capital was the biggest factor in the r.ising share
of government consumption. Fron 1977 to 1980, however, these eLements of
government consumption feLL back as a share of GDP, whi[e compensation
of employees was on a rising trend. The forecasts for 1982 are based on
the assumpt'ion that governments wilL seek to reduce the burden of expenditur.e
restraint on pnivate sector suppLiers, on whom it has lended to.faLt so far,
and shi f t more of jt onto the j.r own d.ilect empLoynrent out Lays.
fhe proportion of other current outLays (aLmost excLusiveLy .interest
payments) in GDP more than doubled between its tr970 [evel and that fonecast
for 1982. The increase is even more marked in Denmark, aeLgium and ItaLy.
A rising cost of debt service, as a proportion of GDP, does not necessari[y
impty a consistent nise in the ratio of genera[ government debt to GDp,
since a major reason for the increased cost of debt service has been an
infLation premium in interest payments on nominaLLy-f.ixed debt.
0n capitaL account, gross cap'itaL formation by genenaL government has
declined markedly as a proportion of GDP over the period since 1970; onLy
in 1975' when the denominator of the ratio felL sharply, was there any cLear
break in this trend, which is forecast to continue in'1982. Governments faced
with budgetary constraints find it easier to prune capit6l expenditure than
government ionsuriiption both because discrete capitaL expenditure projecti
are easiLy sheIvabLe and'because such pruning'is fett by the private sector
rat her t han by pub I i c sector emp LOyees
Net capital transfers wiLL be at a simi[ar levet, as a proportion of
GDP, in 1982 to their" level in 197O. The ratio rose in 1975, as governments
strove to mjtigate through grants the coLLapse of investment, but feLl in 1981
desp'ite some probabLe etement of subsidies to "crisjs" sectors, although
this is difficuIt to identify.
\\o
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The forecast and assumed or decLared monetary poLicy targets for
1982 woutd atLou room for monetary financing sLightLy Lower than
the 3.0% of GDP'estimated for 1982 (with wide differences among Member
states, to some extent depending upon differences in definition of the
monetary aggregates). The totaL net borrowing requirement is expected
to dectine from 6.1% of GDP in 1981 to 5.2% and non-monetary financing
couLd thus be expected to draw stightLy Less upon financiaL markets
'in 1982 than in the previous year (Table 6'5) '
trl
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The 1981 draft budget for Betgium was first outlined in August 1980. The
1981 centraL government borrowing requirement was then estimated at 614%of GNP as against 7r3y. in 1980. In October, the new Governmentfs program-
me incLuded pLans to counten tax avoidance, to impLement higher VAT rates
and excise duties and to increase effective tax rates on marr.ied coupLes,to stimuLate construction activ'ity and emptoyment in smatl firms. In No-
vember an additionaL VAT surtax on Luxury goods was introduced. In December
eL'igibitity of young persons for unempLoyment benefit rnlas restricted. In
March a number of pLanned measures designed to produce budget savings in
1981 equivalent to about 1% of GDP were announced, so that the budget defi-
cjt shouLd not rise as a percentage of GDP. However, the implementation ofthe programme encountered serious difficuIties. Further, sIippage in the
current account of the centraI government has been very considerable. Com-
mission forecasts indicate a centraL government cash deficit in 1981 equiv-
aLent to13"Q7" of GDP (9,3y. in 1980).0n 6 August theformer government decided
on a number of measures to be incLuded in the draft budget for 1982, which
was due to be tabLed at the beginning of October. A centrat government
current deficit of FB 201 200 mi[[ion and generaI government net borrowing
of around FB 455 000 milLion (1?t1% of GDP) was envisaged. Increases in taxes
wouLd bring in an additionaL FB 43 900 miLLion and expenditure plans would
Lre reduced, aLthough compLete details of the expected savings (mainLy in the
f ieLds of pubLi c admini strat'ion, educat'ion, sociaL secunity and subsidiesto pubti c uti lities) were not avai lab[e"
In Denmark, measures to aid construction activ'ity were taken in October 1980.
The centraL government budget for 1981, adopted in December 1980, invoLved
an estimated deficit equ'ivaLent to 5r17, of GDp, against a then-estimated
deficit of 4r5% of GDp in 1980. rn the Spring of 1981 the national pay
agreement invoLved someb,hat higher pay increases in the public sector thanin the private sector. The conditions for pursuing the pLuriannuaL
programme in 1982 were aLso agreed in May by a majority in ParLiament.
t'lith a view to reducing the externaL disequiLibrium, cutting unemptoyment
and stowing expenditure growth, the emptoyment and business programme tlasto be continued at its 1981 LeveL (yearly outLays equivaLent to 1r47. of
1981 GDP), there was to be no reaL increase in non-cyclicaL centraL expend-,iture and a timit of 116% in reaL spend'ing (excLuding spending on energy
supply, on the estabtishment of public transport and on certain job-creat-
ion measures) by tocat authorities. It was furthermore agreed thatindirect taxes were to be increased. Current Commission forecasts put
the centraL government cash deficit in 1981 at 715% of GDp, against 416Zin 1980. The draft centraL government budget for 1982 envisages a further
increase in the cash deficit, to about 8 1l?% of GDp, in 1982.
Measures to reduce the income tax burden and improve certain sociaL benefits
from 1981 onwards were approved in the FederaI Republic of Germgny_ in JuLy1980(estimatedbudgetarycostequivateand1%of
GDP in 1982). In December the Federa[ budget proposat for 1981 r,las reLeased.It invotved a tota( increase of nominal expenditure of onLy 4,3% and a net
FederaI borrowing requirement equiva[ent to just under 118% of GDp, very
sLightLy Lower (as a pencentage of GDP) than the outturn then estimated for
1980. In March 1981 excise duties on o'iI products and atcohoL were raised.
\\ D.
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In May, a suppLementary FederaL budget was introduced to meet the forecast
riser.. u.".uLt of 1.1orse-than-expected unempLoyment, in the financing
needs of the FederaI Labour Office (to about 1/2% of GDP)' Further, the
recession in activity Led to a reduced est'imate of tax revenue in 1981.
Current officiaL estimates suggest that FederaL government net borrow'ing
in 1981 wi LL amount to 2r2% of GDP as against 1r8"/, originaLLy planned'
The preLiminary draft FederaI budget tor 1982 envisages cuts 'in subs'idies,
tax atLowances and pubLic sector wage increases so as to reduce the FederaL
borrowing requirement from DM 34 000 miLLion in 1981 to DM 26 500 miLLion
in 1982.
The most striking deveLopment in budgetary aggregates in Grqecg in 1981 has
been a very subitantiaI incr.ease in centraL government capital outLays,
both on investment and, more partj cuIarLy, capjtat transfers. Earthquake
retief expenditure eariy in the year was partly responsibLe for this- Direct
tax rates were aLso reduced, however, and while the very Large firstquarter
borrowing requirement of centraL government was undoubtedLy swoLLen as a
result of the earthquakes, the totaI for the year is Likely to exceed the
3,2% of GDP earLier forecast. For 1982 it is the intention of the pnesent
government to reduce the centraL government borrowing r"equ'irement as a
iercentage of GDP, but because of eLections in autumn it may be the beg'in-
ning of igaZ U"torer a draft budget for that year is presented.
In France the 1981 clraft budget was introduced in September 1980- It featured
u tig61-_-tqueeze on public expenditure, but more aid to investment and the
creation of a counter-cycLi caL investment reserve. In 0ctober, pubL'i c enten-
prises'investment programmes 1,1ere adopted for 1981: they impLied no voLume c
change from 1980,Over-the foLLowing few months a number of expenditure'in-
creases 1.1ere announced invoLving'improved soc'iaL benefit rates and conditions,
agricuLturat income-support, subsidized investment loans, labour market
*"asu.". and civiL service saLanies. FoLLowing the change of government in
mid-year sociaL benefits were'incneasedr €rnpLoyersrsociaL security contriL'u-
tions were reduced, the anti-cycLical investment fund was activated (50 000
additionaL ho.using starts being aimed at), and a first step in increasing
pubLic sector employment (by 54 000) was desided. The government expected
these measures to be f inanced in part through stronger economi c act'iv'ity (and
hence higher tax receipts), in part by a surtar(, a levy on banks and oil
companiei and a tax on the outgoings of Large companies. On the basis of the
macroeconomi c assumptions of the orig'inaL Finance Law, the centrat govern-
ment cash deficit for 1981, r^ras not expected to exceed the figure of 57 000
mi LLion FF (1r1g % GDP) Laiej down in the orig'inaL Lau', as amended by the "Loi
rectificatif". However, activity has been weaker than assumed jn the originaL
Law and the outturn foi the deficit js L'ike[y, on Commission estimates, to
be very sLightLy higher. The draft budget for 1982 for"esees a centraL govern-
ment cash deficit oi qS 400 miLLion FF; tax pressure would be increased sLight-
sLightLy whiLe expenditure increases wouLd be concentrated on empLoyment-
support measunes (including the creatiOn of new pubLic service jobs) and on
stimuLating investment.0n 7 gctober a freeze was announced on pubLic invest-
ment of 15 000 mitLion FF in 1982 as part of an effort to avojd expenditure
over runs .
The budget deficit foreseen in the original 1981 budget in -@ ]t LikeLyto be considerabLy exceeded as a resuLt of the introduction of new housing
and food subsidiei, of civiL senvice pay increases, of the deferring of
increases in pubLil transport fanes and eLectricity (aLL in the spring) and
of increasing housinrg grants and educat'ion grants to students immedi atety
l\)
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after the eLection.0n 21 Jur.y the new government introduced a packageof corrective measures involving cuts in pubL.ic expenditure (partLyoffset'by some increases in sociaI wetfarf pryr"nts), increases in tax-ation (in particular excise duties and vAT), and the imp[ementation ofthe previousIy postponed rises in eLectric.iiy and pubtic transportcharges' The measures are officiat [y forecasi to reduce the ExchequerBorrowing Requ'irement (EBR) in 19g1 fron z0% of GDp to 16 1/2y,, stiLtconsiderabty higher than the originat 1981 budget estimate of 13:^ ofGDP' The government has aLso reaffirmed its iniention to etiminate thecurrent budget deficit (now officiaLLy forecast at g% of GDp i;-19g1)over a period of four years. Further, the Government is committed to pro-v'iding subsid'ies, to restri cting the coverage of indi rect taxation andto reduc'ing the burden of direct taxation on the average worker.
FoLtowing the instaL[ation of a new Government in ItaLy in october 1gg0,the Prime fiinister (Mr. Forlani) emphasized the need for a stabitisationof pubLic finance, and a package of budgetary measures, incLuding h.ighervAT rates, higher advance payments of income taxes and increased fueLexcise duties, was adopted. soon afterwards, fiscaIization of emptoyers'sociaL security charges was extended to mio-tgat and a credit Line wasopened to assist eanthquake victims. FoLLow'ing the devaLuation of theLira in March 1981, the government announced its intention to cut pubticexpenditure by LIT 5 000 bi LL'ion so as to bring net domestic borrow.ingby the broadlv-defined pubLic sector down to the LIT 37 500 biLtion(9'1% of GDP) announced in the ReLazione PrevisionaLe for 1gg1. At the
same time the Government approved a three-year pIan (1931-83) invoLving areduction in current expenditure in each year equivalent to 1% of GDpzbaLanced by an equaL increase in capitaL spend.ing. In July there ,,,as ap-proved a budget-amending bi[[ aimed at giving effect to tirese targets.That the target for 1981 shouLd be met 
""s "[so stressed in the Commissionrsrecommendation of 22 JuLy to the ltaIian government.
In the NetherLanslg, the draft budget for 1981 was first presented on 16septembFi6dT-tt foresaw a centraL government cash def.ic.it equivaLent to4 1/4% of net national income 6i( in 1980) and general government netborrowing equivaLent to 5 1 /4% of net nationaL incore, igainst a thenestimated [eveI of 6% in 1980. A stight increase in tax p."rrr." was im-pL'ied, mainLy a resuLt of an increase in some VAT rates. Savings of about1% of GDP were to be sought in sociaL transfers and public consumpt.ion,but an extra 0'2% of GDP was to be spent in assisting housebuilding and
empLoyment. In October investment subsidies were increased and in Novembera number of measures were introduced, in the context of the incomes poLicy,to give tax reLiefs to Lot^r income famiLies and to assist housebuiLding,
regionaL deveLopmentz 
€mployment, exports and the financiaL position offirms- As the deterioration of the economic position wonsened, it became
cLear that the planned deficit would be exceeded. In the fi.si few monthsof the year measures were introduced aimed at making substantiaL sav.ingsin the areas of civiL service saLaries and recruitment, sociaL security,
and departmentaL expenditure and at increasing revenue from fueL exciseduties. rn the spring, however, some increases were made in a[[owances toLow-income fami Lies, hous'ing construction t"ras subsidized and fuLL indexationof civil service saLaries (with effect from 1 JuLy) was restored. Notwith-
standing the expenditure cuts, the centraI government cash defi cit for 1gg1
\\r
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is IikeLy to rise to nearLy 6% of net nationaL income' In September the
draft budget tor 1982, prepared by the outgoing.government, was submit-
ted. It foresaw a centraL government cash deficit equivaLent to 5,5%
of net nationaL revenue. The net borrowing of generaI government'in
1982 was put at 6 1 t? of net national revenue q 314 to 8% in 1981)'
The tax burden in 1982 wou[d remain unchanged and expend'iture savings
woutd be made in the areas of sociaL security and pubLic sector saLaries'
Some additionaI expenditure to support industrjaI activities was
i nc Luded.
SimuLtaneousLy with the presentation of the draft budget for 1981
inJuLyofLastyear,theGovernmentinLvxembogrgreducedincome
tax rates, improvel !f igibi Lity for unemfo-p-m-t benef it and increased
"po."p.iiiion, for the restructuring 
of industry. The budget was
amended in November to take account of the steeL industry aid pro-
gramme (investment subsidies, contributions to sociaL expenditure
and participations in certain other costs of the crisis), estimating
the 1981 expend'iture increase at a1r1y.. In February 1981 changes in
the income r.r r"gir"..Or..d effective rates, and'in April certain
sociaL benefits wire increased. rn May furtirer aid was granted to the
speciaL work schemes in the steeL industry. GeneraL governm-ent net
borrowing in 198i is now estimated Ov Cornmission services at -3'97( of
GDP.
Towards the end of 1980 it became cLear that the PubLic Sector borrowing
Requirement (pSBRi in the United Kingdom was IikeLy to overshoot the
1980-81 target considerablmril-b-sfiuse of a deepening recession
and partty because of difficuLties in keeping within the pLanned LeveL
of pubtic expenditure. In response to these probLems' in Novemb:: i3l?:i;"tfiiil.iiTll"r^nounced a set oi r""rr.es for the f inanciaL vear 1981-8?'
incIuding increased sociaL security contributions and a supptementary
oiL tax, and adjustment to expendiiure pLans, which aimed at reducing the
1981-82 PSBR beLow what it was otherwise forecast to be' Furthermore'
in order to strengthen the authoriti".r controL of expenditurer-a 6% cash
Limit was announced for pay provisions for a number of groups of workers
in the public sector. 'fi addition to the November measures, the Budget
for 1981-82, preiented in March, invoLved a further increase in the
burden of taxation, 
"i."Ly an increase in the effective 
rates of income
tax (by permitting no adjustment for fiscaL drag), substantiaL increases
in excise duties, and a new tax on bank deposjts. The voLume of public
expenditure was foreseen to remajn unchanged between 1980-81 and
,1981-8?. Taken together the measures sought to bring the PsBR for
1981-8? cLoser into Line with thai aLLowed-for in the Governmentrs Medium
Term FinanciaL strategy, pubL'ished in March 1980, which set out the
authoritiesr intentions with regi.O to pubLic expenditYfg-alq borrowing
G-i; 1983-84. The of f i ciaL brldget estimate put the 1981-82 PSBR at
uKL 10 600 miLLion G 'l14% of GDP). The Latest Commission forecast
suggests that the outturn wiLL be uKL 11 200 miLLion. In JuLy ap.I[.g" of measures, incLuding extensions of existing measures ,,as
announced with ihe aim of reducing unempLoyment. The additionaL cost
of the measures (to be met from the cont'ingency fund) is put at
uKt 150 miLLion in 1981 t82 and UKL 320 miLLion in 1982183'
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TabLe 6,2
Income and outLaY transactions of
(1)
generaL government, EC totaL
'000 miLLion ECU
1 980 Z change 1981
fron 1979
(2) % change
from 1980
rcAZ (2) % change
from 1981
Indirect taxes
Direct taxes
SociaI security contributions
0ther current receiPts(excLuding interest )
Interest received
TotaL current resources
275 13
249,2
287 14
46,5
2016
878 19
1615
17\
14,6
15,1
21,9
16,2
3os,3
276,8
32O,6
qnq
25,6
978,8
11,7
4n ?
11 ,5
9A
24 16
11,4
344,4
311,5
358,7
<a z,
29 16
1095,O
11rO
13,3
1?,O
13 t5
19,7
12,6
Current transfens
0ther current outLaYs
Government consumPt'ion
TotaL current uses
416 14
TOrO
376 17
863 11
13,0
27 ,5
1 8r0
16,2
477,7
87,8
42?,8
988,3
14 17
25 15
1?rz
14,5
536 r6
1 06,8
465,8
1109,2
12 
'3
?116
4n2
12,2
Gross saving
Net capitaL transfers
Gross capitaL formation
'15 18
2017
65 17
13 rO
13 11
-9 15
19,8
69,1
-413
E(
'6 17
21,4
75,3
811
9r0
Net Lending (+) or borrowing,(-)
Net Lendin3 or borrowing net
as % of GDP
Net tending or borrow'i ntl
tess net interest PaYments
as ii of GDP
-7016
-1rO
-98r4
-4 14
-103,4
-4 12
'1 11
(1) tJationaI accounts def initions.(2) Est i mate .(3) Forecast.
Source: Estimates of Commission services
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7. Emptoyment and Unemptoyment
7.1
199[,rma.,:t*t-i"-virib.'""tq.-in19.80.anaj9anheu"-b-ig,q.q9T.lj?!..4Fy-!-!9'...
coinciAence of h'igh Labour force growth due-to adverse movements in demographic
trends and Low empLoyment growth because of"the recession in demand and output.
-In the last tuo years unempLoyment has accelerated sharpLy to reach record
tevets as increasing numbers of young people and women came on to the [abour
market, s11eILing the rrumber of peopLe tooking for work, trhiLe empLoyment growth
sLumped in the wake o'f the new oiL price rise in 1979 and the number of availablejobs actuaLLy decIined. For the next year, unemptoyment hriLL
continue to rise, aLbeit at a slower nate; empLoyment growth viLI continue to
be negLigibLe and the main impact of the upturn in activity witL be a oUch
faster rate of producllivity growth. Labour market poticies aimed at spec'ific
groups and regions have pLayed an increasingLy important roLe in response to the
probLems raised by changes in the structure of unempLoyment, with
*rnenptoyrnent be'ing disproportionateLy concentrated on young peopLe, women and
oLder workers. The cost of unempLoyment affects both workers and governmentsdirectty. For an average production worker who begame unempIoyed, unemptoyment
pay in 1979 averaged 60 per cent of his prev'ious net earnings if he rnas single'
66 per cent if he was married with two children. This trep[acement ratio'
varies between countries and can be as high as 85 per cent or as low as 32 per
cent; it is tike[y to be higher for Lou-paid workers than fon the average
worker. Because of tax Losses, the direct cost to the government of ah un-
emptoyed worker is of the same order of magnitude as his gross earnings.
7.'l Labour market trends and prospects
'The Communityts [about markets at the beginning of the 1980's are
characterised by high rates of expansion of the tabour force, extremeLy tow
rates of growth of enptoyment, and consequentty, high and rising rates of
unempLoyment. In the 1970's, Labour suppty growth tended to exceed the growth
of new jobs, and each cycticat peak in economic activity teft the totat rate
of unempLoyment temporariLy stabiLized but higher than the prev'ious peak. In
the Last two years, moreover, the rise in unemptoyment has acceLerated: ftom
an average o'f 5r5% in 1979 it reached 8r3% by August 1981 for the Community
as a uhoLe.
In the first oit price shock recession, unemployment increased sharply
in the face of the slump in output and demand, only stabi Lising in the 1976-
1979 upturn, when GDP {rrowth reached some 3 1l?% on average for the tt"to years.
Since the end of 1979, with a net.r faL[ in the rate of growth of output,
the rate of unemploymerrt has again increased rapidly. The majority of th'is
.J
\z\
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increase has taken place in the Last hatf of 1980 and the first half of 1gg1:in t,hose thJetve months aLone, unemployment in the community has increased
by some 35%.
lrlhiLe aLL Member States have more or Less fotLowed the overaLL trend,
the degree to which they have been affected has varied widely: by far the
biggest jump has occurred in the united Kingdom where registered unempLoyment
has nearLv doubLed (up by 982) since the end of 19Tg.0f the 9 million un-
enployed in the community, one-third are in the united Kingdomrand nea'rly 40%
of the unemployed adutt mates are in the united Kingdom. 0ther badty affected
countries are Denmark fup 79D, and the Nethertands fup 83D. rn some Member
States with very high current unempLoyment rates such as BeLgi un (Z%),
rreland (or5%> and ItaIy (8.r8%) the acceteration t,las more progressive. At
the other extreme are some Hember states with much Lower unempLoyment, rates
such as Luxembourg (1'o%) and the FederaL RepubLic of Germany (5r2%)'which
have onLy recentLy begun to show signs of acceLeration.
A comparison of results from the Labour Force Sample Survey, the resutts
of which for 1979 have just become avai[ab[e, with the numbers of registered
unemptoyed shows a re[ativeIy s{mitar pattern between Member states (Graph Z).
rn most of them, unemployment according to the sampLe is sLight[y Lower than
registered unemptoyment, but stiLL foLtows the same trend. In Denmark and
Luxembourg unempLoyment according to the tuo measures fou.ow a simi tar generaL
trend, but the sample survey gives a higher resu[t. This difference between
the two measures is probably a function of the definition of unemployment for
administrative purposes in the various Member States, and the unempLoyment
benefit r69ime which determines the reLative strength of the incentives to
register, as weLL as the abiLity to do so. 0n the other hand, the fact that
the sample survey generaLLy gives a lower resu[t than the officiaL registration
statistics is probably indicative of the extent to which people may drop out
of the labour torce, aLbeit temporariLy (particuLarty married women), or find
aIternative occupations as fami[y workers, or in the underground economyU),
(1)graimates 
of the size of the unofficiat or "underground,,economy vary con-siderably, since by'its very nature the irreguLar economy is difficu[t tomeasure preciseLy- If it is true that the size of the informaL economyis indeed expanding, then this cou[d affect the officiat picture of deveLop-ments in three ways: income statistics wiLt be undeiestir"ting true grorthIeveLs, unemp[oyment statistics wi[|. be exaggerating the severity of theprobtem, and infLation measures wiIL be too-nigh.
\12.
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whiLe stiLL being registered as unemptoyed as Long as there is an jncentive to
do so. This could expLain the quite sizeabLe gaps between the tHo measures for
Itaf.y and BeLgium (see secti on 7.4). In Ireland and the United Kingdom' the tt'Jo
measures do not foltow the same trend over the whote period, but this is probabty
due to changes in the sampting method bet}Jeen the different dates'
The present rapid expansion of the communityrs labour force is due to a
coincidence of deveLopments in demographic trends and activity rates' t'lhiLe the
Community's totaL poputation has grown steadiLy, at some 0'3% per year' the
poputation of working-age is expanding faster than for many years' The very Low
birth-rate during the First world t|,ar means that the number of males reaching
reti rement age in 1982 and1983 is exceptionaLLy totl (those born durjng the baby boom of
theearLy'l9ZO'swiLLonLyreachretiringageafterlgss' whenthenumbersretiringwitL
more than doubLe). At the same time, tte high b'irth rate of tfre earLy 1960rs means that the
number of schooL teavers arriving on the Labour market wi It reach very high tevets over the
next four years. ConsequentLy, the rate of growth of the t'rorking-age popuLat'i on is fore-
cast to doubLe, from an average of 0t57' a year during the 1970ts to 1'0% a year
by 19gZ and remain at that Levet untit 1985 when these speciaL demograph'ic factors
witt begin to operate in the opposite direction'
These demographic factors have been reinforced by trends in activity rates
in recent years. rnformation on activity rates, defined as the proportion of
each age group which is economicaLLy active, is contained in the two-yearLy
community Labour Force samp[e surveys and some resuLts for the community are
presented in Tab[e 7.2.
Activity rates for workers in the centraL age-groups ?5-54 have increased
steadiLy over the period 1gv3-1g?g, but within this overalL trend there is a
difference in the behaviour of maLe and female activity rates, the former
decLining steadi Ly, the Latter expanding quite rapidLy' In addition, in the
younger and oLder age-groups, uhiLe both maLe and femaLe activity rates have
decLined, the femaLe rate has decLined much Less. This tendency towards in-
creasing femaLe activity rates over the 197}ts may be attributed to the move-
ment toward equal pay and growing opportunitjes in services as wetI as changing
sociaL attitudes to women working which have encouraged more women to seek
employment, aLthough there are stitt considerabl-e differences between Member States'
The reasons for the decLine in mate activity rates are not so ctear. It is possibLe
that the cumuLative effects of the recession on job opportunities may be having
\\b
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a "discouraged Horker effect", and to that extent the decLine in maLe activity
rates may onLy be temporary, and pick up again when adequate empLoyment growth
is re-estabL'ished. This wouLd atso reinforce the notion that the increase in
mate unemployment has been due to fewer jobs being avaiLabLe, whjLe the increase
in female unemptoyment is the result of more women trying to find jobs.
rn the oLder age-groups, the combined effect of high unemp[oyment rates
and the grorth of early retirement schemes in recent years is quite evident.
Both these groups have seen a steady decLine in their activity rates over the
period, and given the weLt-known difficu[ty of workers in this age-group to find
re-employment after being made redundant, is consistent uljth the steady rjse in
the overatL unempLoyment rate. The impact of earLy retirement schemes in the Last
5 years can be seen part'icutarty in the decl.ining activity rate of maLes in the
55 - 59 age-group.
In the ear[y years of the 1980rs, most of the underLying trends in the
Communityrs Labour markets wiLL continue, and for the next year at Least, no
major improvement in the situation may be expected, with unempLoyment forecast
to rise further to average 717.?( of the Communityrs [abour force for 1981
as a whole. The upturn in activity which is forecast to take ptace in 19BZ should
stow down the rate of increase of unemployment however: GDp growth at ZrO% is
expected to Limit the increase in the unemptoyment rate to 0rg percentage
poi nt s.
In the 197Ots, emp[oyment growth f[uctuated sharply in the Line with the
cycLicaL swings in activjty. It sIumped during the post oiL shock recession
after 1973 and did not recover its momentum untiL the upswing of 1978 and "1979.
This resumption of growth was short-Lived, however, and the faLt in emptoyment
growth in response,to the fa[lback in GDP growth has been much sharper than in
the earlier recession: after not expanding at aLL in 1980, employment is expected
to faf.t by 1r3% in 1981, exactty the same as in both ?gz4 and 1975, but in
response to a fat[ in GDP of onLy 0157, in 1981 compared to a falt more than
twice as targe G1r21t, in both '1974 and 197s. Ln 19g2, emptoyment groyth is
forecast to be just negative GOrl%)rin response to GDp growth of ZrO%, but it
is L'ikeLy that the main impact of the upsuing in activity on the Labour input
riIt come through in the form of a sharp increase in productivity gronth, uhich
is forecast to doubLe to ?'o% as the sLack in productjon is initiaLly taken up
through better capacity uti Iization.
0n a sectoraL LeveIr Long-term trends in empLoyment are contjnuing, Evidence
from the Labour Force Sample Surveys confirms that until. 1g7g, enptoyment in
\)h
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agricuLture continuecl to decLine, at Least for those peopLe for whom it was
the ma'in occupation. This decLine in agriculturaL empLoyment may since have
slowed down, partLy as a resuLt of Less scope for productivity gains, and
probabty as a resuLt of fewer job opportunities, particuLarly in industry where
empLoyment has aLso b,een faLLing steadiLy over the period. If anything, the
decLine in manufactuling emp[oyment has probabLy acceLerated in 1980 and
particuLarLy'in '1981, the manufacturing sector having borne the brunt of the
dectine in output, and because firms seem to be exercising a much stricter poLicy
towards reta'ining Lab,our during the recession than has been previousLy the case'
The onLy sector where empLoyment has expanded has been in services, both
marketed and non-marketed, but even there the expansion is expected to be
negLigibte in 1981 and LittLe more in 1982.
The dectine in emptoyment has been accompanied by a decline in the rate
of growth of productivity, aLthough by much Less. The annuaL average rate of
growth of sataried emp[oyment in the 1g7}'s has been onLy one-third that of the
1960's; the rate of growth of productivity per employee has faILen by nearLy
a haLf.
In manufactur.ing .indust ry, for wh'ich more deta'iLed information on working
hours is avaiLabLe (TabLe 7.4), there has been a paraIteI decLine in the rate
of growth of productivity per head and per hour. It is clear that most of the
s[owdown in the growth of industriaL output in the period 1973-80 (115% annuaI
average growth rate) compared with 1960 - 1973 $t6% annuaL average growth rate),
which was not absorbed by the faLL in productiv'ity, was borne by the faLt in
empLoyment: whiLe totaL hours worked feLL quite sharply, the rate of decLine
in average weekLy hours uorked remained virtuaLty unchanged betueen the tblo
periods at nearty 17, per year, despite w'idespread demands for a reduction in
working time, either through a shorter working week or Longer paid hoLidays
to combat the rising LeveL of unemployment. In the event, employment feLL
almost twice as fast as average hours, and recent evidence for 1979 and 198O
indicates that the decLine in average week[y hours may have sLowed even further
in 1980 whiLe employment continued to faLL.
The same appears to be true for the economy as a whole. In the 1980 and
1981 downturn, productivity grouth (per person emp[oyed) uas higher than might
have been expected on the basis of the 1975 experience when the average rate
of productivity grohrth fel.L by 4r3 percentage points between the two phases of
the cycle, from 4r2'lin the period 1972-73 to -O'1% in 1973-1975, whiLe
empLoyment growth feIL by only 1,7 points, from 1 12% to -Ats% (annual averages)
>5
7.6
betueen the two periods. 0ver the 24 months from August 1973 to August OZS,
unemployment rose from 2r4% to 4167; (oable 7.5). In the recent experience,
emp[oyment grolrth has borne a Larger share of the adjustment. trhi Le productivity
continued to grow at an average rate of 1r3% G faLt of 1r4 points from that
of the previous upswing), emptoyment dectined sharpty faLting by an average
rate of or9i4 G 116 point drop). As a result, in a period of onty 14 months
from March 1980 to May 1981, unemployment jumped from 5117. to lrg% of the
Communityrs Labour force. The upturn in activity nou under way is not expected
to bring about any dramatic improvement in this situation.0n present fore-
casts, with negIigibLe empLoyment growth and considerabLy faster productivity
grotrth in 1982, at Least some part of the shake-out in employment, particuLarly
saIaried emptoyrnent, which has occurred during the recession is expected to
remain, and unemptoyment may continue to rise, atthough at a somewhat s[ower
rate.
\1b
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7,2 The structure and nature of unempLoyment
In addi.r"" * he Commun'itY
since the first oiL slhock in 1973, the structure of unempLoyment has altered'
gver the Last eight years, the cumulative effects of the steadiLy rising rate
of overaIL unempLoyment have produced a dramatic increase in unempLoyment among
young peopLe, particuLarLy femaLes; among oLder workersr who have been driven out
of the Labour force by Lack of job opportunities; and in the Long-term un-
emptoyed, for whom the chances of finding a job diminish progressiveLy the
tonger they remain unemployed. The resuLts of the Last Community Labour Force
sampLe survey for 1979 pnovide detaiLed informatjon on these deveLopments'
In the 1975 Samp,Le Survey, the number of unempLoyed persons |',ho had been
made redundant or ulho had previousLy been occasionaLLy occupied but L''ere noul
whotty unempLoyed made up nearly haLf the totaL number of unemployed (Tabte 7'8)'
In the tater period lron1977 on, houlever, this pattern changes. CycL'icaL factors decLine in
importance and the retative disab'i[ity of young people and femaLes in particutar
becomes more apparent. Atthough the proportion of unempLoyed young peopLe in re-
Lation to totaL uremployment was much the same in 1979 as in 1973t it had
dectined sharpty in 1975 under the impact of the big cycticat increase in adutt
unemptoyment, before rising again throughout the rest of the period covered by
the sampLe survey. Since then, it appears from the data on registered unemptoy-
ment that the share of young peopLe jn totaL unemptoyment reached a peak in mid-
1980 of nearly 4?'/"but may have decLined stight[y since then to around 39% in,mid-
1981. If this.is the case, then it^is probabLy due to the Largp cyclicat rise in
adul.t unanpLoyment throughout 1980 and 1981r rather.than a dectine in youth
unemptoyment as such.
I\J\- r
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A simi Lar pattern may be observed among female workers: over the period
covered by the Labour Force SampLe Surveys the reLative position of women
deteriora.ted progressiveLy. For the Community as a uhoLe, unemptoyment rates
for adutt women in 1979 were some 552 higher than those for adult men. The
equivatent figure for young h,omen was 402. In 1973, onLy women aged 25-29 had
a considerabty higher unemp[oyment rate than men of the same age.
It is in the very youngest age-group, comprising schooL-Leavers and
workers in their first jobs that the femate unemployment rate has risen both
in absotute terms and relative to male unemptoyment in the same group; from
equaLity in 19?3, unemployment among young females in 1979 t,las some 402 higher
than maLe unempLoyment: ulhiLe the number of maLes seeking a first job actuaLLy
dectined in 1979, the number of femates increased substantia[[y.
I'lhiLe the persistentLy high rates of totaL unempLoyment have contributed
to this situation, it is aLso LikeLy that specific factors have been acting
to weaken the retative competitive position of femates in the labour market. It
is notabLe that after 1975, redundancy as a cause of unemployment among males
actuaLLy decLined, whi[e among femaLes it increased, and the increase in the
number tJho had previous[y worked occasionatty is aLso [argely made up of femaLes.
The difficu[ties faced by women returning to work after a spett away are also
stiLL substant'iaL in 1979, rrhiLe the number of men in this category has decLined
sharpty. The subsequent period of sharply rising overaLL unemp[oyment has seen
a different devetopment: bettr,een mid-1979 and mid-1981, registered maIe unempLoy-
ment in the Community rose by 56%, and femaLe unemptoyment by onLy 33%.0n the
same basis, the share of female unemployment in totaL unemployment feLL from
its high point of sone 47i( in October 1979 to nearLy 43% in Juty 1981.
It seems, therefore, that whiLe deveLopments in mate aduLt unempLoyment
are LargeLy conditioned by cycticaL deveLopments, trends in femaLe unempLoyment,
and particutarLy the weakening in the unempLoyment position of women reLative
to men in the pre-1979 period is essentiail.y determined by structurat factors.
The expanding number of administrative controLs and LegisLation governing
the employment of wonen, and the impact of equal opportunities and equaL wages
Leg'isLation may have combined to make empLoyers Less wiLLing to employ
Lromen in periods of high unempLoyment when maLes afe freeLy avai L-
abLe, In this context, it shouLd aLso be noted that there are
targe di fferences in the pattern of femaLe unenptoyment rates among
r4ember States. The majority of femaLe unemp[oyment in the Community - among
\qb
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both adults and young people - is concentrated in four t{ember States, (Belgium,
Denmark, France and l.reLand) with hrideLy differing totaL unempLoyment rates- To that
extent, it is reasonable to suppose that high rates of female unemptoyment may
be due not onty to the absence of economicaLLy significant wage differentia[s
but aLso to administlative arrangements which provide an incentive to t{omen to
register as unemployed, or which ptace restrictions on the conditions under uhich
women may be emoloyedl. It is notab[e that BeLgium, the Member State in which
unemployment benefit is most generous towards fema[es, aLso has the hjghest
reg'istered unempIoyment rate for women.
tJhiLe the probIem of female unempLoyment is undoubtedLy concentrated
among younger women, that for males is equaLty concentrated among young men and
oLder workers, atthough for the Latter it is Less immediateLy apparent. Since
1977, unempLoyment among otder workers has decLined quite sharpty (on[y the
mate unemp[oyment rate is reatLy significant for this age-group, due to the Low
femaLe activity rate), and the proport'ion of totaL unempLoyed jn this age-$roup
shrank fron 6% in 1973 to barety 2% in 1979. It is highLy unLikely that in a
time of increasing unemptoyment, despite expand'ing activity, the onIy group to
have increased its emp[oyment prospects shouLd be the otdest age-groups, when
aLI the evidence suggests that age is highly corretated r.lith lengthening duration
of unempLoyment. The nature of unempLoyment for these workers is probabLy some-
what different: their famiLy and hence their financiaL comm'itments are LikeLy
to be tower than for a man 10 years younger, the tevel of socia[ benefjts
avaitabte as wetI as the increasing opportunity to take early retirement may not
onty reduce the need to find a job, but may encourage him to drop out of the
active labour force. ALthough the data on retirements in Table 7.8are insufficient
for this purpose, there is a Large increase in the "others" category of non-
active persons seeking employment. At the same time, the sharp decLine jn the
act'iv'ity rate, not only for the over 60rs but a[so for the 55 - 59 age-group,
at rhom ear[y retirement schemes are particularty aimed, suggests that this
has indeed been the case.
['lhiLe data relating age to the duration of unemployment are not
avaitabte from the Labour Force SampIe Surveys, otder workers wi[[ obviousty
be among the most serirlusLy affected by one distinct structuraI change in the
Communityrs Labour markets, the increase in the votume of tong-term unemptoyment,
It is a coroLLar:y of persistent high levets of unempLoyment that workers wi[[
tend to become [ess empLoyabIe the Longer they remain unempLoyed, not onLy
because they are Less attractive to emp[oyers but because they tend to tose the
\L1
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motivation to york as the duration of unemployment increases. In times of
sharp, cumutative cycIicaL dounturn, torkers made redundant nay be unenpLoyed
for up to 6 months but they are confident of regaining their jobs yhen the
economy picks up again. If the subsequent recovery is either too short or
insufficient to provide adequate employment gror{th, one resu[t is that the
average tength of unemptoyment speLls increases. In 1973, aLthough 302 of
aLt unemployed persons had been unemployed for more than one year, given
the Low rate of overaLL unemploymento this only represented some 016Z of the
[aboun force: the minimum "hard core" unemployment. By the time of the 1979
Labour Force Sampte Survey, hoHever, long-term unemployment had reached a
rate of 116% of the labour force.
In the period since 1979, there is some evidence to indicate that the
average duration of unemployment has continued to lengthen: the ratio of
inftot{s onto the unempLoyment register to totaI unemployed (annuaL averages)
has faLLen from about i to 1 in i9T6 to some 2 to 1 in 19g0 and to about
1r7 to 1 in the first six months of 1981, impLying that the average duration
of unempLoyment has Lengthened from. about 4 months to 7 months. A caLculation
of outftovs fron unenptoyment gives a virtuatty identical. resutt. iloreover,
the vo[ume of ftows into and out of the register have fluctuated in Line
with the cyc[e of activity; between 1979 and 1980, the volume of ney regist-
rations per year increased by some 1.2 mil"Lion, and the voLume of outfLorrs
fel"t by sone 250 thousand. In the first six months of 1981 this trend has
even acceLerated, the votume of ner, registrations per month running even
higher, and the volume of outflous even Lower than in 1980. It is ctear,
therefore, that the present increase in unemployment is made up of both an
increase in the number of nev unemployed and a Lengthening of the duration
of unenptoyment spe[[s.
\]s
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7 -3 unernp_lgygeft beIrgIU-jfl9rnl
The unempLoyment benefit schemes'in operat'ion in Member States can
be cLassified'into three types of which the main features are g'iven'in
Table 7 .11 .
- a taxable benefit (i.e" subject to personaL income tax, whjch is a
fixed percentage of gross earn ings (Denmark, NetherLands and Luxembourg);
- a non-raxabLe benefit urhich is a fixed percentage of gnoss eannings
(BeLgium) or net earnings (Germany);
- a non-taxabLe fLat-r'ate benefit (France, ItaLy, IreLand and the United
Kingdom) poss'ibLy t^iith an earnings-reLated suppLement (France, IreLand) '
whereas taxabLe benefits reLated to gross earnings are of the order of
90 per cent, the non-taxable benefits are Lower - in the range 60 to
cent of the reference LeveL - and the suppLement is Lower stiLL.
80 to
70 per
The taxation of soci aL benef its impl"
burden for a minor increase in tax-yieLd,
situations and income'trapsr which arise
f rom oersone L taxat'i on .
For a net^lLY
is the difference
and his previous
ies a considerabLe administrative
but it avoids manY of the anomaLous
when sociaL benefits are exempt
uni3rnp Loy,s6 worker, the net cost of bei ng unempLoyed
btotween his income from various sociaL security benefits
earn'ings; when emPIoyed-
FLat rate schemes have a "repLacement ratio" (i.e. the reLationsh'ip of
the disposabLe incomr: of the unempLoy'eC penson to his disposabLe income
when empLoyed) which is much higher at the Lower end of the earnings scaLe than
at the higher end, anci when combined with suppLements for dependent aduLts
and ch.iLdren impLy a concern r^rith the pureLy weLf are aspects of unempLoyment
benefit" Earnings-reLated schemes, on the other hand, have a connotation
of insurance against a risk of unempLoyment, covered by (and possibLy reLated
to) premiums paid dur"ing periods of empLoyment. A recognition of the enhanced
risk of unempLoyment due to redundancYt 1.e. unempLoyment arising from staff
reductions, pLant cLosures and faiLure of businesses' is shown in the speciaI
schemes for th'is type of unempLoyed worker which are reLativeLy important in
ItaIy, where the norrnaL unempLoyment benef it i s ver'y Low, and 'in France ' Al L
schemes have maximal thus it is impLicity assumed that higher paid staff wiLL
have financiaL resoupces which wiLL cushion the'impact of unemptoyment'
rlr
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The maxima themseIves tend to be above the average LeveL" except in
Denmark and BeLgium, where the maximum benefit corresponds with a leveI of
earnings which is wel.L betow the industriaL average, so that a fLat-rate
benefit operates over a very wide range of incomes.
Income tax and social security contributjons neduced the take-home
pay of an average s'ingLe industriaL worker in the Community by 27 per cent
in 1979. The famiLy man fared somewhat better, because of the operation of
tax attowances for dependent and socia[ benefits for children, and kept some
89 per cent of his gross earnings. Should a singte worker become unemptoyed,
his mean unemp[oyment pay is less than hal.f his prev.ious earnings, but can
vary between 23 per cent of his previous gross earnings in the United Kingdom
and 80 per cent in the NetherLands and Luxemboung. In Denmark, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands where sociaL benefits are taxabLe the replacement ratio con-
verges towards that in other countries which pay [ower leveLs of benefit but
do not tax them. For the average marnied production worker, the repLacement
ratio varies from 50%-60% in the United K'ingdom and France to over 802 in
Denmark, IreLand, Luxembourg and the NetherLands.
Thus, aLthough much depends on the re[ative movement with respect to
gross earnings of income-tax and employersrsociat contributions on the one
hand, and rates of unemp[oyment benefit on the other, it can be deduced without
recourse to compLete income distribution data that repIacement ratios are
highest, and may exceed 1007,rat the bottom of the earnings scaLe, and there
is a range, usuaLly extending beyond the average earnings LeveL, at which they
are constant. Beyond the upper bound of this nange, the repLacement ratio
decLines rapidLy.
UnempLoyment has both direct and'indirect costs for governments too.
tJhen a worker becomes unemp[oyed, the government not onLy assumes the
responsib'i Lity for prov'i ding him with an 'i ncome/ but also Loses the tax
and sociat security contribut'i ons pa'i d by the worker and his empLoyer. In-
direct costs arise principaLLy from the faLL in indirect taxes due to the
reduction in the workerts consumption.
Direct government unempLoyment costs are parti cuLarLy high in BeLgium,
Luxembourg and ItaLy where empLoyers'. sociaL contributions are a reLativeLy
large e Lement 'i n wage cost s : i ndi re ct cost s are L'i ke Ly to be above average
in Denmark, IreLand and the United Kingdom where direct costs are reLatjveLy
low and where consumption taxes are more'important as a source of revenue
than eLsewhere..rndeed" the cost to the government is cLose to the previous
earnings of the unemptoyed worker, whose loss of income is much smatter than
than the correspond'ing cost to the government.
$>
7 .13
1'.4 Labour marke! PoticY ProbIems
The preced.ing anaLysis of the deve[opment and the nature of unem-
pLoyment as 11elL as of the unempLoyment benefit systems iL[ustrates both
the compLexity of tl.re Labour market and the di f f i cuLties f acing governments
attempting to des'i91 pol'ic'ies to cope with the unempLoyment probLem- The
[arge differences between Memben States with respect both to institutionaL
arrangements, the actuaI budgetary cost of unemptoyment aILowances and to
the income Loss for the private person due to unemployment may aLso be part
of the expIanation of the different orientations of government policies in
the Labour market.
It is difficuIt to prov'ide precise figures for the impact of direct
Labour market measures. A rather rough estimate woutd suggest that in 1981
unemployment has been Lowered by slightLy more than 2 mitLion peop[e in this
way, uith direct job creation (mainLy in the public sector) counting for
about 1/Z niLLion, earLy retirement measures for another 1/2 nilLion, vocationaI
train.ing for 1 miLLion and various schemes for short-time working for some
100 000 persons. The totaL number of persons concerned by such measures of
course was much higher (probabLy up to to 5 miLLion)', as the-duration o-f
work-shaling programmes or training programmes is typicaLLy Less than a year'
Although ,the contribut ion of di rect Labour market poLi cy measures thus
is substantiaL, it has cLearLy in 1980 and 1981 been'insufficient to prevent
a pronounced rise in unempLoyment. Member States have therefore to some
extent been induced to rethink the approach to this probLem' In France, in
particular, the ne11 government, whiLe stepping up both public sector job
creation and certain other direct measures, is reLying heaviLy upon a Lowering
of working time and,global. budgetary measures to bring the rise in unempLoyment
to a halt. In othen Member States the tendency has been to seek an intensj-
fication of Iabour m,arket measures rather than a reLaxation of budgetary
poLi cy. In the Uniterj Ki ngdon, in part'icular, where unemployment has shown a
very Large increase in 1980/81, the authorities in JuLy announced an extension
of vocationaL training and other measures in favour of young peopLe but at the
same time declaring that the additionaL expenditure luouLd be financed by
budgetary cut s e Lsewlrere .
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In alL countries, labour market pot'icies are indeed now running up
against budgetary constraints, impLying that further expenditure increases
under this item wouLd have to be compensated by additionat cuts in other
categories of expenditure. A key question facing Member States now is there-
fore to define the most empLoyment efficient aLLocation of budgetary resources
as between direct Labour market measures, various a'id programmes to aiLing
industries, stimuLus to investment and gl.obaL stimulus to demand. More funda-
mentaLLy, the Communityrs empIoyment performance depends upon the wi LLingness
and abiLity of enterprises to expand the number of job opportunities and,
hence, upon the generaL bus'iness cLimate and the retative competitive position.
\df
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Recent Developmentrijllgbour rya.ket qoL
BeLgium. Labour market poLicy remains centred around the "SpitaeLs PLan" of
ffi; 191;; which sui rp the "spec'ia[ temporarv scheme in the public
service", young perlples training schemes, and the provis'ion of earLy retire-
ment or earLy pension on request. ln December 1980t the Government adopted
a ptan to proLong these specific enployment measures for another yeart at
the same time improving their coverage and effectiveness.
Denmark. In June 1980, the Government adopted the "EmpLoyment and Industry
ffi;e-rgii - g3", wh.ich extends and ampLif ies the 1977 Enployment Promotion
PLan which was due io expire at the end of 1980. Under this new programme'
1r5 biLlion kroner (out of a totaL of 5r5 bitLion) were set aside in 1981
for improving the function'ing of the Labour market. ln February 1981' a
further pLan was pnesented, which, together with the exist'ing programme
shouLd reduce unempLoyment by 801000, by means of job offers to the Long-
term unemployed, and empLoyment stimuLation measures in areas such as energy-
saving and urban rgnewaL" In May 1981 it was-announced that the Employment
and Industry Progritmme !{ouLd be trint.ined at its existing LeveL in 1982 and
1983 desp'ite budgetary stningency-
FederaI Repubtig of Cglmany...Labour market poLicy is principaLLy aimed at
easing the probllfililT trertain poputation groups and regions' The 5th
Amendment to the Employrnent Prornotiion Lau, which entered into force on
1 August 1g|g, concentrates on vocatjonaL training, vocationaL information
and guidance and select'ive deveLoprnent of efforts to promote empLoyment in
specific areas G5% of young peopLe who Leave schgoL at the end of secondary[eveL, embark on an apprenticeship in the private sector). At the same time'
the Government adopted a speciaL Dl"l 900 miLLion programme to inprove the
economic situation in problem areas. By the end of 1980, more than 44'000
workers had been hetpecl unden this schlme, which emphasises vocationaI
training, the re-integration of unempLoyed persons and job-creation schemes
designeJ'to improve sociaL servjces. The ninth outLine plan to'improve
regionaL economic structure (August 1g7g> wiLL create 305'000 net'' jobs and
protect 164.000 exjsting jobs between 1980 and \983, involvjng measures to
stimuLate private investment totaL{.ing Dn 47.300 miLLion. rn February, the
Federal Labour Office announced that DM 850 milLion wouLd be avaiLable for
speciaL empLoyment measures in 1981.
Greece. The Greek [abour market js characterised by a very Low LeveI of
;"dT.t"."J rn"rpLoyment, covering on[y urban areas, but a hjgh teveL of
,nJ".-"tpIoyment, partiLuLarLy in runaL areas. Specific Labour marketpoLici"r'"*ist onLy in the fieLd of educationaL reform. The most recent
initiat'ive t{as training in 19?5 - 1977, when a selies of techni caL and
professionaI schooLs was set up to pr^ovide a more pract'icaI form of vocation-
aI training that the tradjtionaL urrjversity system'
\)b :
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France. At the beg'inning of 1981, various additionaL measures h,ere announced,fiffiting Loans to f i rms ior job-creating investment in smaLt and medium-sized
enterprises, improvement of vocationaL training, better use of short-time
working to avoid redundancies and a temporary Lowering of the age Limit under
the earLy retirement scheme. In March, the two sides of industry agreed to
renew the Z-year agreement on voLuntary early retirement QO% of gross wage
at 60 years untiL the age of 65 years 3 months). Th'is couLd affect about
350.000 workers. In June the new Government announced that whi Le awa"it'ing
a complete revision of the vocationaL training and guidance system'in Autumn
1982, it would proLong the Third NationaL Employment Pact untiL JuLy 198?in an expanded form under the titLe "measunes for entry into working L'ife".
This wiLI cost FF 61900 miLLion and invoLve 625.000 young peopLe, companed
with the prev'ious phase (1980/81) which cost 4,000 miLLion and created
534.000 jobs. At the same time it also announced the creation of 54.29A
new jobs in the public sector.
IIgI3Iq. Various new measures to stimulate job creation have been announcedIilTfrilfoLIow-up to the NationaI understanding agreed between the Govern-
ment and the two sides of industry in November 1980. IRL 5713 m.illion wiLLbe devoted to improving the situation on the Labour market, through attract-ing new industries, and expansion of training and job 
""pu.ience programmes.In addition, the Employment Incentive Scheme is maintained, and empLoyersin vuLnerable Labour intensive industries receive a subsidy of IRL 6 per
week for each worker. In June, the Government announced the creation of theNationaL Enterprise Agency, which wiLL be responsibte for ensuring that aLLdevelopment opportunities offering stabLe empLoyment opportunities are expIor-
ed- In the JuLy Budget a 1% Levy on incomes to fund a youth Emptoyment Agency,
which wiLt integrate and extend youth empIoyment schemes, was announced.
rtaLy, The Government issued a Decree-Law in December 1g7giilT6-ducing neh, ruLes on t"rsrken mobi L.ity and tabour marker
management, but this tlas not adopted by ParLiament as the constitutionaL timeIimits (60 days) were exceeded. A draft law presented to the Chamber ofDeputies in August 1980' which provides for wide-ranging decentratization
of many functions presentty carried out by the Government, and more co-
ordination between p[acement and training authorities is sti LL under dis-
cussion.
Luxelnbourg. Labour market policy in Luxembourg is aimed particuLarLy at the
speciaL problems of the iron and steeL industry, within the framework of
medium and tong-term policy to achieve a stable situation on the labour
market. FoLlowing the provision of earLy retirement opportunities for
workers with 40 years service in February 1980, in october of that year, theprovision aLtowing the Government to take action to prevent redundancies
due to cyctica[ causes l.las extended for a further year. In June 1981, afurther series of measures t.las introduced to encourage mobiLity and re-training for steeL uorkers, renewing and extending the poLicies originaLLy
adopted in January 1979 relating to the vocationaI re-trai ning, furthertraining and the temporary "re-empLoyment" aLLowance for steeL workers.
Nethertands. The aim of Dutch labour market policy is to stimuLate jobcreatlT;T the private sector. In November 1980, the Government announced
measures to stfmutate emp[oyment by subsidies totatIing some HFt 900 miLLionfor housebuiLding, exports, and to assist the financiaL position of finms.At the sa,ne time, the enployment service t.ras re-organiserJ, with emphasis
on the development of a rapid inforrnation service as welI as placement
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services, and the courses for young peopte aiding the transition between
school and york uele made petmanent. In frlay 1981 the proceeds from aLL
excise duties on petrol and dieseL fuel- rere aItocated to employment support
programmes.
United Kingdom. Since February 1980 resources devoted to tabour marketpOL een concentrated on specific requirements and groupS, such as
unemployment in inner-city areas, among young peopLe, the Long-term unemptoyed
and oLdir workers. In November 1980, some changes and extensjons to these
poIicies uere intrqduced" The budget for the Youth Opportunities Scheme was
increased for 1981 l'82, aLtowing 140.000 more young people to obtain train-
ing or uork experience. The SpeciaL Temporary EmpLoyment Programme for the
Long-term unempLoyerd uas repLaced by a wider Community Enterprise Programme
prouiding some 14.t100 more pLaces by the end of 1981182. Assistance under
the Temporary Short.-t'ime tJorking Compensation Scheme (designed to encourage
employers to adopt short-time working rather than redundancies) uiLI now
be'avijtable for upr to n'ine months (previously six months) at a rate of 502
of dai[y earnings (previousLy 75i0. In response to increasjng [eve[s of un-
empLoyment, particuLarIy amongst young peopte, the UK Government announcedt
in July, a set of measures designed to reduce the number of people on the un-
emp[oymint register by over 450.000, by earLy 1983. The measures incLuded
extensions to existing schemes namely- increased funds for the Youth
Opportunitjes Proglamie for 1982-gjw'ith the guarantee of a ptace on the scheme
for atL schooL-Leavers bv Christmas 1981; a reduction in the age timit for the
Job Release Scheme to 62 by next February; additionat funds to encourage more
young peopLe to rennain at schoot" New proposaLs'include a UKL'15 weekLy subsidy
io 
"rpioy"rs for each ner; person employed under 18, 
provided they earn Less
than UXt-40 per week; the estabtishment of 20 informat'ion centres in inner
cities to trajn the younE unempLoyed in computing and etectronic assembly skil-l-
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Shaken by successjve oiL crises and under pressure from mounting internatjonaL
competitlon, the Community and the"indiv.iduaL Member States are pursu'ing their
efforts to achieve structuraL adjustment against a background of sLugg'ish
growth, a low LeveL of investment, rising unempLoyment and pers'istent infLation.
Rtongside sectors, such as steeL, textiLes and shipbuiLding, which are in the
throes of adjustment and for uhich the Commun'ity is deveLoping restructuring
or conversion pLans, the basic capitaL goods industries, on which both the
modernizat'i on of product jorr techn"i ques and trade equi librium depend, are
sufferjng from a low leveL of growth, a faLL in'investment ratios, Lower producti-
vity growth and increasing import penetration. The mach'ine tooL'industry has
Shown obvious s'igns of weallness for a number of years, but these are not"l
spread'ing to other cap'itaL goods industries (metaL manufacturer eLectro-
mechan'i ciL equ'i pment, trans;port equ'i pment, etc). These industries must st]ccess-
f uLLy carry out the ma jor technoLog.i caL revoLution now tak'i ng pLace, since 'i t
is here that they can recrerate the conditions which wjLL enabLe them to become
competitive aga'in. Under the pressure r:f events, Communiiy poLicjes initiaLLy
focused on measures, often defens"ive in character, in those sectors which were
in greatest jeopardi; now, however, first priority shouLd be given to deveLop'ing
the advantages conferred by'the Community dimensjon so as to ensure that a
Lead'ing position is achieverd in inclustries with promising future potentiaL-
8"1 Adiustmerrts in the Communityos sectoraL structures
between the tuo oi L shocks
After the first oiL price rises and the ecernomic recession whjch ensued
in 1974-75, and before economjc activity began to sLow down again appreciabLy
in 1980-81 foLLowing the second series of oiL price rises, the Community economy
had aLmost regained its earLy-1970s growth rate (3.5){ on average frorn 1975 to
'1979 as against 4.4% fron 1970 to i973']. 0nly at a reLatjveLy detaiLed LeveL of
sectorat breakdown of the economy can'it be see,n that the growth pattern in some
sectors shifted significantLy from past. trends, poss'ibLy refLecting an acceLeration
in the continuous adjrtstment process irr European economic structures. GeneraLLy
speaking, in most majrsr categories of:rectoral activity (intermediate products,
equipment products, current r:onsumptiorr goods, services), average Erowth per-
formance during the Liast ten years has invariabLy been some 20% Lower than
during the years of high groi'lth, th.! s clrop being on the same scaLe as that for
the Commun'i ty economy as a whole.
Between 1975 and 1979o the Last ,,ear for which sectoraL statistics for
most Community countries are avaiLable, the basic sectors contributing most tc)
overaLL growth were energy (urith a particuLarLy high LeveL of growth), inter-
mediate products, pari:icuLarty chemicaI products, and aLso steeI in 1978 and
1979 and market services.
\b\
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The sectors with the Lowest performance in terms of vaLue-added growth were
bu'i Lding and construction, non-market servi ces and agri cuLture (mainLy because
of two bad years )n 1975 and 1976).
Changes of greater significance are evident'in the capitaL goods sector.
tJi th 11. .7t of the tota L of the Communi ty va Lue added, th'i s
sector accounts for around 40% of aLL 'industry and pLays a
decjsjve roLe in stimuLating economic act.iv'ity. Although a number of industries,
such as data-processing equipment (office machines) came through the 1974-75
economic crisjs with scarceLy any sLowdown in their growth and have s'ince cLimbed
back to a very high growth rate (almost 87. a yeali n volume terms), the more
traditjonaL industries such as those manufacturing metaL products, and even more
so those producing industrjaL machines, have had growth rates of onLy around 1%
or indeed negative growth rates. They are quite ctearly the principaI victjms
of the low IeveL of growth jn Commun'ity and internationaL demand for capitaL goods,
but the durat'ion of thjs contraction jn demand is rtseLf undermining the capacity
of these industries to adjust to technoLogicaL deveLopments, resuLting'in a very
Low LeveL of growth in their investment and productivity. A compLicating factor
is that the other capitaL goods industries (eLectricaL and eLectronic aoods), which
had proved more resj L jent jn hoLd'i ng out against the generaL recjuct'i on in invest-
ment expend'iture, even in 1974-75, have since 1978 achieved only one thjrd of the'ir
groulth rate of the. previous ten years. If account js taken of the situat'ion in
the transport equipment industry (motor vehicLes), where there has been a sharp
slowdown in growth since that date, a question mark may be seen to hang over the
future of a whoLe sector of activity. Its growth is now based only on the manu-
facture of equipment for the sett'ing up of eLectronic data transmjssion systems,
but this branch accounts for only 0.9% of Cominunity vaLue added and provides only
0.7% of totaL empLoyment. It'is against this hackground that t're must measure the
scaLe of the d'ifficulties confronting Commun'ity industry, the economi c growth
of which has hitherto relied mainLy upon the production of cap'itaL goods-
The industries producing-current consumpt'ion goods have seen a graduaL
decLine jn thejr contributjon to economic act'ivity, faLling from 7.8% of totaL
value added in 1973 to 7.1"1 in 1979, mainly as a resu[t of the decline of the
textjLe jndustry, which had negative growth rates during four of those six years.
0nLy the rubber and pLastics industry has on average ach'ieved sustained growth,
though wjth fai rLy marked cycL'icaL fLuctuations.
\51
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In overalI terns, thc. bastc pattern of the changes taking place in
sectoraL structures in the Commun'ity has not altered since 1973.0n1y turo major
sectors, energy and servjces, have increased thejr share intotaL vaLue added
betueen 1973 and 1979. No ma.ior industriaL branch has maintained the reLative
Leve[, jn terms of vaLule added, which it had 'in 1973; 'indeed, the buj l-ding
jndustry Lost one perce'ntage pojnt between 1973 and 1979, The market services
sector is by far the principat beneficiary to emerge from this process of ehange
in Community economic structures. The acceLeratisn in the sh'ift of the economy
towards services, despite or because of the adjustment constrajnts with which
the Commun'ity countries are faced, is cLearLy evident from the figures: in
six years, fron 1973 to 1979r, the share of the vaLue added of market services
rose by nearty two percentage pojnts to reach 41"6i1 of the totaL for the
Community economy, uhereas'in the thirteen years from 1960 to 1973'it increased
onLy from 38.7% to 39.7%. As the draft fifth med.ium-term economic poLicy
programme points out, the share of jndustry in the creation of weaLth and
empLoyment is dectinjng at a faster rate than Long-term trends had suggested,
and this reduction shoutd be stabjL'ized by deveLopjng competitive jndustriaL
activ'it'ies.
As far as employtnent is conceriled' the trends may be summarized even more
sisrpLy : rljth t1n1o except'i ons, no goods-produc'i ng sector, whether agri cuLture,
buiLding, energy or the various industrjatL branches, has shown any net job
creation since 1975. Th,e tr.lo exceplions are transport equipment and the rubber
and pLast j cs jndustry, r,lhi ch together accoun'ted f or net creation of 108 000 jobs
out of the net 1.4 miLLion jobs created bretween 1975 and 1979. Here aga'in, virtuaL-
Ly aLL of the increase is based on the services sector uhich, in the space of
four years, provided 2..3 nriLLion jobs jn the market services sector and 1 miLLion
jobs in the pubLic service sector"
This cloes not mean, hollever, that the services sectot'has become highLy
tabour-jntensive. tJhiIe public services, with 121 jobs per 1 000 units of vaLue
added'in non-market services, have a very high Labour content (the caLcuLation
of vaLue added in voLum6 terms being very conventionaL, this coeffjc'ient is reLative
arbitrary), market servjices b,y contrast/ with a coefficjent of 74, are stiLL weLL
beLow the average coef f i c jent for irrdust ry Jfi. The Labour content per unit d
vaLue added (whjch 'i s mereLy -r:he inverse cf apparent Labour product'i vity) has been
declin1 ng steadi Ly 'i n at. l brarrches, ulith a very rapid decLine 'i n agricuLture
and energy, a moderate decLine in
buoyant sectors such as chemicaLs
equipment, where the reductjon js
and aLso in bui Lding.
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the various industriaL branches except the most
and data-processing and eLectro-mechanjcaL
very sharp, and a sLower decLine in services
Amongst the 'industriaL branches, where the coefficient was 132 in 1979, the
text'iLe industry'is by far the most Labour-intensjve and this, together wjth the
fact that its annuaI rate of neduction is scarcely any faster than the average for
the economy, indicates how far it stiLL has to go before achieving profitabLe
productjon conditions (by way of exampLe, the textjLe industryrs Labour content
per 1 000 units of value added in 1979 llas 100 in the Federal Republic of Germany,
110 in France, but 150 jn trta[y and 187 in the United Kingdom). ALthough it shed
823 000 jobs in net terms between 1973 and 1979, the weakness of the growth of
this branch itseLf contributed to the sLowdown in the reduction of this coefficient.
Between 1960 and 1973, its Labour content feLL by 5.1% a year, but after 1973 by
3.2% a year. During th'is period (1973-79), the Labour content felL by 3.7% a year
in the chemical industry, by 4.3% a year in etectro-mechanical equipment and by
77" a year in data-processing equipment.
As regards sectoraL investment, the deterjoratjon in the condjtions govern-
'ing the reaL return on capitaL have to a Large extent contrjbuted to the con-
traction in the voLume of investment. Though the growth'in reaI profit ratios,
which suffered considerabLy during the 1974-75 cris'is, reverted to a s'ignificant
upward trend in a number of industriaL branches, the share of gross operating
ratios in vaLue added did not generaLLy regain the LeveLs achieved at the begin-
n'ing of the decade. There is therefore stilL a considerabLe Lag between the
revivaL jn the growth of macroeconomic investment and that of the gross operating
surpLus, since it was not until 1979 that the volume of GFCF exceeded the LeveL
reached )n 1973, though the figures forecast for 1981 indicate that it wiLL once
again faLL beLow that LeveL.
The very Length of this period, marked by a Low LeveL of growth in invest-
ment desp'ite the apparent restoratjon of profitabi Lity conditions, probabLy ex-
dains in part why average productivity growth was onLy 2 to 37" a year.
AnaLysis of individuaL sectors shows reLativeLy different patterns of per-
formances. Between 1975 and 1979, the intermediate products sector hacj fairLy sus-
ta'ined growth and high productivity gains, aLthough the growth of investment llas
very substantjalLy negative not onLy in the steeL jndustry, hrut aLso jn the
chemjcaL inciustry, at Least untiL 1978, the Last year for which detaiLed figures
\6t
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are avai LabLe.ConverseLy, the capitaL goods sector/ despite Less buoyant growth,
carrjed out Large-scaLe'investment, though this is not refLected jn any major
productivity ga.i ns. However, it is ev'i dent that, aLthough manufactur.i ng'i ndustri es
as a whoLe saw some revjvaL in their average rate of reaL gross operating surpLus,
foLLowing the d.isastrous resuLts for 1g74-75, this improvement was not sufficjent
to stop the steady decLine in investment rat'ios. l.l'ith the exception of agricuLture,
average investment ratjos in each branch between 1976 and 1978 were uniformLy
beLow the average LeveL for 1970-73. This s'ituation is to some extent reminiscent
of the comments made on the faLL'i n the Labo{",I r content per unit of vaLue added,
but the rate of decrease in this approximate measure of capitaL intensiveness,
notabLy in some branches of industry (steeL, chem'icaLs, but aLso data-processing
equipment and rubber and pLastics) is even more rapid than that of the Labour
coefficients. Here too, the greatest degree of stab"itity'in the trend of invest-
ment ratios is to be found jn the services sector, whjch does in point of fact
account tor 557" of totaI investment (or 30% if residentiaL construction'is
exc Luded) .
ALthough aggregation of the data at Communjty Level masks the wide djversjty
in nat'ionaL situations, this c'cmbined decLine in the intensiveness of two factors
of product'ion, capitaL and Labour,'in many branches of industry, shows at the
very Least the djfficuLty with which the process of adjusting the European pro-
ductive apparatus'is taking pLace" The externaL trade figures mereLy reinforce
the view that Community industriaL structunes are in danger of faLLing some llay
behind major internat'ionaL competjtors"in the adjustment process"
Trade with countries outside the Community, account'ing for a LittLe under
50y. of Member States' totaL externaL trade, is in overaLL terms aLmost in equiLj-
brium as far as goods;ire concerned antJ in surplus if services are'i n-
cLuded. Simj LarLy, whi Le generaLLy remain'ing fai rLy stabLe, export/'import ratios
for aLmost aLL categories of products improved during the period 1974-75, onLy
to decLine thereafter, especiaLLy in 19V9' a year of fairLy high internaL growth'
Howeven, this reLative stabjLity cannot conceaL the emergence of a deterioration
jn a number of the Communjtyts major trading industries. The cLearest case js
that of the motor vehicLe'irrdustry, whose export/import ratio feLL in ten years
from 18 in 1970 to 3.6 in 1979, but the other jndustries produc'ing capitaL goods
have, aLbeit to a Lesser extent, shown the same difficuLty'in maintain'ing their
competitive position; thus, exportlimport ratios have, for a number of years,
\b5
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been fatLing in the case of eLectrjcaL goods and machines, data-processing equip-
ment and industriaL mach'ines. tJhereas, as has been seen, activity in the capitaL
goods sector has not managed io regain its past buoyancy, imports of capitaL goods
increased from an average of 16.47" a year (jn vaLue terms) between 197O and 1973
to 18.92 between'1975 and 1979. whiLe the growth rate of exports feLL during the
same periods from 12.9% to 10.2'/." This is a dangerous trend for the Communjty jn
the medium term, though it appLies in differing degrees to the various Member States,
being evident in the case of the FederaL Republjc of Germany at any rate- It.is
based in part on d'ifferences in price compet'itiveness, but aLso on some Leeway in
tebhnotogicat adjustment, notabLy in electronics as compared with the United
States and Japan.
A return to stronger competit'ive positjons must be sought not so much in an
extension of sectoraL protect'ionism as jn a successfuL changeover to efficient
manufacturing processes. Thjs js obvjousLy the course pursued, for exampLe, by
the chemicaL jndustry, which has steadiLy'improved its export/import rat'io, and
it is not yet that pursued by the textiLe and cLothing industry, where exports
are sti LL decLin'ing compared with imports.
8.2 Sectors with future ootentiaL
The above sectoraL anaLysis is based on the traditionaL economic breakdown
of industriaLized countries into major sectors of activity whose importance is
judged in ternrs of their share jn value added or in the number of persons employed.
For each group of industries or service actjvities, the t^rhoLe body of statjstics
avaiLabt.e, as may be seen in the annexed tabLes, derjves from the choice of these
criteria and governs the economic observation and interpretation of changes in
sectoraI structures. The current technotogical changes, uhich
wiLL profourrdLy aLter production and working conditions in the years ahead and
which the structuraL adjustment process in the European economies is basicaLLLy
a'imed at achieving, Lie aLmost entireLy outsjde the range of these instruments
of anaLysis. Here again, there must be change, even if there is no hope of elimi-
nating aIL the uncertainties, but efforts must be made to correct the over-
pessjmjstic picture of a productjve apparatus in decLine which emerges from the
conventionaL approach outLjned above.
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In at Least four areasi, though the List is not exhaustive, the activities
that are LikeLy to deveLop may either offer substitutes for the decL'ining roLe
of certajn industries or, through the transformation of productjon methods, revi-
taLize sectors considered to be in decLine by freeing them from the constraints
uh-ich hoLd them back and by restoring to them the condit'ions of competit'iveness
whjch wiLL enabLe them to regain their positjon: these areas are energy, mjcro-
electronics, aerospace and biotechnotogy. There'is no quest'ion here of describing
in detaiI the possibitities whjch each of thenr offers or of examining the stage
of deveLopment they have reached; what must be made cLear, however, is that the
achjevement of a Leading positjon in them by the Community countries is a fundament-
al condit.i on govern'i ng growtfr prospects and a return to a more baLanced empLoyment
situation.
fleasures jn the energ), fieLd have aLready been'initiated on a Iarge scaIe
and considerabLe success in reducing oiL dependence has aLready been achjeved
(see box : o'iL and energy). l'he measures are ajmed both at easing baLance of
payments constraints and at creating new forms of production and consumption
underpinn'ing growth and creat,ing jobs. The amount of jnvestment required to
finance nat.ionaL projects is substantiaL and w'iLl bring capitaL expenditure Linked
to either energy production 9r consumption up to 1O% of totaL GFCF. However,
whi[e the scope offered by tfre development of new sources of energy and by energy
conservatjon is considerabLe and varied, particuLarLy as regards potent'iaL jobs
in the case of energy conseryation, it requires effort and the coordinatjon of
measures, both as regards research and deveLopment and fjnanc'ing and as regards
the prov'i si on of i nf ormat j on f or users -
The mjcroeLectronjcs industry and, more generalLy, technoLogies connected
with data processing are aLs6 expanding rapidly. By penetrating aLI sectors of
the economy, fron agricuLturer to services, microprocessors have far-reaching
economjc repercussions. They aLLow an acceLeratir:n in the growth of Labour pro"
ductjvity and, by reduc'ing the cost of capital, in the grnwth of the overaLL pro-
ductivity of the factors of production, and they aLso resuLt in a wjder range of
products, creating new denancl and generat'i ng new production activ'i ties. However,
their jmpact on empLoyment is init'iaLLy negative because the process of adjusting
the vocationaI skiILs requirecl is so sLow. The fact remains that the Community is
cLearLy Lagging behind the Urrjted St&s and Japan- European producers do not enjoy
the ldvantages offered by a genu'ineLy unified market, the benefits of pubLic
procurement, which is insufficientLy coordinated at European LeveL and often goes
to jnternat'ionaL competitors outside the Community, or mass'ive pubLic aid for
research and deveLopment.
\bl
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However, the Community does enjoy major comparative advantages in the deveIopment of
software, which is fundamentat to aLL forms of data processing, and in the manufac-
ture of h'igh capac'ity microprocessors, but here too major efforts must be made to
increase the awareness of industry and the services sector so as to ensure the
successfuL penetration of these new technoLog.ies.
In the aerospace industry, there are tt.lo prime areas in which cLose coopera-
tion bettleen Member States is necessary. These are the manufacture of the new
generation of medjum-range ai rcraft, with a potentjaL market estimated at
S 55 000 miLLion, and the further constructjon of sateLLite Launchers. These pro-
grammes have an impact not only on job creation, the improvement of teLecommunica-
t'ions, meteorology and air transport, but aLso have a technoLogicaL impact on the
etectronjcs industry and thus on the economy as a whoLe. As far as the bjo-industry
is concerned, the potential fieLds of appIication wouLd seem to be extremety Large,
particuLarLy'in agricuLture and chemjcaLs. However, jt is stiLL jn the fieLd of
atternative sources of energy that, in the short term, the first tangibLe effects
of a technoLogy whose precise economic impact is djfficuLt to measure shouLd make
themsetves feLt.
In the case of aLL these,industries with future potentiaL, the amount of
expenditure requ'ired for investment or research and deveLopment purposes 'is
enormous. However, competition between countrjes on industriaLjzed areas'in these
spheres is intensive, and the countrjes which are the first to establish a Lead on
this market wiLL be the onLy ones that can draw any benefit in terms of empLoyment
and growth from the industries concerned. The Community'is far from being in a
strong position compared wjth the United States and Japan, since in terms of per-
centage of GDP, it channeLs fewer resources to research than those countries; jt
aLso has fewer engineers and scjentists jn terms of percentage of totaL empLoyment.
It isagaihst this rather unfavourabLe background, aggravated by protectionist
tendencjes which hoLd up stiLL further the efforts which must be made, that more
energeti c Community poLi cies are requi red"
8.3 Community sectoraL and structuraL_pq!jcies
In addition to its proposaLs for economic policies jntended to create a
stabLe economic and monetary environment that favours growth in the Member States
and js based on efforts to control the factors which generate infLation, the Com-
mun'i ty has at 'i ts dj sposaL cons'i derabLe weL L-def ined measures capabLe of having
a wide impact. Leaving aside the particular probLem of the common agriculturaL
poLicy, which is deaLt wjth separateLy (see box No 1), community measures are
ajmed at organizing and deveLoping the proper operation of the internaL market
by removing obstacLes to the free movement of persons and goods, drawing on a
w'i de range of i nst rument s :
\bB
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- the establishment o1'a common externaL tariff so as to ensure uniformity of
conditions govern'i ng accerss to the Community market;
- the eLimjnatjon of t;echnicaL barriers to tnade;
- open tendering fon rlationilL pubLic contracts;
- the pursujt of an act'i ve compet'i tion poLicy under uh'i ch State a'i ds are subject
to Comm'i ssion controL;
- ajd to promote cooperation between European fjrms in the technicaL, commerciaL
and LegaL spheres.
However, under the pnessure of events and because of the adjustment diffj-
cuLti es encountered b1r thg lvlember states, the commun'i ty has had to step up i ts
sectoraL-intervent'ion measures and has not yet managed to strike a baLance between
the measures it takes to support traditionaL jndustrjes that are undergoing a
serious adjustment crisis, lrave a high degree of Labouri ntens'i veness and are
very LargeLy concentr;rted in certajn reg'ions, and those it takes to promote
i ndust ri es wi th f uturel potent'i a L.
0n the basis o1'the principLe that, for economic as much as for strateEjc
or socjaL reasons/ no sectoii couLd be abandoned even if there was no Longer any
chance of jt being profitabLe, Community measures in sectors jn difficuLty have
pr.imar.iLy been designed to strengthen thejr structures through more effective or-
ganizatjon of their production and to re-estabLish improved conditions of pro-
ductivity and profitabil'ity through temporary pubLic aid'in support of investment.
Such measures designecl to ensure restructuring and'indeed, in some cases, conversion
have apptied to the steeL 'industryrthe texti Le industry and shipbu'ilding-
The most specific intervent'ion measures have been in the areas of externaL
commerciaL poLicy, competjtion and jnformation, often invoLving a major sociaL aspecL
The "Mdtjfibre Arrangement" (MFA) in the textiLe industry and the proposed
amended reneb,aL to the end of 1986, timiting the growth of texti [e imports from 32
non-Community countriers, is a typ'icaL means of "provisionaL" protection intended to
shjeld a sector from fuavjng to carry out a process of overrapid adjustments which
wouLd have serjous ef1'ects on empLoyment and regionaL equiL'ibria. SimiLarLy, in
the steeL indust?yt ? system of production quotas ulas estabL'ished jn October 1980"
and minjmum frontier prrices were fixed, whjLe 14 biLateraL agreements covering 75%
of the Communityrs stereL imports were extended untiL 31 December 1981 (see box
No 3 : the steeL industry).
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As regards aids, Limits have in some cases been imposed on the granting of
pubLi c subsidies or Loans. For exampLe, the Fif th Di rect'ive on aid to sh.ipbu.iLding,
adopted by the CounciL on 28 April.1981, governs the cases in which the Commission
may authorize aid to shipyards within the Commun'ity. The same appLies to the way
in which the Commission examines some of the a'id granted in the text.iLe industry,
notabLy in BeLgium and the NetherLands. However, jt shouLd be noted that such aid
authorizations are regarded as exceptionaL, and jn the steeL'industry for example
the CounciI has decided that th'ey must be aboLished by 1985.
The purpose of measures taken'in the socjaL area js to faciLjtate the re-
training of workers and to reduce its impact on their incomes; thus, in the ship-
buiLdjng industry, the European SociaL Fund (ESF) has provided assistance for some
7 000 persons in three Member States (D, I, UK) in order to increase the vocationaL
and geographicaL mobiLity of the Labour forcel the Commission aLso presented the
CounciL with a proposaL aimed at heLping to maintain the jncome of eLderLy workers
affected by restructuring measures in this industry, but the CounciI did not
endorse it and the quest'ion is being re-examined by the Commjssion. In the steeL
industry, on the other hand, the CouncjL authorized the Commission, on 24 June 1981,
to contribute under the ECSC Treaty to the financjng of payments made by Member
States in connection with early retirement measures (effective up to the end of
1984) and part-time working measures (for a period up to 30 June 1987).
0therindustriaL sectors, such as the motor vehicLe indust ry, or service
sectors, such as d'istribution, have untjL recentLy had a particuLarLy high Level
of growth based on the steady rise in living standards and expanding export markets.
The jncrease jn internationaL competitjon and the queeze on private househoLds'
incomes during the past number of years have seriousLy affected
these sectors making it more difficuLt for them to carry out the necessary ad-
justments to changes in technoLogy, in the cost of energy and, more generaLLyr'in
new conditions of production. For exampLe, the Community motor vehicIe industry
saw jts production and exports faLL, in volume terms, by 9% and 8.4% respect.iveLy
between 1979 and 1980, whj Le 'imports grew by g.Oy".
Community poIicies in these sectors initiaLLy consisted in informing Euro-
Pean producers of market condjtions and trends, in improving the operation of the
s'ingLe market and, where appropriate, in bringing the Commun'ity's financjaL jns-
truments to bear.
\bo
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Thus, in June 1t81, the Commjssion adopted a communication on the structures
and outLook for the European motor vehicLe industry. This h,as a study of the
.industry conta'ining, firstLy,, a very detaited anaLysis of the situation and of the
probLems jnvoLved in increas'ing its internationaL competjtiveness and, secondLy,
guideLjnes for coordinerted measures to back up the efforts made by the Comrnunity
motor vehi cLe industry to 'improve its competit'iveness, facj Ljtate adjustments and
deveIop an appropriate economic environment. More specificaILy, the Commiss'ion has
continued with the harmonization of ruLes at Community LeveL, putting forward the
jdea of "Communjty typer-approvaL" with regard to technjcaL specificat'ions, which
wouLd make the approvaL of a vehjcLe in one Member State vaLid throughout the rest
of the Community. It has also pressed the Japanese authorities to remove non-
tariff barriers to imports into Japan and, at the i"equest of the Counc'iL, it has
started statisticaL monitoling of imports of Japanese cars into the Community-
LastLy, aLthough Community financiaL assistance to the motor vehicLe indus-
try has so far jn most cases been in response to regionaL or social needs, its
impact'in quantjtatjve terms has been significant, amounting to 57" of investment.
The share of ERDF assjstance jn the financjng of investment to which'it contrjbuted
amounted to nearly 7l{ betweerr 1975 and 1980, and ECSC Loans financed up to 50%
of the cost of the operations; concerned"
The Community has aLso embarked on measures invoLving sectors with future
potentiaL. There u,as no question of the Commurriiy acting in pLace of industry or
the market in picking out activ'ities wjth future potentjaL as opposed to those
consjdered to be more tradit'i onaL, but rather of ujng the economjes of scal-e pro-
vjded by measures in the generaL jnterest canried out at European LeveL. Tuo types
of measures have thus been given priority: the stimu[ation of research and deveLop-
ment and the extens'ion of transnationaL cooperation in data-processing, eLectronjc
data transmission, ajrcraft and aerospace, biotechnology and nel.l sources of energy-
Community assistance touards research and deveLopment ranges from the ongani-
zation of meetings for groups of scientists to the fjnancing of programmes such
as piLot projects reLating to new sources of energy, in connectjon with the object-
ives set by the Counc'iL on the Long-term security of primary energy suppL'ies,
heLping European industry to become more competit'ive and the protect'ion of the
tb\
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environment. HoHever, over and above research proper, the counciI has, for
exampLe, drawn up a muttiannuat programme (1979-83) on data-processing cover.ing
both generaI measures (standards, pubLic contracts, assessment of the effects
of the new microeLectronic technoLogy on empLoyment) and 'industriaL promotion
measures relating to the production of the future generation of compLex integrated
circuits, software and the appLication of data-processing systems and equipment
that are in the Community'interest. The Community communication system known as
DIANE (Euronet) is one of the first spec'ific resuLts of the'impLementation of
this approach. ParaIteL to these measures carried out at European [eve[, the
Community promotes the development of projects invoLving two or more Member
States, with considerabIe success in the aircraft or aerospace industry in
particular within the framework of the European Space Agency.
\bz
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(Chapter I box No 1)
AgricuLture
GeneraI economj c trend and structuraL adjustments : Community agri cuIturaL
product'ion'increased,, between 1973 and 1979' by about 1.57. a year with a
fairLy sharp acceleriation in growth during the Last few years. The increase
in production was obLained through more intensive use of the means of pro-
duction, resuLting'i l.t an increase in jntermedjate consumpt'i on, especiaLLy
after 1977, and reduc'lng the average growth of vaLue added in the sector to
nearLy 0.5% a year for the peri od 1973-79
Although the rise in product'ion seems to have been determ'ined more by de-
cisioni taken under1he common agricuLturaL policy, the fixing of prices and
ueather condit'ions than by the generaL economic situation, the state of the
economy has markedly'infLuenced the annuaL rate of reduction in the number
of persons empLoyed in agriculture. The rate of reduct'ion r,las 4.8% during the
period 1968-73, but felL to some 3% between 1973 and 1979, mainly because of
fewer empLoyment posr;'ibi Lities eLsewhere for agricuIturaL workers wishing to
[eave the sector. Productivity growth accordingLy slowed from 7'82 a year in
the years before the crisis (1968-73) to 4.5% after 1973-
The sLowdown in the growth of per capita output was not the onLy factor curbing
the rise in aglicutturaL jncome. The very appreciabLe increase in the prices
of intermedjate products, exceed'ing that in product'ion prices, resuIted fjrst
in a faLI in "real income" per person empLoyed ln 1974, folLowed by stow
growth up to 1978 and a further drop thereafter.
Though the financ'iaL situation was hardLy favourabLe, structural changes have
continued. The propor.tion of agricuLturaL vaLue added accounted for by jnvest-
ment rose steadjLy, despite the ris'ing cost of borrowing. At the same time, the
sjze and product'ion potentiaI of the average farm in the Community are cont'inuing
to increase. However, because of features specific to a sector heaviLy infLuenced
by non-economic factors and managed under an agricuLturaL poLicy whose sociaL
aspects infLuence prlce determinat'ion, prices and incomes do not have the same
'i mpact on adjustment as'i n the case of most other branches. Some 7O% of agri -
cutturaL products are covered by a system whjch guarantees both markets andplices, and th'is increases the rjsk of structuraI surptuses and imposes a
burden on the Community budget because of the payments that have to be made
from the EAGGF Guarantee Section.
At the same t'ime, progress has been achievgd_in the comTol PqLicy !o'iryproveqSri.rttr."t rt.r. if-e90, the.EAGGF Gu'idance. Section has
ffiiTppropriationof3600"miLLionECUava.iLabLeforaf,ive-
year period to heLp in the financ'ing of agricuLturaL restructuring, this amount
being suppLementary t.o national expenditure. The Commissjon has urged member
countries to give frersh impetus to structuraL poLicy, by updating existing
measures and by initjating new measures aLong regional Lines.
The Commissjon's report under the Mandate of
shouLd aLso jnfLuencer structuraL adjustment.
commends that:
- 
policy on prices should be shaped in such a
reftect market reaL'i t'i es and thus come more
main competitor countries;
- 
producers should, more than in the past, be brought face to face with the
reaL'ity of the market with regard to the potentjaL for market'ing their out-put, which means that there must be financiaL particjpatjon on their part
or that the jntervention guarantee in the event of structuraL surpLuses
shouLd be L'im'ited.
30 May contains proposaLs which
In partjcuLar, the Commission re-
way that Commun'i ty pri ces
into t'ine with pri ces in the
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(Chapter 8 : box No 2)
0j L and energy
In two successive slhocks, 1973-74 and 1g7g'8\, the price (fob) per barreI of
crude oj I imported lcy thl Community rose f rom L,ess than S 3 to I 36, thus 'in-
creasjng by a factor-of 13.8. These savage increases have given rise to ad-justments on a very uneven scaLe, and, aLthough the adjustments have in parti-
cuLar a[lowed a con,siderabLe reduction in the volume of net o'i I imports, they
have not been suffi,cient to offset the price effects : the Communityrs oil
biLL has risen from I Q 6A0 million in 1973 (.2/" of GDP) to 8106 000
mi L L'ion i n 1981 (some 47" of GDP) .
In order to cope with the energy constraint, member countries have taken steps
to boost their investment programmes with the aim of deveLop'ing nationaL energy
production, substituting other sources for oiL and restructuring demand so as
to increasL energy r:fficiency. However, the growth of energy investment has
remained v".y tod"rilte for the Community as a who[e, rising from 1.4% of GDP
in the period 1968-'?4 to 1.6% of GDP in the period 1975-80 (equjvaLent to 7-7%
of totat GFCf), thor.rgh these average figures mask sharp differences between
countries, witir energy'investment rang'ing from 0.9% of GDP in the case of
Italy to 2.87. of GDp in the case of the United Kingdom during the second period-
Member countries have atso begun to introduce pnice policies which encourage
energy production, the use of desirabLe substjtutes and energy conservation'
However, the jtnp"tt of the price rises on the finaL consumer has in most cases
been spiead over tinne because of the time Lags in the adjustment of specific
taxes on petroleum products. In addjt'ion, many techni caL or admini stratjve
measures designed tg reguLate the use of energy (heatin9, transport, etc')
have been adopted in aLL Member States"
Throughout the wholg of the period 1973-80, energy consumption in the Community
remained beLoul ol'very s[ightLy above - trith the exception of 1979 - the 1973
Levef, whjLe GDP grew by an average of 1.97" a year. 0iL consumption feLL by
some 100 mjLLjon tonnes, or more than 17%, during the period 1973-81, and this,
given the growth of Norih Sea ojL productjon in the United Kjngdom (up 87
*ittion toines), expLains the reduction in tfre voLume of net'imports from
585.8 miILion tonnes; in 1973 to 389 miLLion tonnes in 1981.
The Communityrs depclndence on oiL imports thus clropped dramaticalLy fron 61.7%
in 1973 to a forecas;t 41 .3% in 1981. The share of oiL 'in energy consumption was
cut from 60.5% to 50% during the same period. It m'ight be pointed out here that
the main energy objerctives which the Community has set itself for 1990 are to :
- bring down to 0.7 at Least the ratio between the growth rate of energy con-
sumption and the growth rate of GDP;
- reduce the share of oi L in energy consumption to about 40%;
- reLy on soLid fueLs and nucLear energy to cover 70 to 75% of primary energy
requi rements for erLectri city generation-
The first examjnatjgn of Member Statesr progress in pursuing these objectives
highLighted the neecl for greater nationaL effort. The key factor in this con-
n"ition wjLL be the volume of energy investment up to 199O z Member Statesl
current programmes provide for some 500 000 miLl'ion ECU between 1981 and 1990,
equivalent io 2.2% ctf GDP (10.1% of GFCF). However, in contrast to what has
been the pattern in the past, most of the additional investment is to be
concentrated on the use of aLternative sources of energy in power stations and
on energy consenvat'ion and is therefore subject to uncertainty and very depen-
dent on-the generaL economic situation. It is therefore necessary as of now
to combjne juAic'iou5 price and taxation poLicies with possibLe financiaL sup-port at nationat or European teveL. This questjon is at present being exam'ined
within the Community institutions-
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8.17(Chapter 8 : Box No 3)
The steeL jndustrY
since the f irst oi t shock (974-75>, the commun'ity 'industry has been involved
'in a rapid process of adjustment, aga'inst a background of a substantiaL dete-
rioration in the jndustry's reLative posit'ion, with:
- a 17.9% f all .in crude steel product jon f rom 1974 to 1980;
- a 180 000 reduction in the workforce between'1973 and earLy 198'l;
- a decLine in its share in world production from 21.9% in'1974 to 17'87" in 1980;
- a 13z inqease in crude steel production capac'ity between 1974 and 1980;
- a drop in capacity utiLjzation rates from 80% in 1974 to 557. in 1980;
- a 40% contract'ion in jnvestments at current prices between 1975 and 1980'
The commun.i ty,s trade baLance'i n steeL remajns comfortabLy in surp[us, but the
ratio between imports and exports (in tonnes) of ECSC products rose from 30%
in 1975 to 41% in 1980. At the same time, imports rose from the equivalent of
5% of totaL crude steel productjon (tonnes) 'in the Community in 1975 to 7% in
1980. However, the trend of the Commun'ityrs batance of trade in steeL products
shows growing speciaL'izat'ion on the part of the community steeL industry, w'ith
greater concentration on more sophistjcated products, resuLting jn a reLat'ive
'increase in the vatue added of exports compared rll'ith that of imports' S'ince
1977, Community restructurjng poL'icy has consisted of measures designed to
faci Litate the reorgan'ization of thL productive apparatus and the retra'ining
of uorkers, whj[e Llaving it to f irms to dec'ide on their own modernization
and rationatization. These measures t"iere accompan'i ed by a seLf-djsc'i pL'i ne
agreement between the main steeL companies, notabLy with regard to product'ion
aiO plices. This voluntary agreement reached under the auspices of Eurofer
broke down in May'1 980 under the pressure of grow'i ng excess capacjtjes'
So as to prevent a total collapse of a Large part of the Community steel
indust ryt d mandatory system of product'ion quotas appLying throughout the
Commun.iiy rrr intrr:dlced in 0ctober 1980 on the basis of Art'icle 58 of the
ECSC Treaty. A series of biLateraL agreements with the major suppLjers outside
the Community, .ove.ing some 757" of Communjty steeL imports, was graduaLLy
compteted. This system of quotas, which were fixed quarterly for each under-
taking !{as restriited in'its durationl on 1 JuLy 198f it was replaced by a
systei of voluntar)r commitments entered into by steeL compan'i es, except'i n
the case of certain products. The strategy which emerged from discussions
between the Commis:;ion, the CounciL and ihe parLjament during the first haLf
of '1981 is as foLlows :
The majn obstacLes to improv'ing the profitabjLity of undertakjngs are at
present excess capacit'ies that outstrip demand and the massjve use of govern-
ment assistance enabL'ing recipient undertakjngs to pursue a poLicy of unfair
competjtion. In March leal, the comm'issjon was g'iven the task of estabLishing
a new code of disc'i pLine on government aid, urhich is to be progress'i veLy
aboljshed by 1985 at the Latest. UntiI then, aid wiLL have to be accompanied
by effective restructurjng in order to obtain authorization from the Commission.
Further, the Commissjon was g'iven the task of asking undertakjngs to submjt
their midium-term restructuring pLans so that'it could examine the trend ofjnvestment, incLudi ng contribuiions from pubIi c funds, the trend of capac'ities,
etc. The Commjssion js nob1 preparing further decisions on this question'
LastLy, with regarcl to sociaL security, the Community witL contribute to some
of thL'expenditure (part-time r,rork'i ng, earLy ret j rement) incurred in connection
with restructuring.
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TabLe 8.1
SectoraI structure of I'aIue added, empLoyment and investment
Q>
EUR-6(1)(4)
VALUE ADDED (Z) EI'IPLOYI{ENT (3)
1973 1979 1973ffi :6 1979
GFCF
1973 1978 1979
FUELS, PoWER PRoDUCTS
'iIANUFACTURED 
PRODUCTS
INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS
MetaI mineraIs
Non-metaLLic minerals
Chemj ca I product s
EAUIPI'IENT PR0DUCTS
MetaL products
IndustriaI machines
'offi ce machi nes
ELectri caI goods
Transport equipment
F00D,BEVERAGES, T0BACC0
CURRENT CONSUMPTION GOODS
BUILDING, CoNSTRUCTI0N
MARKET SERVICES
NON-I{ARKET SERVICES
Texti Ies,ctothing,Ieathers Z.g Z.s
Pape r 2.1 1.9
5.2 5.6
30.5 29.4
6.5 6.4
1.9 1.?
1.E 1.72.7 3.0
12.0 11.7
3.0 2.73.0 2.70.7 0.92.6 2.E2.7 2.7
4.3 4.?
7.8 7 .1
7.6 6.6
39.1 41 .6
12.8 1?.9
1.7
30.2
4.9
1"5
1.7
1.7
12.6
3.1
3.0
0.E
2.9
2.E
2.9
10.0
4.E
1.9
1.1
2.1
8.5
34.1
16.9
1.7
2t.9
4.5
1.3
1.5
1.7
11.9
2,E
2.8
0.7
2.7
2.E
2.8
8.7
3.9
1.8
1.1
1.9
7.8
36.E
18.7
6.7
18.7
5.2
2.4
1.6
2.3
6.2
1.4
1.3
0.6
1.2
1.7
2.4
4.0
1.2
1.0
0.6
1.1
2.O
54.1
14.?
' 7.2- 4.2 4'.6 4.4
8.2 :
16.5 3
5.0 2
1.4 3
1.2 3?.4 3
6.3 :
1.1 :1.3 i
0.6 31.3 :2"0 :
2.1 :
3.1 :
0.8 :1.0 .0.5 30.E !
l,E :
55.7 55.3
13.2 13.1
Rubberrplasti c products 1.2 1.10ther manufacturing products 1.7 1.5
TOTAL '100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .100.0 100.0
(1)EUR 6 z B, D, F, !, NL, UK(2)Gross vaLue added at market prices at(3)Totat empLoyment
(4)GFCF: gross fixed capitat formatjon
exchange rates
Source : Commission departments
1975 prices and exchange rates
by ownership branch at 1975 prices and 1975
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EUR-6 (1)Export/rmport'ratios in trade with non-community countries (2)
8.2?
70-73 74-75 76-79
AGRICULTURE * i l4 ,t7 .16
t?77
.14
1978 t?79
FUELTPoWER PRoDUCTS * 114 .11 .14 .14 .15 ,16
MANUFACTURED PRODUCT5 * 1145 L67 I .56 1 .63 I .59 1.44
INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS * I,25 I .63 t .52 1,51 t .66 | ,17
METAL MINERALS ,74|,|ON-METALLIC MINERALS 1, 1?
CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 2,32
1.10
1.18
?,69
,98
1.16
?r47
.95
1.1?
2 .59
l,t6 ,i6l,?2 1.062,51 2.35
EAUIPMENT PRODUCTS * ?r92 3,03 2.65 2.gg 2,48 2.30
METAL PRODUCTS
INDUSTRIAL MACHINES
OFFICE MACHINES
ELECT6,TCAL G00DS
TRANSPORT EAUIPMENT
2.33
3.87
1 .30
2,17
3.93
2.37
4.40
1,24
2,02
4.14
2.39
4.0?
t .09
1 .93
3.18
,2. 59{.31
L ,17
?.0f
3.51
2 .51
3,97
1 ,04
t,94
2,49
2.01
3.59
,97
1,70
2,66
FO0D,BEVERAGESTTOBACC0. * 
. 49 .60 .65 ,64 ,70 ,70
CURRENT CONSUMPTI0N G0OD.St 82 ,79 ,78 ,BZ ,gZ ,74lrEnrrEs;tltrffiNr --:::------::l ifLEAIHens' 1.15 .96 .80 ,85 .gJ ,741fPAPER .41 .39 .45 ,47 ,4g .441'^'Lr\ r{I rJy rilb 1 ? fllBqFE.PLlsTrc Pq9l. tr.47 4.45 3.!3 3.gO g.06 2,6AtlJlen fiANUFACTURTNG - 
. $0 .56 ,66 ,70 ,7! .67
l PMDUCT.S. _____,__ 
_F___-
lmoroR vEHIcLEs 13.81 10.0s 5.11 5.3g 4.gg g.6lfotneR mEANs 0F TRANSpoRTl.42 1.67 1.65 !,87 1.09 l,Ss
| ------- _____f,__
ITEXTILES, CLOTHING
ILEATHERS, F00TtdEAR
t.03 .gg .75 .80 ,77 .68
lt.J00D, FURNITURE
. t9 ,?6 .3? 31 35 30
IOTHER 1.15 1.02 1.11 l.1g 1.11 1.131
IToTAL TRADE rN G00Dslrur  lx u I 0DS ,97 ,92 .94 ,96| ------- ,?9 .90 |(1) EUR 6 z B, D, F, I, NL, UK
(2) Export/rmport ratjo: exports/imports in trade b/ith non-community countrjesat current prjces and exchange rates
Source : Commission departments
1.98 1.44 1.11 1.16 1.1{ .97
I\}
9. Some structuraI properties of sqlsjdi€, investme
and-"-IgL
Thei"e is generaL agreenrent that economic poticy has nou to give heavier
weight to remedyini ttre structuraL weaknesses of the European economy- Unfor-
tunite[y there is no escaping the fact that this means irpractice, studying a
vast nurirber of compLex mechanisms whereby pubLic finance and regulations
atready promote or dampen the structuraI evo[ution of the economy' The present
chapter makes a necessariIy setective and highl"y summarised contribution to this
subject, concentrating on three major aspects: firstty, the structure and size
of subsidies, secondty, the nature of investment incentives, and thirdLy, the
evotution and reIative IeveLs of taxation of .energy consumption. The reLative
importance of subsidies compared to GDP tended to increase in the 1970s refIec-
ting extending government intervention whiLe the overatI economic situation
woriened. Especiat[y subsidjes for housing. and transport proved to be increa-
singty expensive. The increase and weight of current subsidies suggest that
income and activity ma'intenance subsidies outweighed measures stimuIating
structural adjustment. The share of investment grants stayed near to 1 %of GDP
in the Community. A number of countries modified their tax depreciation aLLowance
provisions baLancingrat Least parttyrthe negative impact of inflation and profit
squeeze on business iinioDCing structures. 0ther investment incentives and subsi-
dies Iike tax reIiefs, debudgetized Loans, credit guarantees and protectionist
measures are high[y opaque. Excise duties on gasotine, diesel and heating oiL have
been augmented inmbst nrember countries over the tast months remaining in reaI terms
neverthetess be[ow 1973; tevel.s in most cases. Higher reaI oiI prices and in some
cases higher vatue adderd tax rates Led to h'igher charges per Iitre. For finaL users
the combined totaL reaI tax charge of excise duties and VAT together reached or
exceeded Levets observerd in'1973'
9.1 Th" :! ruct:Ig and- g j .e of subsi di es
The notion of s;ubsidies is often used in u,ays embracing rather different
interpretations, From an erconomic angLe, the fottowing wide definition
appears appropriate : Subsidies are direct or lndirect payrflents
other than those nc,rmaLLY made for goods, services, and pnOductiO'n
factors supptied to a firm or a factor owner, conditionat on sone action by the
recipient and des.igned to induce a change in rel"ative prices.The broad coverage of
t.his economjc definit'ion is iILustnated by the fact that it wou[d inctude the
subsidy equivatents o1' measures negutating prices and market entry, of tariff
and non-tariff barriers to free trader of preferentiat credits and credit 9a-
ranties, of tax retieiFs or deferments, and direct government transfer payments
to the business sector. The most narrowly defined concept at the other end of
the scate is the one used in nationaI accounts statistics inctuding mainLy proF''
duction, export, import and interest rate subsidies as wetL as coverage of
current trading Losses of ptlbLic enterprisest recorded as current transfers by
government to production un'its (private and pubL'ic enterprises)'
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A somewhat broader concept, aLso often used, adds (unrequ.ited, non-recur-
rent) government capitaL transferts to the business and housing sector,
'inctuding mainLy jnvestment grants, debt amortization and cancettation,
and coverage of losses accumulated over severat years. The deve[opment of
subsidies according to this concept wiLL be described be[ow"
Tabte 9-1 Eives the deveLopment during the 1970s of subsidies defjned,as
current and cap'itat transfers toproduction uriits. A ctear upuard trend preva.ited
in nearty a[[ community countries. rn 1978 subsidjes amounted to 65"000 mitLion
ECU or 3 314 % of GDp in the communityr 3l4 % po.ints higher than at the
beginning of the 1970s. The increase tras particularty strong in Betgiun(2%
poin!d, IreLand (5 % points) (1r, rtaty ( 112 zpoints), and Luxembourg(32 points)- In a[t countries this trend resutted mainty from rapid
growth of current transferpayments to the production sector (subsidies narrow-
ty defined as in nationat accounts statistics; see tabLe g.n. t,lhi[e it woutd
have been interesting to know what roLe interest-rate subsidies for invest-
ment and other purposes p[ayed in these develoments no re[iabte figures on this
subject are avaiLab[e. It seems, however, that they are used to rather diffe-
rent degrees in individuaI member countries.
The increase of current transfers appears to be much smalLer jf one
looks.at subsidy figures derived from nationat budgets, because since 1gZ1lZ3
a substantia[ part of agricutturat subsidies has been shifted from the nationaI
to the Community IeveL. Current transfer payments of nationaI governments atone in-
increased onty sLightly from 116 to 1r9'/, of GDP for the Cornmunity as a who[e with a
constant share in Germanyra decLine in Dehmark but nore or Less substantiaL increaes
in atI other member countries (see tabLe 9.2 tower part). Series excLuding
subsidies pa'id by Community instjtutions are however misLeading, given the
transfer of competence for a traditionaLl.y subsidized sector from the nationaI
to the Community budget. A decLining share of nationaL subsidies under these
conditions may nevertheLess involve an increasing share of those subsjdies
remaining in the sote nationat responsibitity. Thus Community subsid.ies
have been inctuded throughout this chapter.
(1) For IreLand this increase t.las [argeLy a side-effect of agricuLturaI poLicy.
However, even after substracting current EC transfers to IreLand (114% in-
1973 and 5.6Iin 1979) a significant increase of 314 to 1%of GDP between
1973 and 1979 remains.
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Informatjon on the composition of subsidies by recipient sectors or
branches generaLty proves to be surrounded by a number of substantiaL difficuL-
ties. Subsidies not targeted at spec'iaL sectors are often difficuLt to attribute
statisticaLLy; moreover, rec'ipient sectors are not necessariLy those who are
intended to benefit from financiaI aid. Avai LabLe data on the sectoraI compo-
sition of subsidies which is much affected by institutionaL factors by country,
are therefore not aLways compatibLe' Bearing these Limitations in mind
table 9.3 gives estimates for seven member countries of the orders of magnitude
of the retative shares of financiaL aid going to hous'ing, agricuLture, transport,
and industry and trade. These figures convey the foLLowing generaL impressions:
- the overaLL structure of subsidies varies wideLy between member countries,
refLecting to a targe degree different structuraI problems and tong term
poLicy choices.
- the transport 6nd 66rmilunication sector is one of the top aid recipients in
aLL member countries;. Subsidies paid to this sector have 'increased rather
rapjdly; their sizer compared to GDP varies widely from somewhat [ike a haLf
percent in the UK to 2 112% in Belgium and ltaly. In the Latter two coun-
trjes the transport sector is by far the biggest aid receiver.
- agricutture subs'id'ies, determined by the combination of community poLicies,
additionaI nationaL aids, and the reLative weight and structure of this
sector in nationaL economies, in some countries outstrip visibLe a'id to
industry whiLe rema'ining far beLow industriaL aid in others'
- subsidies for housing, aLso absorb rather different amounts of financiat
resources, varying $etween negLigibLe amounts in ltaLy, a third to a hatf
percent of GDP in Belgium, Denmark, and Germany and 1 '112% in the UK'
These figures ref[er:t onty generaL government subsidy expenditures excLuding
tax expenditures wh1ch are structured rather different[y in member countries'
High housing subsidies for the UK resutt mainly from measures aiming at '
reducing rent payments of Low income groups occupying dwetLings owned by [ocat
authorities. other countries may in fact pursue simitar aims through rent
reguLation, subsidizing the suppLy of dwetLings through tax reL'iefs' or
transfer payments llo Low income househoLds.
- industry and trade, finatty, are generaLLy found to have received between 314
to 1 y. of GDp as direct subsidies in 1977178. These subsidies are highty
concentrated on a few branches with different weights'in ind'ividuat member
countries. An exampLe is the coaI mining industry (see tabLe 9'4>' which
f)-r[b
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obtained a subsidy votume at ar4% of comrnr.r.nity GDp in 1980 ranging from 0r1
for the fi to 1'11. for BeLgium. 0ther impoitant focipients have been ship-
buitding, shipping, steeL, aircraft and computer industries.
The descriptfon of subsidies so far has focussed on statisticaLLy
recorded government expenditures. There exists however a number of other
financiaI aid instruments which may be used as substitutesfor subsidies.
rn some countries especiaU.y BeLgium, rtaLy and the uKrgovernment loans,
equities and advances are an important tool for injecting money into seLected
branches or firms. The subsidy vatue of these sometimes rather important
capital fLows depends on the extent to which they are accompanied by prefe-
rentiaL interest rates or rebates and Later rrite-offs. frloreover, credit
guarantees are used as a substitutefor government [oans to business. where
used as indirect financiat aid to aiLing firmsrboth generaI government Loans
and guarantees for bank credits may onty deLay recorded budgetary subsidies
and acce[erate their grobrth in the future when these toans have to be
written-off, or guarantees have to be honoured.
Tax reLiefs, taking the form of preferentiaL tax rates or aLLowances
deductibLe from the tax base for corporatjon tax and other business taxes,
personaL income or sociat security contributions are other indirect forms of
subsidies. For Germany the 1979 subsidy report evatuates business tax savings
at 13,000 miL[ion DM or nearLy 1% of GDP. An estimate of tax expenditure in
favour of the Bel.gian business sector shows a rather rapid increase for the
1970s, reaching in 1979 a size comparabLe to direct subsidies <111%of GDP).
The UK "Governmentts Expenditure Ptan" document of March 1980 estimates the
combined impact of capitaL aLLowances and stock ret'ief on corporatr'on tax at
E 5 500 miLlion, to which have to be added another E 7 to 800 mi[Lion for
unincorporated business (excIuding pubLic corporat'ions). These tax reIiefs
amounted to 3 114% of 1979 GDP. As "no attempt is made to distinguish retiefs
and aLLowances which can be regarded as part of the structure of the tax system",
one may assume that normat capitaI atlowances have no part in the estimate.
But under the assumption of a 52 % standard corporation tax rate and "normal"
dectining batance capitaI aILowances of 25%rthe above mentioned indirect
subsidy would have amounted to only 1 314 %instead of the 3 114 %of GDP due to
free depreciation for equipment and ptant. lrhite the coverage and the estima-
tion methods are very different, the resuLts iLtustrate, however, that the
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size of indirect subsidies through tax reLiefs are substantiaI and may weLI
be of the same order of magnitude as, or even h'igher than, recorded subsidy
expenditures for industrY.
9.2 Investment incentives
There exi sts a w'ide range of instruments in trlember States aiming at sti-
muLating or supporting structuraL adjustment. Some of them are reLativeLy per-
manent features of tax systems or financiaI markets, others are designed to be
effective .6n[y over ia shorter period of time. Such'instruments with
direct budgetary impticiations can be usefutty grouped under one of the three fol-
lowing headings :
- interest rate subsidies (often combined with credit guarantees or Loans),
- grants or ref,undabLe tax credits, iind
- tax poticy measure:s incLuding depreciation atLowances and tax rates.
Each of these toots affectsraLthough to different degrees, investment
determinants tike LiquirJity, profitabiLity, and capitaL costs, whil"e each of
these determinants can'further be influenced by a variety of other poticy measures.
Limited avaitabLe data iand the Large variety of specific features of existing
schemes make generaI assessments about t'he effectiveness of incentives
rather difficuLt. Impa,ct evatuations are accordingLy not numerous' The actuat
shape and use of these 'instruments therefore dependsto a high degree on existing,
historicaLLy determined structures and poLicy preferences.
Interest rate sulosjdies and investment grants are generatty accorded on
a setective ba.is and o'ften subject to discretionary decisions'In some countries
they are an important instrument of regional policy. Incentives for regions in
Gentral. and Nothern ItaLy reLy primariLy on interest rate subsidies white the
Belgian EconomiC Expansion act of 1970 expticit[y envisages tow interest
rate toans. Generatty interest rate subsidies are/ however, primarity
used as an incentive or aid for speciaI branches, individuaL firms, or specific
activities (e.g. housing, shipbuiLding, export credits, R & D, capitaL support to
firms in difficuLty) whereby a speciat Link to real investment is often absent or
rather indirectzas in the case of export credits and special aid schemes incLuding
interest rate subsidies.
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rhvestment grants accounted for an average i %of community GDp
in the 197os' much Less than current transfers. 0n average totat gross
fixed capitaL formation (GD c F) rlas subsidised in this way by
roughly 4n in the first har.f of the 1920 s and by 5,/. since then.
LeveIs aniJ trends varied substantiaLLy between member countries
(see TabLe 9.5 ), ref[ecting to a Large degree the vanying emphasis ptaced
on different instruments (tike interest rate subsidies, investment grants,
and tax depreciation aLLowances). For exampIe, in Betgium considerabte
importance is attached to interest rate subsidies, and in Denmark Limjted
intervention takes ptace under the cover of regionat pol.icy. Interesti ngLyt
countries with rather advantageous tax depreciation atLowance provisions and
high infLation accorded aLso high 'investment grants (IreIand, ItaLy, UK).
Notwithstanding the wide differences in Ieve[, Betgium, Denmark, Germany
and the NetherLands aLt doubted their respective volume of investment grants
reLative to gross fixed capitaI formation, whiLe the UK reduced it. A major
exptanation of these opposing trends are shifts of pol.icy emphasis over time
between investment grants (or refundabLe tax credits) and tax deprecjation
aLlowances. Thus, the decline in investment grants in the UK and in Iretand
in the first hatf of the 1970s, llas a corotLary of the introduction of extre-
meLy LiberaL tax depreciation aLLowances for equipment and plant, whiLe the
increase in the Nethertands since 1979 rettects a shift of poticy preferences
in the opposite direction towards investment grants. In atL these cases it
was intended, or it can be deduced by comparing changes of investment grants
and tax expendituresr that either the observed increase in grants was not com-
ptetety offset by cuts in preferentiat depreciation aLLowances or that the
reLative decLine of grants bras more than compensated for by better deprec.iation
aLLowances. The underLying trend of investment subsidies may therefore be
understated to some degree by avaitabLe expenditure figures.
Financiat regionaI policy aid, whose structure has not changed very
much on average in the Community but sometimes substantiaLLy in individuat
member countries over the 1970s, reached approximatety a quarter percent of
GDP in 1978. RoughLy haLf of this consisted of investment grants, another
quarter of empLoyment premiums, whiLe the remaining quarter was mainLy composed
of interest rate subsidies and tax neLiefs (expressed in terms of discounted
subsidy vatues). As totaI investment grants in the Community amounted to 1y,
r1s
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of GDP onLy 10 to 20?iof investment grants reported by nationat accounts are
imputable to regionaI poLicy, white more than Or8% of GDP must have been given
in the framework of other investment subsidy programmes Like housing, pubIic
transport, industriaL and agricuLturaI poLicy. tlhite investment grants occupied
the first pLace in re,gionat. policy in most countries with the exception of ltaty
the use of other instnuments varied substantiaLLy between member States.
Emptoyment premiums were used extensively in lta[y, but other countries avoided
the use of this instrument in a regionaLLy selective way. Interest rate subsi-
dies and soft toans rianked high in BeIgium, Denmark and ItaLy. Tax reLiefs
pLayed a substantiaL rote in France and IreLand and to some degree in Betgium.
The practicaL conditi,ons under which investment grants are accorded vary not
onLy between, but ats,c within individuaL countries. Grants may be subject to
profit tax or not, anrC they may or not have to be deducted from the book values
of investment, thus affecting depreciation atLowances, tax payments and the
actuat subsidy value,cf a grant. The most systematic approach towards invest-
ment grants djfferentiated by regions and types of investment, combined with a
speciaI tax on investment to fight regionaL concentration was introduced in
the NetherLands in 19'78. Commun'ity efforts to avoid over-bidding between
countries and regions have ted to the Limitation of the subsidy equivatents of
grants to 25 %, 30"A, 40% or in exceptionaL cases 75 % of initiat investment
costs, according to tlhe gravity of regionaI disadvantage (1)-
Tax depreciation attowances have been used in aLL member countries as an
economic poticy instrument for short and [onger term purposes in the past. In
principLe depreciation aLlowances are based on two generaL rules: CapitaL con-
sumption for tax purposes (a) 
-is norma[[y caLcuLated on the historicaI costs of
eligib[e capitaL goods and (b) it shoutd be spread in an appropriate way over
the Iife-time of capitaI goods. In practice these principtes have not ensured
approximateIy comparabLe provisions. The historicaL cost principte is widety
apptied (in spite of widespread debate about the case for replacement cost
vaLuation in some countries), apart from occasionaI aItowances
which exceed 1OO%under speciaL conditions. The spread of aLLowances over time,
on the other hand varies widety between countries depend'ing on tife-time as-
sumptions, . advance alL Lowances and depreciation formuIae (see Tabl-e 9.6).
(1) See aLso: Eighth Report on Competition PoIicy, Brusse[s, ApriL 1979, pp.109
to 114; figures refer to totaL subsidies including those given perjob created through new investment.
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The United Kingdom and IreLand opted at the beginning of the 1970s
for a system of practicaLLy free deprecjation for pLant and equipment,
excIuding further improvement except the introduction of aLIowances above
1AO % or a change from the historicaL to the reptacement cost principte.
Denmark appL'ies the aggregate book va[ue system aLtowing an annuaI write-
down of up to 3O % for equipment and plant. The Life-time of investment
goods becomes irrelevant for the sBread of aItowances over time under
this system, which favours Long-Lasting pLant and equipemnt. ItaIy aLLows
onLy straight-Line depreciation (same percentage of originaI costs per
year) admitting however substantiaL generaL advance aL[owances of 15L for each
of the first three years. Combined with favorabLe Life-time assumptions, it
altows equipment and ptant to be written off by 50'/" and more within two years.
other Community countries offer a choice between straight Iine and one or more
decLining baLance methods (fixed percentage on residuaL book-vaLue of indivi-
duaL investment goods), generaLLy Less favourabLe than the systems appLied by
the above-mentionned countries.
Assumptions about the Life of investment goods, where relevant, are often
negotiabte, and seem to vary substantiatLy from one country to another at the
LeveL of individuaI goods. Average tife-time caLcutated over 40 types of
equipment goods (unt"reighted) points towards figures varying between member
countries from 7 111 to 9 1/4 years with lta[y and France at the lower and Bene-
lux countries at the upper end. Life-time assumptions for industriaL buitdings
vary from 20 to 50 years between countries. To a significant degree, however,
these discrepancies seem to be compensated for by advance depreciation aLLo-
Hances in countries assuming a tong tife-time.
GeneraLLy tax depreciation aLtowances are [ess used in a seLective way
than interest rate subsidies and investment grants. Nonethetess there exists in
some member countries a preferentiaI treatment of investment in energy saving
and production, R & D, environmentat protection, and regionaL policy. However,
the primari[y gLobal use of depreciation aLtowances does not mean that actuaL
systems have not substantiat structurat effects. It appears that capitat cost
recovery ruLes are often biased in favour of machinery and equipment and against
non-residentiaL buitdings (1). Buildings benefit generatty onty from straight-
Line depreciation aLlowances, white machinery and equipment is mostLy etigibLe
for decLining batance depreciation. In other countries, tike the United
Kingdom, initiat aLLowances for buitdings are tower than those for equipment
whi[e office buiLdings are not eLigibLe at aU. (so also in lreLand and Denmark).
('f) see lMF-survey, ApriL z0r 19g1 p.11g and 0ctober ?7r 19g0 p.33314.
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0n the other hand one country in the Communityr ltaly, appties the same
provisions to equipment and business buiLdings (see tabLe 9.6).
A'ppralsing depreciation at[owances on the basis of their nominai rates
atone may, however, be misteading. How favourable they actuaLLy are in economic
terms depends on marginaL jncome tax rates (for unincorporated business)t co?-
porate tax rates, and other taxes on cap'itaL costs or capitaL income. In fact,
tax depreciation aItowances are the rnore important, the higher tax rates and
vice versa (e.g.il{ith llax exempt incomerdepreciation aLIowances for reLated
investment are'irreLevant) because'it is the LeveL of profit tax rates and
depreciation atIowance provisions which determine together the extent of
temporary tax savings,. How far corporate tax systems vary between member coun-
tries with respect to standand tax rates, treatment of distributed profits,
and doubte taxation i:; i ILustrated by tabLe 9.7 .
Standard corporate income tax rates in member countries vary between
36'A in ltaly and 56 % 1n Germany, urith a special rate of only 10 % on
manufacturing industries' profits in IreIand, and reduced rates for profits
beLow certain ceiLings; in the UK, the Benelux countries, and Iretand. In aLL
countries, with the exception of Germany, standard corporate tax rates tend
to be 'betow the h'igher income tax bracketg. As it is a major pro-
.perty of ,tax systems incLuding corporate and personat income taxes to
charge distributed profits tt"lice, aLI countries with the exception of the
NetherLands and Luxembourg accord income tax credits to sharehotders for cor-
porate taxes paid on distributed profits. Due to such provisions, sometimes
extremety compLexractuat corporate income tax on dividends (and doubLe
taxation) is excLuded in Germany, Greece, and ItaLy and reduced to between
50 and 75 7. of standard corporate rates in other member countries. The com-
bination of standard corporate tax rates Lower than the highest marginaL
income tax bracketsrtogether with a substantiaL doubLe taxation of distri-
buted profitsr'invoLves for atl countries, Germany excLuded, a bias in favour
of seLf-financing out of retained profitsrweakening the roLe of capitaL
markets. However, this does not appLy to unincorporated, generatty small
and medium sized firms onLy surbject to personaL income taxation.
Floreover, the effect of depreciat'ion aLLowance provisions changes
with infLation, nominaL interest rates and financing structures. H'igher nominaL
interest rates together with higher intLation rates tend to reduce discounted
reaI after tax capitaL cost recovery and make investment appear tess profi-
table. The Link between investment financing and infLat'ion, whiLe rather com-
ptex in a framework of chang'ing growth and chang'ing composition of investment,
is iLLustrated by the folLowing facts: Replacing an investment good in the
Community after a ten years Life-time required in 197O on average roughLy
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32 % additionat financiaI resources beyond the recovered nominat capitat
costs. rn 1980, due to higher inflation, this ratio had increased
to 62 %, varying between 40 /" in Germany and z5 to 78 % jn rreland
and the u K. Thus, replaci,ng capital goods acquired in the past now
reguires substantjaLLy higher amounts of nominal. capitaI expendjture and
L'iquidity. As depreciation aLLowances are generaILy the most important source
of gnoss investment expenditure (e.g.60 to 80 % according to baLance sheet
figures for non-financia I business fn Germany over the 1970s) acceLerating
or high infLation tends to put strains on financing structures. F.irms may
thus be pushed to reduce the weight of investment t.tith long recovery periods.-
Apart from other factors Like Longer term demand prospects, the combination
of high infIation and prevaiIing depreciation attowance provisions may wett
have contr.ibuted to the observed weak investment performance espec.iaLty for
construction and capacity extension. This impact of infLation has been miti-
gated to some degree by higher investment grants, interest rate subsidies and
better depreciation a[owances (see tabLes 9.5 and f.il. Howeverrgrants and
interest rate subsidies are generaLLy seLective affect'ing onLy certa.in parts
of totaL investment not chosen according to the impact of inf[ation. As it
appears that setective measures favour primarity firms and branches jn
distress or notoriousty in difficuLtyrthe combined effect of higher.infLation
and seLective support measures tended to sLow down positive adjustment, i.e.
the expansion of profitabte activities. Measures tike changes of depre-
ciation aIlowance provisions and tax rates have been taken in severaI
countries. Among 0ECD countries, the most radicaL measures are
under discussion in the United Statesrinctuding substantiat simpLifications
and incentives through a generatization of the existing investment tax credit
system and acceIerated depreciation aLLowances.'The Latter wi tt be achieved
by di stinguishins a few groups of goods with assumed Life-times of 3r5 or
10 years for equipment and ptantrand 15 years for business buitd.ings. These
changes are tobe introduced progressivety over the next few years to spread
the budgetary cost,
trnvestment incentives,'interest rate subsidies, investment grants
and depreciation aLLowances have a number of properties distinguishing them from
each other with respect to (a) business Liquidlty, cap'itaI costs, and profits,(b) the impact on government expenditure and receipts and (c) generaI economic
and sociaL side effects, alL retevant for poLicy choices.
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Interest rate subsid'ies paid out o/er a number of years primariLy
reduce capitaL costs and trend to increase profits, but they have only
marginaL effects on [iquidity. As they are Linked to credit financing they
are often combined with credit guarantees or speciaI Loan arrangements. The
budgetary impact of interest rate subsidies is spread over a number of years,
deferring subsidy payments for todayrs investment into the future. SeLective
interest rate subsidies are not an efficient means of compensating for the
gLobaL effects of high interest rates, a profjt squeeze or the devaLuation
of depreciation attowances due to infLation. Their effectiveness depends
on the interest rate -ensitivity of fixed investment and therefore main[y
affects projects of high cap'itaL intensity or of a Long Life time. From
a more gene!.aL point o,f view, the reaL economic importance may be attached
to guarantees and toarr arrangements channeLLing capitaL towards firms
which otherwise wouLd not be able to obtain the funds needed (e.9. smatI and
medium sized firms or companies in distress), whiLe interest rate subsidies
themselves are onty a supplement of Limited economic relevance in the context
of totaL cost and financing considerations ActuaL. gross interest cost
according to business baLance sheet statistics varied between 3r5 |.1978>
and 5r3 y. n974) of tc,tal costs from 1970'to 1978 in Germany. - ldhile
interest rate subsidies may t.leLL have an impact on capitaL cost caLcuLations,
their weight in investment decisions compared to other factors Like Liquidity,
profits and demand prospects in an environment of high uncertainty and
inf Lation is unavoidab,ty Limited.
Investment grants act simuttaneousLy on Iiquidity and capitaL costs
in subsiding the purchase price of investment goods. They aLso tend to
increase present or future orofits; the extent to uhich this occurs, depends
to some deEree on technicaL detaits tike asset accounting provisions and
whether grants are sub,ject to profit taxes or not. Compared with interest
rate subsid'ies there is no deferment of subsidy expenditure into the future
for 1he government budlget. There may even be a partiaLLy compensating in-
crease of future tax r'eceipts, if grants have to be subtracted from the
book vatues of subsidized investment goods (apart from reaL income effects).
Tax depreciation aLLowances are in generaL a rather complex instru-
ment. Their benefit is subject to the existence of profits, timiting their
potent'iaL benefits for new firms, and the size of retevant tax rates. A
more favourabLe treatmrent brings forward a[[owances from more distant
future accounting periods into the present, or nearer to it, teading to
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temporary tax savings, and this can be considered as an interest free credit
inituding some risk sharing between firms and the government with positive
effects on business Liquidity, capitat costs and profits" Depreciation
aItowances do not increase government expenditure, but tower receipts.
Because the budgetary eff,:rctis spread over a Long period, the budgetary impact
over time is difficutt to estimate. Business surveys suggest that firms,
and especiatLy smaIt and medium sized ones, prefer this toot because it is
Less subject to discretionary administrative decisions, red-tape and r.eIated
uncertainties and deLays. The dependence of the economic effects of deore-
ciation aItowances on tax rates means that firms producing no profits do
not benefit immediateLy from this incentive, whi[e those producing high
profits may be stimulated most to invest in capacity extension or rationaIi-
zation according to longer term prospects. Better tax depreciation atLowances
as an incentive to stimulate investment or to compensate for infLation induced
disincentives inctude therefore a stimulus for positive structuraL adjust-
ments through higher profitabiLity and internaI Liquidity.
9.3
Deve[opments of crude oiL prices since 1973 and the ensuing adaptation
of other energy prices imposed abruptLy and repeatedl-y a far reaching needfor globaI and structurat adjustments (see last AnnuaL Review, chapter 1
and 7)' Not onty were business and private househotds caLLed upon to change
their behaviour and their pLans: governments aIso were confronted with the
need for poLiticat action to acceLerate private adjustments especiaLty
through incentives for energy saving and fuel. switchfng, Like energy taxation
and investment aids (rnajor incentives for energy saving and fueL switching
investmentr appLied by member countries ) are summarized in Tabte 9.g.
ALL Community countries have for decades been Levying substantiaI
excise duties ( votume taxes ) on major refined ofI products, affecting
primariLy gasoline and dieseL oiL, and to a minor degree tight heating oiL
and residuaL heavy fuel oiL (mainLy used in industriaL heating and power
stations). As excise duties do not respond automaticat ty to price changes
their reat weight in user prices tends to dectine with crude oil. price in-
creases and generat inf tation. lrlany governments up to lg7z l7g were reLuctant
\ 8Lf
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to increase energy excise duties sufficientLy to prevent a decLine of reaI
tax receipts from this source. Generatty high infLation countries adiusted
excise duties more often than tow infLation countries suggesting that requ'ired
LegisLative measures are generaLLy taken onLy when the reaI tax receipt toss
becomes substantiaL. This interpretation is supported by the fact that tax
adjustments uere Less numerous for Low taxed products (heavy fue[, heating
oiL and even dieset oit).
Due to Large clifferences in excise duty LeveLs on gasoLine and dieseL
oiI on the one hand ernd heating and resjdual fueL oiL on the other handn user
prites,r:f low taxed qiL products increased more rapidLy than high taxed ones.
This may have been another reason why Low excise duties have been adjusted
more hesitantLy. As er resuLt of this cornpLex poLicy adjustment process
excise duty charges per Liter of gasoLine remained suhstantiaLLy beLow their
reaL 1973 leveLs in siome countries like Belgium, Germany, and the NetherLands,
whi Le they kept pace w'ith generaL inf Lation or increased even more rap'idLy
in others, especiaLLy Denmark, France and ItaLy. The reaL excise duty
charge on diesel oi L decL'ined 'in aLL member countries tc some degree, except
in Denmark, uhere a neu energy tax tlas introduced in October 1977 whlch is
Levied at a moderate rate aLso on dieset road fueL, but reimbursed to profes-
sionaL users. ItaLy, where nominaL rates have been cut byturo-third, has now
together with Denmark far the towest rates of aLL member countries'
Excise duties on Light heating oiL remain rather Low, in spite of
increasing LeveLs in nominaL and reaL terms, generat[y significant[y higher
than in 1973. Betgiurn and the NetherLands substituted higher VAT rates for
increases in excise duties on fueL oiLs. BeLgium abandoned in 0ctober 1980
the excise duty 6n furaL oiLs and appLies since the standard VAT rate on these
products instead of tlne reduced VAT rate. The tax burden is thereby shifted
to private consumption aLone. IreLand introduced taxation of heating fueL oi Ls
in 1976 by reducing tlhe excise rebate on heavy oits other than road fuels.
Heavy fueL oiL traditionaL[y has been charged only with marg'inaL or no
excise duties at aLL,especiaLLy in Denmark, F?ance, IreLand and ItaLy. Other
countries raised Low rates of 2 112 to 5 ECU per ton 'rn 1973. 0nLy two
countries, the UK and lreLand, adjusted their taxes on heavy fuel oiL sub-
stantiaLLy since then. Denmark introduced a new reLativety high excise
onflx>
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duty on heavy fuet oi t in '1978o at lor.lin$, houeveR" f "!rms to deduct it Like
VAT' The gene!'aL impression in the fjeLrt r.;'f enerEy 
€xe.ise <Jqties is one ofpartial' adjustment to inf Letir:n acccrcj'i;'rg to hue-igetar"y needs, considerations
of industral competitivity and energy n*!_it:;r rec;u.irem*nts" The sjtuation
in stlmmer 1981 as it emergerl f rr:m these pot ic'ies "is giuen in TaLrle 9.9"
tihi {.e for the business ssctsr ener,Ey ercise Cuties are of primary
interest beeause of their cost eiferts. prir,,ate househoLdsr behaviour
towards energy saving is infLuenced by fjnai- user pr'ices incLuding VAI.
In fact, private househotds had to pray nci onty higher excise duties but
also h'igher VAT due to higher oiL pricesn Cuties and VAT rates.
Totat taxation of petroLeuni prldtrrt ccnsurnpticn (excise duties and
VAT) in rrominal terms have increased substantiLl.y since 1973 (see TabLe 9.10).
In generaL the tax take per Litre on lo,"r taxe<J heat'ing oi I increased relati-
veLy more than that on gasoline cr d'iesel. o"iL-o mainLy, 5*..use of the Link
between VAT' and bef ore-tax {real} product pri ces" In reat terms (see 'tabl.e
9.11) the total tax take per Litre Eenerai.Ly (r+ith the exception for dieseI
oi l- in ltaLy and gasoLine in the Nethentairrjs) has reached or exceeded its
1973 LeveL, given the exc'ise duty and V;iT rate adji;stnrents whi ch occured
over the Last 18 months in a nurnben of countries" Flo',*ever, not onl"y oi t
product r"eLated but genenaL VAT rf;tesy tcc, have inerc"ased in a[|. countries,
except Franee, since 1?73" A constarrt q:r only snmewhat h'igher totaL reaI
tax take means that petroLeum pror{ucts have not supperted a significant
additionaL totaL tax charge ro stirnuLate energy saving and fueL switching
in households, The major inceni'ive has originated in most cases from higher
crude oiI prices atone"
9.4 eo.'!mu!i i tJ llo I i ci-e,-q _torygrlds _1g.F"lf-S!-i ":*-
Cornmunity poL'icies on subsidies and investment incentives are governed
by principles for aids by states set- out-in the Treaty of Rome (articLes 92
to 94). The general apprgach to the probi.em set out in Art " 92 U ) i s that
any a.id granteiJ by a Member State or throulglr State resources in any forni
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favcuIinE
certajn undertakings or the production of certairt goods in so far as'it affects
trade between Member Stetes' is incompat-ibLe with the common market'
\86 9.15
ALthough these criteria are quite wide, in practise Large bLocks of
a.ids and incentives retmain the sote responsibiLity of member countries'
subsidies which do not affect intra-community trade Like those for housing,
LocaL transport of passengers etc.' are not the subject of Community compe-
tition poticy. flloneot,rer, as onty aids favouring certain undertakings,
products or industries faLL under Art.92(1), measures apptjed to aLt enter-
prises within the country Like generaL tax depreciation aLtowance provisions,
however different thely rnay be between countries, are also not a part of
Community competition poLicy. Neverthetess such aids may weLI warrant econo-
mic anaLysis of underLying financiaL incentives or disincentives and poLicy
recommendations at thre Community LeveL in so far as generaL economic poticy
issues Like emptoymen't and budgetary policies are invotved.
Aids given for speciaL purposes in the framework of regionat and sec-
torat poLicy as hrell as projects of speciaI Community interest may be consi-
dered by the Commission to be compatibLe with the aims of the common market
and benefit from one 6f the derogations set out in Art' 92$> a), b) and c)'
Measures referring tO Such speciaL purposes have to be communicated to the
Commission in advance and are examined by it before appLication at the
nationaL tevet and described in the annuaL reports on Competition PoLicy'
Aids to continued openation are generaLLy not admitted by the commissjon'
whi te aids for new in'rrestment to faci Litate or promote growth, productivity'
emptoyment and structruraL adjustments may be considered to be compatibLe with
the common market.
overrecentyearsCommissionserviceshaveannuaLLyexaminedand
taken a position on more than a hundred cases of aLL types of State aid envi-
Saged or introduced by member countries. In three quarters of these cases no
objections have been raised. The remaining quarter of cases has been subject
to speciat procedures teading to additionat enquiries, negotiations, and modi-
fications or withdrawaL. 0nLy in a few cases have formaL negative decisions
been taken and Published (1).
(1) see : Tenth Report on competition Poticy, BrusseLs 1981, p' 112
9.16
6N
o.
-Io\o
O.
F
(n
+,
c
o()()
og
o
P
o
z.
!c(!
6N
o\
IoN
o\
r
at,
.t-,
cf,
o
C'
c,
o
.},
c
o
Ect
o
o
o)
oL
oc
at)(9
P
o
+ra
oL
:l
IIJ
olol
5lol@l
Pc
@
E
P
v,(l,
c
ol
c
!
:,
(J
c
o
L(u
\F
oC.(5o
LC
PO
JP
ol
PP
Q.+,oUloc
tt
CtJotu
.P >\c-o
oLEI
L.Ff(o(J O.
ts-l
g\OrmO. I\\ON
.\\\\\\\\\rq r\J tvt Mt ffl Mr fft' 14- m
qryNro\O\r\Orrf)
t l 1.4 t4 .f -f -f -f tf) m- r,o
I .f rn CU O. rn O\ rn \O l..l
.\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \rrr(\lnJtqNtftftmra.S
\t\oN\oo\N6\o.f
-^\-\t\\\\\\.,rllf|rf)mMtrn1^'\o'\o
O\N-€Nr\OOr
-l \. \ \ \ \ \ \ \ ..(rJNmnrrv-flet-f-f
\lln\O.ftO\O\C\JiO€
_\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ INN\O\ON€OO-r-..t-
rn.f.ff\NrNmFr
^l ,\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \rv rv (\l nJ m -+ ft tr) rO- Irr|-
9rnNo\o\o0(v^r.frn
-! \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \N nJ N (\' NJ nJ trt Mt tft to
\ooN6$€oo.f
-\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ r.tfl Jfl m lq lf ]rt .f .f .$
fi\OOi.t()rqO\(\tfr\\\\\\\\ttfl lcl .f .f .f .'f .f rn rn
9sNrqtfln\oN@o\I\FFT\NN'\NF'\O\O.O"O\O.at6.biti>
r r r r r r r
6
(J
lJl
\tf
Jz
J
e,
H
tu6
(L
a(9
rF
o
o
cT,
o
.P
c
OJ
C)
L
0)
o'
o
a
o
L
o
P(J
(l.,
o
o
oq,
c
af
-o
0)
-cP
o
P
th
Pc
o
E
o
o.
t-
olF
oc
o
t-
P
Pc
o
EcL
o
o
o)
og
o
rC
.(UO\ O,
orJ|u!PooFF
417
i:t9 'i-H o5.
o qro!
1l g-b
.5€r;
: h#*s* oco
a.rfU
.:;iHi 3..sa;! s
!
F il-E*"I 3 .,
at$F
.: 
-h 3Lcq
; tgE
P oL
o+-c9
#O'FL
>. OrP @
3 peE
il 9;booo o.- f
i oro 9CEE
E!iE
o t)t C
4J c (!'-C.FP.
E ooo
co(!.^
L EOW'
argg
- ^!*t E'5 0
.F.F O 
-5.:5b
tE'F
eESt
: *Ei
,bFh
Pc(,c
3 3'- p'3'r5;oofR
0
O)(J
L(u
vl
c
tt
o
EE
oo
1J
c
o
P(o
P
t^
oL
lrJ
o
aL
-o
an
ot\
o.
JO)
E.: f;i
.93dE
!g*.nt{- cJ 
.
.: .:5 6
o*Pto
H i;:+>o:
o.F L tv
:HTEfise': sr
.! g€'.;
:Eg Sl{f F gt
an t glJ'F
\O o'
O.r
r(\l
\O@
r(\
r f\-
to tfl
\OF
rr\l
@rl
utF- -f
Or
Mt \o
fu {'
a
o
#
P
Pg)
c
H
P
E
E
U
-o
l
Ix
UJ
mto
(\t
€.+
(\t oO
tqt.r
Mr o\|\NcJ\ o\
\t8
ootrr\O\O(}i.ra^O\O\O\ \ \ \ r 'l \ \ \ \
r'rf\rr
trttr;lrlrq-ftnrr99
c) ci 
-' 
.,t ot on .,t .,t .,t o*
cOoOO'r^lt--f'f,rtl9
--r-i\\\\\\\\
.j-.r!-1J{\J(\fN(vr!lv
(\{)(|c.)\O\OcOnr!f\n
-t ;i -1 ^t *t ,.'r* 
** 
^t 
t.,t *'
OOi.!Fu1 O{O.C\rl'O\q
-\\\\\\\\\\
re-f\jC!(\Jfv
.+trtf-t'-O'tf''lflh
-s r 'r \ \ \ \ \' \
crrnic!61rm.*\J.rn
r^OrrlO. ls\ONq\t
-i \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ -\
c\l oJ r cv c\l f\J N r'l
or\-rln\oo@eon\ \ \ \ \ \ \ | \ -\
.J:.;.-.s\tr^F-.oo\c)o
OC)Ocrr\OF*r'-hN.
-\ -i \ \ \ 1 \ \ \ .tmni(voJNtrlrvf\lNN
oo nJ ra ofl \o Ln 0o o o\ lt!ri\\\\\q\\OeirC!f\l Nw)f\l(\
.tlv)r\orrtrrrn\oooo9
-r'\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
reFr-rer
6\Oeo\C)tnl--O\Or^t\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ --\C.f ni f! 14 nr! m (\l t l 1.) lt!
OtsJ.tt'-ctltnr|oq\\\\\\\\\r
nf rri fn F., iO t ) -S \f, .* -g
FE il * X $ * [ fr *
c
P('
x
P
c
E
E
u
=u
=
+
u
o
F
P
J
z.
!46
J
d)
4
o(9
rl-
o
o
o
c
C)
u
L
o
o
o
L
P
o
tU
o
o
o
oc
tJl
3
0,
=,p
o
P
o
L
0,(F
o
c
o(\tLIP
o\
P
o, o)Jt
3LotFL'
9.18
!
n
a9
oc
ru
L
Pr:oL c
.- o I >f o!-coLo (',
#L(gOJ
c o o> o
o: o. g .tu(o >o F!> (!d!
o L_c E 
= ^\EOOrpsLo):Ju)(I, \O C, O 0.,-O l-tsPL.FU
nc(Ir Lo p
..Fo(oPJ6 C-O r0J 0r o l.r!JS(!OP\
or3 # o (U
_$EOU'
CVJ P O L E U
.'F o L qJ O I6 O O (!).s u
>rF-oP 0
\(u!F"'F O >, IE(g0'JL
.-]oJ 5O\! >'O C f, oJJ o (cT- ILP a
utoqottaqr 3 O3-o >rlgJ(o
o o xo 3 (!O-c-oJ.cJ c
+Jf JCO(! O3()6Cq- O f p P
.F O-c O, O O pU) L-c c <
"OP O 
_q, o U}ts (I) 6 eU) (I) L (t)P.F CJL(l)LO O
+-o>c(tr O (r)-c'r 3 \(4sc.pLo c\j
o {J (U o-ro
.cLct9#op(!()J cP O.P (! OEO6,o! o u, u, L rrL g O L Llc
+- o-c o (u q#pr+- c, q)
u), o o=LO>'OC# 
-O
opJ(/)(! .orF O: L \ Ft{-(DOs.PL
.F(nLc: O 
_\
'c 0i oJ > 5,Trcs(oo l>OJO0rPq, Ir o(99.F L e
-o.c F o.o \O O .r (oE e
'p g) .E, o et>g) O o o/rF . \
.rt e-c O (n @C OP 0, t:#qrP O.r !
.c O+ L L J
cP.F o (!# o(/} 
_cc uo c{J o:t a
-oPo-c o <O o c')4J IO A C'-.- P3 s'F o) o L C@ 3.F 0, gU)\F O JO E
o t,-c c, o-g c
.rCP>EdrL
# to 'F'F E OoLCrp
.-pPo@c.s
# (oJ-C 0J e(!J C Cr{J (,P (D.F L 3(4+,E OP (!O
'-,F A O U L OF O-J_C J_O q' o
o o crF (! c'F
ooxcr>O O otr (9 Lg)(,P 
.-OJ C)
o o : (! \oL -o 3 (, \.F PO:OorC# $J
>JJ'r o c +r ('O oJ5'F 6 o g
aC (!'-PP(jO666O POE-O f #C +, O::'r 3 q (oFHc(4x(,, c
c,
aq! !"
#:oozvt
oN
tz
@
L
c,
F
(o
L
P
(E
loI
ot4
&.
p
(!
(o
c
o
P
o
a
q--
4J
at
c,
0
<t
\o
f.-)
tI
N
rt
a
oo
r\
tr
!r
c\,
a
t$
14
.it
.ir
.if
.n-
o\o
(v
\o
o
r/t
o\
r
u\
tn
ri
\t
o\
c\!
r|{
N
o\
oo
tl
\o
r.l
l.l
0J
c
x
(q
F
r|
o\
.$
rv'l
\oo
-i-
oo
r.)
.$
tr-)
l.ln
\?
€
c\'!
\o
rv
Nl.)
\o
\o
.f
t-
l-t
oo
ro
.if
.fo\'
.{.
n
v1
o.@
f.l
F-
*c.
'fl+i\l
+
(U
P
F
.$
r81
|/\r\OoONFClrM)
.fO\eF)-f\tNrO-\\\\\\\\\reocto(30ocf,
OE\trt-rfoO\tm
.t \) O c\l O r O tO t,llltt\ri\q(fFOTOFCIO
-$0OOrt/]6@@..$l"-c!Orn-f(:N{'O\\\\\\\\\ONIC).:C)OFOe
14ro\o.c\jNr\ot4\Or\lOrlCfC\rrN6llttt\\\aC)mc}Tc)FOOO
o\ .$ cl r\r r.t o. co .f c|,OtOOoO.+nAO.rnO\\\\\\\\\O.fOOCIC)O(vCl
frl t- o F- tt \t f\J oo 
"jfoLria\o^t\f,NfN\\\c\\\\\
oN(fC)ooosC)
Yl\Or-ClorrtF"srt4col/\aJo.\o\\\\\\\\
eO.\Or-fc\OCf,
l.(vr!'rf'-O.'0oO(vF oo s F tl s $ .f\\\\\\\\
e\flftrFFCfC3
o\ f\t 14 e5 u1 u1 \o t!'l 17)
.J. ]fl O Cf, c\! t- t"- n F-\\\\\\t\\C)-f,OOC)Ocl,Cf
tOOOeTVO.O\.teO
-tf-O.$0Or\ooc|rn\\\\\\\\\Olelc)nIrOOf!O
tn (! U1 \tl/t@trrnrr\\\\ONCf,O
tOTOOO\ON1t\-toavtn \o c3 \o r lr\ 00 o {\t\t\\\a\\\O^rOC)O€f,OFr
(\, fQ c| a{t O\ \t \O s1 \Orvf\,o\of\rtiu\oa{\\\\\\\a\Of!OC3OC)Orr
l/l tfl *$ .O t - O. {\J F O.nlr|r@\O.?O'\tq\\\\\\\\
or.t(frc)rooo
l..f oO f! @ 
- 
F* f.! s\ -fivl(vOaflealO€.$\\\\\\\\\C)toOrOFOCf
C
_\_ o
Oo iJ
'FL (!
+ro o{olbLO g
a +t o :lU A L €, EO .F? 15 Ec; o o
I'- E '-r Cr +,OT'C-LJ\
at'ts o o 5 c \ p
o'FPc\l-o.r J # ) o L ot') .Fr (o (U J .- # O
c 
€ 
= 
Lr o P (J q v, v)O Crll.r (0 f C L(' c+ c g) | z. lt c (F (l,
:t OO {U{r CD C L .c
o o (5L
-llJt.O F f\, fV t\J i4 
"taaaa
F iV (\l c\l C\,1 C{ (\l f! }.1
€f*
o.
nf.-
o\
@
t\-
o.
l.l|\
o.
€
r.-
o.
to
r*
o'
o
€
o.
wlN
or
\o
N
o'
tn
F-
o\
6t-
o.
M}i\
o.
F-
F-
o.
NN
o\
t4ts
c'\
}Z
tn
('
L
0.,
oz
o
H
c
o
o
L
H
q)
I
c
o
Lu
o
E
L
o(.9
x
L(5
e
o6
E
g)
a,
.D
.L6
t9
q-
o
o
P
c
o
I
L
o(r
o
.o
0,
o
L
o-
x
-o
an
il,
!
vt
-of
o
+
o
o
P
o
o
rrE
ou
r.l
o
o,
-o|E
F
flo
9 .19
e
o,JP
otn
oo6
Jo+,
C.F
oL
.-)
+J rJ(oo
co
3(J
UJ
I
E
oo
P(Jaooo
C
.9.
th
O) .rCP
NC-
.-O
!
.-3
oq,3P
=ooL
o!|J.)c,
.JP
L.eo o
PP
oC
o
L{J 'F
oCD.
o!J P '\ q)O.r U) (/)
,JPA
C.F a Q)or+- o (/)o(JU,!:o (oCr!
.e! C (lJ
> c f -oC, J'F
-* rE .:cDcoc :i
'r Q'r C YC.r U) (Oiroco':oco /rF(l,oU' icLo. P x(Uo)- r o
-g(/)(!crXor-c)ZOrOo'=C.e o ::
E'E.: 3 .;
-ox 
=!\Ftt oJ 
=
LOO 
.YEL
>,e >\ 0rJs
\OC+Jojl(vooo o olLl
fl
-f\ls Olvv\,i @l
'DOor o!ttU(u
+r+J
.cc4) A)oot- !-oo
o. o-
tD'
+
aS
,p
\,
i
I
I
I
II
'P
t-
af
,\oo
a oY-
a +J' gro3:-C!(5 (oP
Ap.e(h
+, .ot/) t.> 90
c f o (o oo4J ao oL o .p o.(,Lc a av o .h t I oJO C O oJ (U O .rcr.r O'F (U o. 
= 
P
+) .rEC-rF PO'aL () +t .Pr.r.e O L Ar >OJ C (o (,T O OJ'-
+-'5 o) +Joco tF ooPO E (n :t'F c':' r+- (J6L P L A grv o o a (u
oo,c: U) J.!a L r- L O-C U' r-
3O'F >-O O 3iZ-C > -O'r (J-c U'
.ef-.c: C (!+, O O+r O'F !- XP (o(,)Jfl .Frv, o.ooo (/t3{JoO_O+l -Oj:.|-. . . . . . !l- . .(/)F CFFN lf) -f, rr \O N I p s.nt
.t
t-
P
of!c
olc
C
E
o
t)
o
P
a
o
:o
as
:t
a
!c(o
.lc
(o
{r
.OO\ .-
IJacro
-oc(o
Fl!
(Lo-
a69('
+- {-oo
oo
U)(,){D(o
ta(J<
C, Fl.tNrnorrtF ltt tn091\\\\\\\-\\\6 6-Nr.tN.t\tm e V\NL r4a6Nr .c^r{t I Qqbivi-@oNorort
lll
l\| ln .ltI\t O\lr|t\JN 14 @ 't'Sl\\\\\l\lN iOCrO'\O .g 9'r \'@bo | -trr;tnIo o\ .Cnl
NrF
.+ Ct rn
\\lo ctt\14 .tfo.
.tn
tl
@\O\\O\Or€
rOe
a(\I
ra'
o
.$ f.l\t\OOrl\o
.f\
tlo
a|\l
lA O\.f \O F\\\\\
eltl-O'f\Oe tnFN ioF \c,
't @ (\l\\\
e€Flttllrn
.{|
v
€.f.C(\tO\(\r\\\\\\t\rn t4F.l€F I
wt\lnl.ltltl €\o
o\(\J
t4
C'\
a
(\l
6
O.|\'
Otn
.Se\\oo
e@
s. Gf\,\oct
c)NQ rfl
oo
6.$o rt)\\
eO
rl\
qt
O.
It\
nl\
m
€rl
.s\
o\
€
t
.i
o\
rf|a
o\
o
c,
I
L
J
o6
(!g
o
+)(o
c
.tt
c
o
.f
c,
-o(o
P
@
N6
IoN
o\
o
o
Po
P
o
Po
3
c|u
o
Pc
a
o
o0
o
Pc
o
EcL(l,
o
O)
o
L
o
oI
PI
ol
6l
olLlJIul
ol
ol
LIfl
ol
tJ, I
9.20
r\ro€@otrlf\lo(\l
\ \ I i \ \ I \ I ..
.f.ftnlo.$.srn.+1
.ft!Fr..rOO\O@\O\ \ '\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \O@N\O\O!\O\O\Oln
.frn\Oo\\O.+N(\I.frrl\\\\\\\\\\(\, (\ (\J t\' nJ rO r4 tA rq ttr
nl a! .f r F \o N r t)\\\\t\\\\..
.J tv.l rt n tft .f .s -f tl
rno.otN\ooor.tf\l\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ ..\O ro .f l.) rO \t *f \O 0O
.$.t.if\O@t4N(\tON\\\\\\\\\\FmOt\N6OO0O0Ol-
mO.O\O\O\.$()-O.on\\\\\\\\\\(\lrFrN.+(\lrF
o\tftNo^J^Jor(\,,aft\\\\\\\\'\\(\rfOh.+rVlNIO\O\O
\O!n\O\O\Ou"l.OrcV\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ ..OOOOOeT
\OO\(\JtO€t'€rrfi\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ ..Frf\Jr\J(\f\rNlotr'
() (\r r.t .f rr \O t\ 0O O.l-FNNNNt_t-Nt-O' o\
F
rlt
6O\O.o\O\O\FC)O
_\\\\\l\\\OOOOOOeT
\O\OrON\ONNNNN\\\\\\\\\\OOOOOOOOOF
OrC)0oO\frt(\rrO.lt\\lr\\\,.FFOOTTO
.$0o0Or\-0oO.()Nu1
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ rr
FOOOOOFFF
ro.rio\ooFln|.|\\\\\\\\\\
nImNJF(\Ja\rNr\r(\(\l
1r.ittr^\Oo.r|.l.l...'\\\\\\\\\\ooc)ooooooo
NOC)OFF.if.fMr.f\\\\\\\\\\
OOFTFFF
FFrFFt{).ftOlfl
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ rrooooooooo
-t .$ r/1 tn \O \O \O F- t-\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ rrooooooc>oo
Oe(\.lm.f|/rr\Ot\€O.t-NNNNt\1\t\Nt-O. Ct\
o\
..,
tr.l
c
a
o
I
o
L
o
P
'I
o
U'
P
co
6
0,g
L
C)s
P
o
op
o
,H
c
o
Lg,
Pc
Q'
E
Po
4)
c
P
c
0,E
L
o
ro
.t)
o\
oOLr0,3C
oc,F(9
11)
r:bta 9.6 CorFotata Bfoflt tsreso ilre dPor€ci.1 it. ?l eeeiraes/.nt
Progartles ol
cotponate" tat
€qu-ipfeit rsftc pa€ftt
T4< dei:6rcre!:i.f,;J iil*d.rLe 5fFlc:.
fr::ir:;itai. ti:;i I *!ngs
lril/estn* Fl
gadirt::i
Itlain tinar:i;L
re$i,lra!. psl .cy
inst ruFents
D(
- strndard r.te:4E I i
-progresslve r.t.s of 33 to{8ltor protlts up to tt
.io Bf
-doubt. t.ratlon of dlvl-
dends rcduced to hatf tho
3tandfd rsta througlt tar
credit
- ttendard r8t8 40 I
-no r€duced fates tot saall
lnd medium sirad conpsni€3(snE)
-doublo taxation of dlvi-
dends reduced to 314 ot
stendard natr through tar
credi t
-tar ftae investrent fQsalvag
of up to ?5 lof annual tax-
tbte profits equivat€nt totn advance attovance tor
lnvestncnt even belora etaP
tuatty purchascd
-stsrrdard rate:56I
distributed profits: 56 I
-no r€duced fates fot SiE
- no doqbte taration of divi:
dands,futty retundabte t3r
crcdit (neg systetr introdu-
bed in 1977)
- 3trndsrd rate 50 X
-no rcduced rat"s tor sflE
-doubta t8x.tion of dividends
mduced to hal,f the standard
r.te through tar crecit
-3t.ndard ratc 3 45 I
- rcduced rate of 10 I tor
l|nuf acturing, reptacing
to?trer ststen of tax Qreap-
tlons fof erport protits
- rcduced fates of 35 to 45 Ufor prolits u9 to 55"000
puntS
-doubl.e t!ration of dividends
reduced to tess than hatf
the standard rate thrEughtar credit
- standard rates !
'state: ?5 I
+ Locat : 15 I
= lffective-rate: 36/?5 :
-no reduced .ates tor SfiE
-no doub(e taxation o{
crvidends
-st€ndard rate:402
-progressive rates fron
?0 to 40tfor pf,otits upto 1r3 rio t-fR
-fu(t doubte tax.tion of
dividends
- stsndard fste : 48 X
- reduc€d ratc : 45 f fofprofits up to ,10.000Hf1"
-lutl dcubte trxation ot
distributed Drofits
UK - strndard r.t.: 5? I
- r.duced rates of 40 to 5AXto. profits up to200.tl00F
-doub(e tarstior, reducad
to 60Zot standard.rle
due to tar credit
-tltra{dht*li'ne 0r dqtl.in :r!{r
batancs {!!ui-tltiier.. : 2.,
- 198?: edriii ic,rrt 15 I oi.l:-
c$nc+ gtr {.,Lrailrcfltn{ rrr\.*lat-
r.s. (* cdl;iiaF;f-t; s}
- iltgregated !l!.rh vatue .! ii, -
Yd'frct of qp (a 30 l
- 1f91 to l9Bl ddiilit.f,at i5i^
trai al[.'tsarrar ni 5i r,..
Varient tC, A A i6afStft+.rl
subsidy
- Stratcht-t !'je 9.
- dpcrinilg i"rL.r,.;r, i.Lr j- p. .
er5 ,ith #i';i ifi!:i? ratet e i
zrt
- Sti aiqht i"ifl(- 0.
- de,:l inr.g loilnr+:,n ,'.' i-;i 
.1,'i to ?-,i olar;ftuF rlti!
?0 to 5ol
- 
pri:ierentrel sJi.ti;-.!1Frs ti
? to 3 r"cr t!er?y:,,!vii::j
i nrieglnfrr!:
- ltlli ta 'El: lSI a'id'i,i iar'il
first ?e!r al i,:!.iiife .:qu'ld-{elt lu a ilSs{hs;/-iy
-f1r.a' deprrcia:;ia ai,l. :'d .-
up to ISS I in {i}^ tirst
7€x'r sine* 1g;>iii
- 0n(y stra{ght-liire;
hcrever a.rlvanre ai i.atgd!ii('
at 3 E i5X 1n a'i4'iir,.
to nE.rhi6l ret€s
- str;iqhr-i i're *r
- der linirr.! l;rl on{-ii fiJi "i
lIie.: Z
- st f n i gilt-t iri:€ c.
- deel. irling irar4...: .
nutl ipt:+rs t,,: \, i',.'
sarr n,Jn reter: a,l!,: :)
- lunilea cf Preial',:1.-.'"
ibet ighsC iri i';r: :ii:{i
rcl:l ariii 
't ri,*tli:r rjfn,,tgt h*tr
- tirrt ye*r 1';a i r'.i";..i)"
a(tiJHsrr€j e iirr. i'l:::
D.i1 :r iri: )i Jht'-l iile:
5 a r.;"
- 6ttu.ir-jiti -': i:le i.ate:
? : -.:--,rl!! r€pcatedit
ri'.trr,,".! r.ivarrce a j, i.o-
la:,< +g
l5r1:?,{ d 1
+!i i.. ii
'-t,! ei.i,od,:tr\ce: for af{ice
3i;!rf in,i I'oJSittQ
- a,)'ri:f icii s{f;ri0i,t-r.ilre 1?79 : 1,1 Xtf 60P
syr ll.:i
I io I' ii.a. ar
1; * J,5 t,
l* r .'l il
1i;, -i !l
.ir I ; r.;i?-i iiae fat{:
l: 1 ;',1.
tyig : S,6 Xof Gat,
19?8: $"3xsf 6DP -ir,vestsent graits
-ro!:!1 !iglIg.!l elt -sqft t,:ans,fte+btf corln!'l€s 
-aid for rrrrrchase clindustriaI land dnd
bui ld-ini
- tebour tiaiiliid aids
i978:0,7loi GoP - inlestDent gfaFts
- !ntefesi rate $ub::i-
di es
* tax ret iefs
- c.sdit garantees
- invest0efrt !:rants
-speciaL trdvant€ alt0-
Yanres tcf easiernboarde' regions
- investnerrt q.ants
'tdr 
"e'.ief s
- sof t i.oans
-aid fa. purcnir:;a rf
indust.iaI ian4 aric
bui LJirtqs
t?;'$ : l,? xef 00P -inveBtnent grants
- tax rel r e ts
- 
(abc,:r lrt:iing a'ids
- enploj/ilent reili{ss
1c?g: i,5;of r'DP - efro, lYnent Llreillun"
- inie.c.;i iate sJbs idies
- irrve:tiftrr,t grdnt!
- tar 9i,r€fs {€rethgtiorl{roo lci,rl ccrpt)iat!:
tar icr nec act ivities
dur-iog fr rst 10 yedf3)
_ inve!it(lt'rt grants
Nt
".'i:!Frl: r:ti irqr'.-li*t
r:.rr: J 1c &:{r.6.
_ ::1.F. 1J3r: L? al {O!At}t:{:S
;is Jr: i:il! iP','r dr :
i : lJ ?.
-... :r'sjiI:-l !r,{ .: if,-n"
' -,,;,i'*;1. it I i iph..-i. jne
rr'';a i { .:,
'' i rr'r'l y{.3f adveire
aiir5,6flie: rLi;
*irrlc ilili inc.cesrd
i:i i5 X
- :,r' ::l I,o!'dace:i Jti tf;"
1i!^e 3.iJ(te ail:1 littnrS:*d
i*?A i l,9tof 60r
19it t l,? goi g0P(r*oiCiy fisi0g.iue
to sJgsi itJtiorl ofgfanis {+r tdx ftea-
xui€: einae 19?8]
1t,?9:lxot$DP
- inve9tmetrt grantS anli
inucstnent tax €n
invcstnent in centrai.
areas
- tax ietiels
-.erd for prurchase oi in-Custria[ (and and
bui Idi ngs
- inveiioent grefits
* interest rnte subsidies
- enp(oysent g.eniu8s
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T.bl.e 9.8
isin financiat incentives for in,uestnent in energy saving.and Juet sritching
- situation t{ay 1981
H0usllt{G BUSII{ESS
DK
IRL
NL
Linited aids avatlabte fron some.egionaI adninis-
tratiorrs.for thernat insutation(Iattonie) or for
doubl,e giazing in nev buitdings (Ftanders)
30 t grant for rcnovatlon in rented dwrttings
max. 890 ECUr 20Ifor orner occuPied
25Igrant (ma:t.4?85 EcU) or tax retiefs for
renovation in private dYel.tirrgs
Grants up to 72 ECU per toe savedl t.oans at redu-
ced interest rates; 30Zgrants in public housing
33 I grant (naxinun 72. ECU for renovation in
orivate dvetlihgfs
25 I grant (nax. 3750 ECU) for renovation in pri:
vate duettings
Average 30 U grant (nax. 1444 EcU) for renovation
in private drettings
661grant (man. 100 ECU) for basic insutation i
90lgfant (max. 150 EcU) for pensionefs
-Free depreciation; Additionat inte.est subsidy ofI I point over 5 years vhithin frarneuork of a iore
generaI incentive scheme
-setective grants up to 401 (average 281) for ener
gy saving in industry (processes + space heating);
projects uith a payback of tess than 2 yea?s
exc tuded
-soft toans (Er?5 X) for energy retated investnentin industry, especiatty smatI and nediuil-sized
enterpri ses
-2 tbonification for loans retated to coat conversion;
25 IcapitaL grant for additionat cost of aoat-using
equipment up to a maximum of 42 EcU per toel speciat
depreciation a[ [oxance
-Up to 35 Ngrants for approved capital expenditure to
reduce energy consumption in industry; toans fron
the EIB rith nationat exchange rate guarantees
-Loans from the Etg tith nationat erchange rate
guarantees
-10 to 15 X grants in addition to standard invest-
ment premium (up to 25lfor renevabtes)
-25 U capita! grant for the cost of coa[ using boitersr
up to a (nornat) rnarinun of 930 EcU
Note: lhe tabLe given above summarizes the maior investment incentive schemes for energy saving and fuet seitching in
- 
hous.ing and business, apptied by member countries. lhe L'isting does not incLude m€asures to promote district
heating in densel,y poputated urban areas.at a.taiger scaie (Dinnark, Gerrnany, France and the Nethertands) rhich
routd require suttt"nii"t private and pubLic inveitment. floreover, energy saving and fueI seitching cannot be
separated in manY cases.
The tabte iil.ustrates ihat investment grants timited by ceil,ings are the most Hidel'y used instrunent' ln addition
or atternativeLy direct and indirect interest rate subsidies (Bel9ium, Gernany, France, Iretand, Itaty) and
advance tax depreciation atlouances (BeLgium, france) are aHarded. Estinates of budgetary charges from grants
and direct .interest rate subsidies undertine the ride differences rhich exist betveen nember countries rith
respect to impLied budgetary expenditures varying betueen near to nothing and o'4 z of generaI government expen-
diture. Actuat o"og"i"ii-ct'1.g.. r"y u" somewirat-higher due to advance depreciation attocances atrd energv retated
R & D expenditures ofte; difficutt to identify and attocate to energy saving investment.
Source : Commission services
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